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ABSTRACT
A RHETORICAL FRAME ANALYSIS OF PALESTINIAN-LED BOYCOTT, DIVESTMENT,
SANCTIONS (BDS) MOVEMENT DISCOURSE
Jennifer Megan Hitchcock
Old Dominion University, 2020
Director: Dr. Kevin DePew

This rhetorical frame analysis uses a combination of rhetorical theory and frame analysis
to examine the rhetorical framing strategies of the Palestinian-led boycott, divestment, and
sanctions (BDS) movement. This project investigates how both official and vernacular BDS
activist-rhetors frame the movement and their goals, how they frame their responses to evolving
rhetorical situations and challenges, how they tailor these frames for different audiences, and
how resonant these frames are likely to be for targeted audiences. The results of this study
suggest that BDS activist-rhetors typically frame the BDS movement as a nonviolent movement
to achieve Palestinian rights and hold Israel accountable for an ongoing system of oppression,
discrimination, and settler colonialism against Palestinians. This framing relies on the values of
justice, freedom, equality, joint struggle, and individual and collective agency—values that
strongly overlap with social and racial justice activist discourses that focus on intersectionality
and justice for marginalized and oppressed peoples. Thus, these framing strategies likely
resonate most strongly with audiences comprised of networks of social and racial justice
activists, especially black American activists and other activists of color in the US, and to a
significant degree with younger liberal and leftist Americans, including many young Jewish
American racial justice activists. In response to the shifting rhetorical situations and challenges
they face, including sensitivity to antisemitism, BDS activists regularly denounce antisemitism,
emphasize Jewish support for the BDS movement, and draw comparisons to other familiar

struggles for justice and liberation. BDS activists emphasize certain frames for particular
audiences while maintaining a strong consistency in overall framing strategies between
Palestinian official BDS discourse and the more vernacular student-generated discourse of US
college activists. To address common critiques of the movement and expand support for BDS,
BDS activist-rhetors could express more empathy with Jewish fears of antisemitism and clarify
some BDS goals and demands, both of which could help wider audiences transcend the affective
rhetorical obstacles and predictable uptakes to promote more productive discussions about
Palestinian rights and help achieve a more just and sustainable resolution to this intractable
conflict.
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NOMENCLATURE

The following acronyms for various terms and activist organizations are used repeatedly
throughout this dissertation:

ACLU = American Civil Liberties Union
AIPAC = American Israel Public Affairs Committee
AMP = American Muslims for Palestine
ATL = All That’s Left: Anti-Occupation Collective
BDS = Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions
BNC = Palestinian BDS National Committee
CJNV = Center for Jewish Nonviolence
IAW = Israeli Apartheid Week
IDF = Israeli Defense Forces
IHRA = International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance
INN = IfNotNow
ISM = International Solidarity Movement
JFREJ = Jews for Racial & Economic Justice
JVP = Jewish Voice for Peace
PACBI = Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel
PSC = Palestinian Solidarity Campaign UK
SJP = Students for Justice in Palestine
SAIA = Students Against Israeli Apartheid (at George Mason University)
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

“BDS will unavoidably contribute to the global social movement’s challenge to neoliberal
Western hegemony and the tyrannical rule of multi/transnational corporations. In that sense, the
Palestinian boycott against Israel and its partners in crime becomes a small but critical part in an
international struggle to counter injustice, racism, poverty, environmental devastation, and
gender oppression, among other social and economic ills.”
—Omar Barghouti, Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions: The Global Struggle for Palestinian
Rights (58-59).
“The Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Movement (BDS) is a global campaign against Israel.
It is the newest weapon in the ongoing effort to eliminate Israel and deny the Jewish people their
right to self-determination. BDS brands itself as a progressive human rights movement, but
nothing could be further from the truth. In reality, BDS undermines hopes for peace, justice, and
human rights in the region. . . BDS is bigoted. It calls for the elimination of Israel and the
violation of Jewish rights.”
—StandWithUs, “Fact Sheet: BDS Movement”
“The trouble is that once you see it, you can't unsee it. And once you've seen it, keeping quiet,
saying nothing, becomes as political an act as speaking out. There is no innocence. Either way,
you're accountable.”
—Arundhati Roy, Power Politics (7).
While many Americans mistakenly believe that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an
ancient religious feud dating back thousands of years, others assume the Zionist project to create
a Jewish state in Palestine only began in the wake of the Nazi Holocaust. The reality is that
tensions in the region between Jewish Zionist immigrants and indigenous Palestinian Arabs arose
in the early twentieth century as Zionist immigration to Palestine swelled in the wake of
increasing antisemitic persecution in Europe. Inspired by other nationalist movements of the late
nineteenth century, European Jewish Zionists sought to solve the problem of antisemitic
discrimination and violence by establishing a Jewish state in Palestine (Khalidi, Palestinian
Identity; Morris). In order to secure a Jewish homeland in Palestine, Zionist immigrants and
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militias, and later the Israeli government and military forces, have sought to acquire as much of
the land of Palestine as possible while limiting the number of Palestinians even though
Palestinian Arabs had inhabited the land for many generations, leading to ongoing repression of
the Palestinian population (Khalidi, Palestinian Identity; Morris; Makdisi; Pappé, The Ethnic).
Since before the founding of Israel, Palestinians have resisted their dispossession and oppression.
This resistance, like the resistance of other colonized and occupied peoples, has taken the form
of both violent and nonviolent methods, including armed resistance, terrorism, and nonviolent
strikes, boycotts, marches, and many other forms of protest (Pearlman; Sharp; Mishal and
Aharoni). While Jewish Zionists have succeeded in establishing Israel as a Jewish-majority state,
Palestinians remain stateless and occupied. In recent years, Palestinians have sought international
support and solidarity for their cause through boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) targeting
Israel. As this growing nonviolent movement has gained support, it has also faced harsh criticism
from supporters of Israel.
Situating Myself
In the interest of transparency and to situate myself as a scholar of this topic to which I
bring my own experiences and biases, it may be helpful for me to reveal how and why I began
studying discourse relating to the contentious Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I have no direct
familial, ethnic, or religious ties to the region, which means that while some people may question
my interest in this issue, I also have the privilege of not having people automatically assume I am
biased because of ethnic ties. Like most Americans, I first learned about the situation in Israel
and Palestine through a combination of cultural and familial sources through which I absorbed a
common and overly simplistic view of Israel as having been created after the Holocaust to
provide a home for Jewish refugees who had nowhere else to go after the end of WWII. I was
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also raised in a very conservative Christian Zionist household in which my parents presented the
idea of Jewish return to Israel as being biblically ordained and prophesied, and I have several
family members who are staunch supporters of Israel and represent a right-wing Christian
Zionist perspective1. As I discovered through later research, however, none of these limited
perspectives account for the full history of Zionism or the Palestinians.
As an undergraduate student, I studied the rise of Nazism in Germany and the Holocaust,
and since then, I have also studied antisemitic discourse and the history of antisemitic violence
and Jewish persecution. This knowledge, along with my parental and cultural education, gave me
an interest in and sympathy with the Zionist project to create a safe-haven for persecuted
diaspora Jews. Studying the Holocaust in depth also sparked my concern for human rights
around the world. The more I studied the history of Palestine/Israel2 and Orientalist and
Islamophobic discourses, however, the more I also came to understand the extent to which the
Zionist project to create a Jewish state has also prevented and impeded Palestinians from
achieving human rights and self-determination—a reality often obscured in mainstream Western
and US discourse on the subject.
In 2009, to pursue my interest in the subject and take concrete action to support “peace,”
I visited parts of Israel and the West Bank to produce a documentary about Israeli and

1

Christian Zionists have come to exert greater dominance over US policy toward Israel in recent decades, especially
under Republican leaders, which has been reflected in President Trump’s decision to officially recognize Jerusalem
as Israel’s capital without precondition and relocate the US embassy. Christian Zionists tend to view events in the
region through a lens of biblical interpretation of end-times prophecy and believe that God gave the land to the
Jewish people, whose gathering in the biblical land of Israel is a prerequisite for the end times and the return of the
Messiah.
2

Throughout this dissertation, I usually use the term “Palestine/Israel” to refer to the area between the
Mediterranean and the Jordan River, including both the state of Israel inside the Green Line and the occupied West
Bank and Gaza Strip. I have chosen to use this particular term listing “Palestine” first because “Palestine” was the
earlier name for this entire area during the British Mandate period, while “Israel” became the name of the area
within the current state of Israel after 1948. I also use this joint term to avoid preferencing one historical narrative
over the other.
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Palestinian nonviolent activism against the ongoing Israeli Occupation, titled Dreams Deferred:
The Struggle for Peace and Justice in Israel and Palestine (2011). It was during this first-hand
experience that I was struck by the stark differences between what I witnessed there and the
common narrative and framing presented about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in most
mainstream US news media sources. Even extensive reading about the Israeli Occupation and
unarmed Palestinian popular resistance to the West Bank separation barrier left me unprepared
for the harsh realities I observed in the West Bank: checkpoints, sniper towers, 25-ft walls,
ubiquitous settlements, aggressive Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers and Border Police, allday curfews imposed on Palestinian villages, and the violent repression of unarmed Palestinian
and international solidarity activists. Witnessing Israel’s military occupation of the West Bank
and getting to know many Israeli and Palestinian peace and justice activists not only challenged
my prior liberal Zionist perspective but also increased my interest in the discourses about the
situation, including the rhetoric of the growing transnational Palestinian-led Boycott,
Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement.
I noticed that even though the Palestinian-led BDS movement advocates the same
nonviolent tactics and universal principles of human rights that were the focus of the South
African anti-apartheid movement, the movement often gets labeled as threatening and antisemitic
in a way that is distinct from other human and civil rights movements. I wanted to discover why
pro-BDS activists have faced so many unique rhetorical constraints and obstacles in their quest
to raise awareness about Palestinian oppression and pressure the Israeli government to change its
discriminatory and repressive policies. I also sought to find out how BDS activists have tried to
navigate this challenging and evolving rhetorical situation and ecology and to determine when
and how they may have been successful and unsuccessful.

5
Brief History of Palestinian Resistance and Israeli Responses
The inevitable path to conflict in the region emerged after Britain, the colonial power that
gained control of Palestine after WWI, promised a “Jewish home” in Palestine to the growing
European Zionist settler movement with the 1917 Balfour Declaration (Harms and Ferry 67-71;
Morris 73-82, 88-151; Avishai 141-142; Pappé, The Ethnic 13-17). After decades of increasing
conflict, the 1947 UN Partition plan allotted the majority of the land of Mandatory Palestine to a
Jewish state, at which point Zionist forces began forcibly expelling and encouraging Palestinians
to flee in order to strengthen the fragile Jewish majority and establish and maintain a Jewish
state. By the time Israel declared independence in 1948 after defeating the combined armies of
the neighboring Arab states and taking possession of 78% of Palestine, the percentage of
Palestinians residing within Israel declined from approximately 45% of the population to only
15% of the population of the new Jewish State (Harms and Ferry 94-102; Morris 184, 222-259).
Even after the 1949 armistice, Israel prevented Palestinians from returning to their homes and
denied them compensation for lost properties (Harms and Ferry 100-102; Morris 269-281;
Pappé, The Ethnic 187-190). Palestinians living within Israel remained under martial law until
1966, and the majority of Palestinian refugees and residents of the West Bank and Gaza became
subject to Israeli military occupation following the 1967 War (Berger; Harms and Ferry 112;
Laron; Morris 336-343; Munayyer; Thrall, The Only Language 88). While Palestinians living in
Israel have enjoyed greater freedoms and most basic rights when compared to Palestinians in the
West Bank and Gaza, many Israeli laws and policies—both de facto and de jure—still privilege
Jewish Israelis in land rights, government funding, marriage laws, and immigration policies, etc.
(Berger; “Discrimination”; Makdisi; Munayyer). This situation has only gotten worse for
Palestinian citizens of Israel since the passage of the 2018 “Nation-State Bill” in the Israeli
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Knesset (i.e., their parliament) that encourages continued Jewish settlement and reserves the
right to self-determination in Israel for Jews only (Green, Emma, “Israel’s Nation-State Law”).
For those living under military occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, Israel restricts
Palestinians’ freedom of speech and protest, denies them the ability to travel, routinely
confiscates Palestinian lands (for the construction of the separation barrier or for “security”
reasons); and in the West Bank, Israel imposes checkpoints, curfews, administrative detentions
without trial, night raids, home demolitions, etc. (Thrall, “BDS”; Makdisi). Israeli forces have
also harshly repressed Palestinian protests and uprisings in both the West Bank and Gaza, and
the Israeli government has worked with Egypt to impose a blockade on most travel and goods
going in and out of Gaza since 20073 (“Israel: 50”; Thrall, “BDS”). Israel has continued to justify
all of these policies as necessary for Israeli “security” and the long-term maintenance of a Jewish
demographic majority (“Israel: 50”; Morris 329-331).
Though most Arab and Muslim leaders in the region have opposed Israel’s ongoing
oppression of Palestinians and denial of their basic rights (going back to their opposition to the
1947 UN partition plan and the establishment of Israel), most Western countries have supported
Israel throughout the years, despite its human rights violations. The US government has been a
consistently strong champion and patron of Israel for decades, with US support increasing after
the 1967 war and staying strong ever since (Said, The Question 188-192; Khalidi, Brokers xii,
xxvii-xxxvii; Thrall, “BDS,” The Only Language 68, 72-73; Harms and Ferry 108; Mearsheimer
and Walt). Despite claims to being an impartial peace-broker between Israelis and Palestinians,
the US not only provides Israel with approximately $3 billion annually in military aid but also

3

After the 1993 Oslo Accords, and especially in recent decades, the Palestinian Authority has also harshly repressed
Palestinian protest in the West Bank, sometimes in concert with Israeli security forces and increasingly on their
own; Hamas also cracks down on dissent in Gaza (“Palestine: Authorities”).
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regularly vetoes UN security-council resolutions critical of Israel and has blocked Palestinian
attempts in recent years to bring the Palestinian case to the UN (Khalidi, Brokers xii, xxviixxxvii; Wilner; Eisenstadt & Pollock; Oren, “The Ultimate”; Mearsheimer and Walt). In recent
years, the Trump administration has gone even farther than past US governments by enacting
several US policy changes and statements that support Israel and seek to suppress pro-Palestinian
and pro-BDS activism in the US, changes which also cater to the policy preferences of
evangelical Christian Zionists, an important base of support for the Republican Party. These
rhetorical and policy shifts include officially designating Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and
moving the US Embassy there in 2018; declaring, in contravention of international law, that
Israeli Jewish-only settlements in the West Bank are not illegal; and suggesting that Israel has
the right to annex parts of the West Bank (Wadhams; Halbfinger, “US Ambassador”; Jakes and
Halbfinger). These changes to US government policies and statements highlight the strength of
US support for Israel even as it continues to deny many basic human rights to the Palestinians.
The 2005 BDS Call
In response to the lack of progress toward reaching a negotiated resolution with Israel,
the continued growth of Israeli Jewish-only settlements on occupied Palestinian land in the West
Bank (widely considered illegal under the 4th Geneva Convention), and in light of the failure of
the international community to hold Israel accountable for its ongoing violations of international
law and denial of basic Palestinian human rights, in 2005, a committee of Palestinian activists
and 170 Palestinian civil society organizations launched an official call for international
solidarity in the form of a nonviolent boycott, divestment, and sanctions movement modeled
after the anti-apartheid BDS campaign targeting South Africa (UN Security Council;
“Palestinian Civil”). Since then, the BDS movement has racked up successes in pressuring artists
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and musicians to cancel performances in Israel, several churches and academic organizations to
support boycott and divestment, and some multinational corporations to cancel their Israeli
contracts (Barghouti, Boycott 24-30).
In response, Israel and its supporters in the US and Europe, including US politicians,
have also taken steps to curb the growth of BDS despite First-Amendment concerns. For
example, during her speech to AIPAC in 2016, US Democratic presidential candidate Hillary
Clinton denounced BDS and vowed to fight it. Several US state legislatures have recently passed
anti-BDS legislation that deny government contracts to businesses or individuals who promote or
participate in certain boycotts of Israel, and pro-Israel advocates have pushed for anti-bills in
both the Senate and House, though none have passed both houses of Congress to date, largely
because of concerns with their restriction of First-Amendment rights to free expression and
protest (“Anti-BDS Legislation”; “The Palestine Exception”; Greenwald; Hauss).
Policy initiatives seeking to restrict pro-Palestinian and pro-BDS activism are partly a
response to the fact that the BDS movement for Palestinian rights has been one of the fastest
growing student-led movements on college campuses in the US in recent years (Maltz, “The ProPalestinian”; Ziri; Thrall, “BDS,” “How the Battle”). Even as pro-BDS activism has faced push
back from many pro-Israel and mainstream Jewish organizations, BDS campaigns have gained
the support of many other student activists on campus, especially those led by students of color.
As more mainstream pro-Israel Jewish student organizations (including Hillel, StandWithUs, and
J-Street) have taken strong stands against BDS, newer progressive Jewish organizations that
include a wider range of voices on Palestine/Israel and BDS—including Open Hillel, Jewish
Voice for Peace (JVP), Jews for Racial and Economic Justice (JFREJ), and IfNotNow (INN)—
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have sprung up in recent years to challenge the traditionally limited parameters of the debate
about Palestine/Israel within the US Jewish community.
The BDS call includes academic, cultural, and consumer boycotts of the Israeli
government, institutions, and corporations (rather than individuals), and it also asks international
organizations and governments to sanction and divest from Israel in the same way that was
widely applied to South Africa’s Apartheid regime until it abides by international law and grants
Palestinians human rights (“Palestinian Civil”). The BDS call and the rhetoric of the campaign is
rooted in international law, universal principles of human rights, and UN resolutions, and it
demands that Israel end three major forms of injustice against all three sectors of the Palestinian
people:
(1) ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands occupied in 1967 and
dismantling the wall;
(2) recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full
equality; and
(3) respecting, protecting, and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to
their homes and properties, as stipulated in UN Resolution 194 (“Palestinian Civil”).
Opinion polls indicate the international BDS movement is widely supported by over 80% of the
Palestinian public (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, “Palestinian Public”).
While BDS is often referred to as a “movement,” it has also been described as “a loosely
organized network” of grassroots activists who devise campaigns that are often sensitive to the
context of local values and needs (Hallward, Transnational 33-34). BDS has become an
increasingly polarizing issue, with supporters seeing it as a tool of nonviolent Palestinian
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liberation from Israeli settler colonialism and opponents charging BDS activists with antiSemitism for allegedly singling out the only Jewish state.
Risks of Supporting BDS and Palestinian Rights
After a few years of increasing popularity of BDS on college campuses, along with BDS
successes at pressuring companies to cancel contracts in Israel and to convince artists and
musicians to not perform there, pro-Israel and anti-BDS advocates have undertaken increasingly
aggressive steps to hamper the growth of BDS activism. Websites like Canary Mission have
sprung up to publicize blacklists of students and faculty who have engaged in pro-BDS activism
(Nathan-Kazis, “Revealed”). Organizations like the AMCHA Initiative include lists of faculty
who have publicly supported BDS or been critical of Israel, and, in some cases, college
administrators have been pressured to censure or even terminate faculty who have been
outspoken in their support for BDS and Palestinian rights (Abraham, Out of Bounds; Salaita,
Uncivil; “AMCHA Publishes”). Abraham describes cases of scholars critical of the Israeli
narrative facing vilification and abuse both from within and without the academy. He argues that
publicized cases, such as Norman Finkelstein’s denial of tenure from DePaul, have led to a
perceived risk associated with doing Israel-Palestine scholarship (79-82). Steven Salaita also
discusses his own case of having his tenure-track position at UIUC rescinded after the discovery
of a handful of critical tweets he made during the 2014 Gaza War. Abu-Laban and Bakan echo
the argument of many pro-BDS activists by asserting that claiming critics of Israel are motivated
by antisemitism “serves to silence public discourse and limit freedom of expression” (323). It is
possible that this perception of risk may discourage some scholars in various disciplines,
including rhetorical theory, from pursuing the in-depth study of pro-Palestinian or pro-BDS
discourse.
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Regarding legal attempts to stifle pro-BDS activism, the ACLU has publicly criticized
anti-BDS bills as unconstitutional infringements on the First Amendment, and subsequent to
their critique, a few senators who had previously supported such legislation have come out
publicly against it (Hauss; Eidelman; Stanley-Becker). The ACLU has also taken up multiple
cases of state government contractors who have been forced to sign oaths to not boycott Israel as
a requirement for employment, including teachers in Kansas and Texas (Eidelman; StanleyBecker). And in October of 2017, a Texas anti-BDS law attracted attention on social media
because a clause in the law required people to sign a pledge to not boycott Israel in order to
receive government relief after hurricane Harvey, which apparently confused many people who
had been otherwise unaware of the existence of anti-BDS legislation or even the BDS movement
itself; the clause was later removed and the law challenged on First-Amendment grounds
(@ACLU; “Texas Town”). The recent watered down anti-BDS House Resolution 246, which
was passed with overwhelming bipartisan support (only 16 Democratic representatives voting
against it), condemned the BDS movement but did not include any penalties for BDS support
(Kampeas; Stolberg). Immediately after passage of this anti-BDS bill, however, several
mainstream US news outlets published articles about BDS, some of which included the views of
BDS leaders and supporters in addition to critics (Halbfinger et al.).
In 2019, the Trump administration directed federal agencies to apply an expanded
definition of antisemitism from the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) that
includes examples of speech critical of Israel when investigating claims of discrimination under
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; critics contend that this change is intended to crack down
on pro-BDS activism on US college campuses in the name of fighting antisemitism, and Jared
Kushner even explicitly asserts that this new policy directive equates anti-Zionism with
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antisemitism (Kushner; Redden, “Trump Order”; Myers and Seidler-Feller). In response to this
controversial Trump administration action, several Jewish journalists, scholars, and activists
have criticized such heavy-handed attempts to broaden the definition of antisemitism to target
pro-BDS and pro-Palestinian activism, critiques which have found their way into major
mainstream publications like The New York Times, The New Yorker, the Los Angeles Times, and
others (Gessen; Bokat-Lindell; Myers and Seidler-Feller). In one example, Jewish-American
journalist and New Yorker columnist Masha Gessen argues that comparisons between Israel
actions in the West Bank and Nazi-style persecution are not necessarily antisemitic and are also
“not outlandish.” She recounts in detail what she witnessed on a Breaking the Silence tour in the
West Bank4:
This particular tour ended in a Palestinian village which has been largely overtaken by an
Israeli settlement that is illegal under international law. One of the Palestinian houses
ended up on territory claimed by the settlers, so the settlers built a chain-link cage around
the house, the yard, and the driveway. A young Palestinian child, who is growing up in a
house inside a cage, waved to us through the fencing. Comparing this sort of approach to
Nazi policies may not make for the most useful argument, but it is certainly not
outlandish. The memory of the Holocaust stands as a warning to humanity about the
dangers of dehumanizing the other—and invoking that warning in Palestine is warranted.
These cases of anti-BDS legislation and policy changes not only highlight the political
effectiveness of organized pro-Israel BDS critics, but also reveal that anti-BDS legislation often
backfires by calling attention to the BDS movement and creating a backlash against such pro-

4

Breaking the Silence is an Israeli non-profit organization run by former Israeli soldiers who “have taken it upon
themselves to expose the public to the reality of everyday life in the occupied territories” by leading guided tours of
various parts of the West Bank to Israelis and international visitors (“Organization”).
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Israel legislation for its perceived infringement on the US Constitution and First-Amendment
freedom of speech. Legal restrictions on BDS activism can, however, also serve to restrain
popular participation in such campaigns when people fear political or social repercussions or the
loss of job opportunities for doing so.
Research Statement: Looking at BDS Discourse through a Rhetorical Lens
In the absence of any alternative path to a peaceful resolution in Palestine/Israel or
international accountability for Israel’s actions, the nonviolent BDS movement seems to offer a
potentially productive avenue for pressuring Israel to comply with international laws. The BDS
movement, however, also faces unique rhetorical obstacles that prevent it from gaining wider
support in the West, including sensitivity to antisemitism and ingrained stereotypes about
Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims, especially in the post-9/11 era.
Since social movements, including the transnational BDS movement, are themselves
largely rhetorical actions designed to persuade audiences to support the movement’s cause, a
rhetorical perspective is necessary for a comprehensive understanding of the movement itself.
Rhetoric scholars have long advocated for using a rhetorical lens to study social movements
because, as Cathcart argues, “movements are rhetorical acts” in which collectives of individuals
seek social change (361). Morris and Browne also contend that social movements “are by their
nature rhetorical. . . they organize symbols to persuasive ends”; social movements also “seek
change not through violence or coercion but through force of argument and appeal” (1-2).
Stevens and Malesh argue that studying the rhetoric of social movements can help scholars
understand the nature of these movements (12-13).
Even though the BDS movement has been examined by scholars in multiple disciplines,
such as postcolonial theory, political science, peace studies, and conflict resolution, it has
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received very little attention so far from rhetoric scholars (Hallward, Transnational; Pearlman;
Bakan and Abu-Laban; Siapera; Omer; Abraham, “Editor’s Introduction,” Out of Bounds). Thus,
the rhetorical situation, rhetorical strategies and appeals, audiences, constraints, and rhetorical
effectiveness or “fitness” of BDS discourse have not been investigated in-depth. Such a
rhetorical investigation of BDS movement discourse can yield insights into the rhetorical
strategies used by BDS movement activist-rhetors and the nature of constraints and obstacles that
may prevent pro-BDS discourse from resonating with wider audiences. This is also a useful
perspective from which to study a social movement as it attempts to address an ongoing conflict
and injustice that has so far eluded all other attempts at resolution.
In order to determine how BDS activist-rhetors use rhetorical moves and framing
strategies to persuade their audiences, why the BDS movement has been more successful at
gaining support from certain sectors while evoking opprobrium from others, why critiques of
BDS from Israel’s advocates have been so harsh, and whether common criticisms of the
movement are valid, I have chosen to analyze pro-BDS discourse to examine what BDS activistrhetors are saying and how resonant (or not) their framing strategies and messages may be with
different audiences, considering the evolving rhetorical situations and ecologies they face. My
analysis will employ rhetorical frame analysis, combining rhetorical analysis and frame analysis
to focus on the underlying framing strategies—both official and vernacular—used by Palestinian
leaders of the movement as well as student activists in the US. In order to address the gap in the
rhetorical study of BDS movement discourse and discover how BDS activist-rhetors have
responded to this unique rhetorical situation, I use rhetorical frame analysis to investigate the
following research questions: How do official and vernacular pro-BDS activist-rhetors frame the
movement and their goals? How do they frame their responses to the evolving rhetorical
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situations and challenges (including Western sensitivity to antisemitism)? How do they tailor
these frames for different audiences? And how resonant are these rhetorical framing strategies
likely to be for targeted audiences?
I intend for this rhetorical frame analysis project to contribute predominantly to the field
of rhetoric but also to discourse studies and social movement studies. Though my project
primarily uses a rhetorical perspective, it is also interdisciplinary because I use frame analysis,
which has mostly been used in the fields of sociology and discourse analysis (Goffman; Benford
and Snow; Johnston and Klandermans; Kuypers; Zald; Hope). The rhetorical study of social
movement discourse could benefit from the use of frame analysis because frame analysis can
help reveal underlying ideologies at work and break down arguments to their most basic level,
which can help rhetoric scholars understand how discourse may resonate with audiences’ beliefs
and assumptions. Frames are the building blocks that audiences use to understand the
foundational issues and unstated assumptions, and when these foundations are missing,
audiences cannot be receptive to higher-level arguments, evidence, etc. Incompatible or
contradictory framing on opposing sides can also be an obstacle to audience reception.
An examination of pro-BDS discourse is important because the transnational Palestinianled BDS movement is currently the most successful nonviolent Palestinian strategy for raising
awareness internationally about Palestinians’ lack of human rights, and yet the BDS movement is
often maligned and misunderstood in the US. Such a project could not only help Western and
American audiences better understand pro-BDS rhetoric, its rhetorical situation, the BDS
movement itself, and contemporary social movement discourse more generally, but it could also
encourage BDS activists to reflect on and adjust their rhetorical strategies and framing when
appropriate. In addition, without an effective nonviolent strategy for achieving their rights
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through the power of persuasion, for what is one of the most difficult and contentious human
rights debates, it seems inevitable that a small number of Palestinians will continue to resort to
violent resistance—as many other oppressed peoples have done in similar situations (Rabkin,
What Is 175; Freire 46, 55).
Framing Palestine/Israel
Throughout the Israeli-Palestinian conflict between Zionist Jewish settlers and the state
of Israel on one hand and the indigenous Palestinian Arab inhabitants of the area on the other,
both sides have sought to frame the situation from their perspectives to sway other countries and
potential supporters to their cause. In regard to the nature of the Zionist project to create a Jewish
state in Palestine, Raef Zreik brings the two perspectives together to assert that what Jewish
Zionists view as a nationalist movement for Jewish liberation and self-determination is
simultaneously experienced by the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine as a settler-colonial
project to dispossess Palestinians and take their land:
Zionism is a settler-colonial project, but not only that. It combines the image of the
refugee with the image of the soldier, the powerless with the powerful, the victim with
the victimizer, the colonizer with the colonized, a settler project and a national project at
the same time. The Europeans see the back of the Jewish refugee fleeing for his life. The
Palestinian sees the face of the settler colonialist taking over his land. (358-359)
It is important to recognize how Israel and the Zionist movement have framed the Zionist project
in Palestine in order to understand the way some audiences respond to the Palestinian-led BDS
movement, which is often perceived as a threat to not only the Zionist project but to the very
existence of the Jewish people. For my project, however, it is necessary to examine how
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Palestinians have framed the situation in Palestine/Israel to understand the context and rhetorical
situation for pro-BDS movement discourse and framing strategies.
Since the early work of Edward Said, postcolonial scholars and pro-Palestinian activists
have historically and rhetorically situated Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation within an
anti-colonial framework (Said, The Question, “Zionism”; Barghouti, Boycott, “Putting”;
Abunimah, “Palestinian Writer’s”). Contextualizing Palestine/Israel in a settler-colonial
paradigm is also helpful for understanding much of Israeli policy and Palestinian resistance,
which often parallel the colonial policies and indigenous resistance found in other settler-colonial
societies. Like most Palestinians, the BDS movement frames the situation not as a “conflict”
between two equal sides but rather as an example of settler-colonialism that reflects an unequal
power imbalance between the Israeli settler-colonial society and the indigenous Palestinian Arab
inhabitants.
Zionist framing of the goals and nature of the Zionist project and Palestinian resistance
differs significantly from Palestinian framing and has evolved over time in response to changing
geopolitical conditions. In the early twentieth century, Zionist leaders tended to borrow from
colonial discourse to make their case to Western officials by arguing that Zionist development of
Palestine would help civilize the land and the native population (Said, “Zionism” 12). Edward
Said describes the rhetorical strategies of the Zionist leaders as adaptive to the Western rhetorical
context of the period:
Everything they did in Palestine was enacted on the world-stage so to speak in a rhetoric
and costume fundamentally of the same sort as the cultural currency of the period. Thus
Zionism initially portrayed itself as a movement bringing civilization to a barbaric and/or
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empty locale. . . Later of course Zionism transformed itself into a movement bringing
Western democracy to the East. (“Zionism” 12)
Though public attitudes in the West are starting to shift, sympathy and support for Israel has
remained high in the US and many other Western countries for decades largely because of the
perceived alignment of national interests, shared values, and similar histories, especially in the
case of the US and other settler-colonial societies (Khalidi, Brokers xii, xvi-xxxvii; Telhami,
“Americans Are”; “Voters Show”). In the post-9/11 era, Israeli leaders, beginning with Ariel
Sharon, have also succeeded in rhetorically linking Israeli repression against Palestinian
resistance with the US’s global War on Terror, with Israeli leaders claiming to be fighting
Islamic terrorism just as the US has fought al Qaeda and ISIS (Bakan and Abu-Laban 48; Bazian
1059-1064; Verter).
Just as in the early days of Zionist immigration to Palestine, both violent and nonviolent
Palestinian resistance, including the BDS movement, are often rhetorically framed and perceived
as existential threats to Israel and the Jewish people (Reut Institute; StandWithUs). Though antior non-Zionism was common among diaspora Jews for the first few decades of Zionist
immigration to Palestine, including after the 1917 Balfour Declaration, Hitler’s rise to power in
Germany and the subsequent Nazi Holocaust bolstered diaspora Jewish support for Zionism
(“Protest”; Morris 171-172; American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Yearbook 206-214;
Rose). Western nations’ support for Zionism also increased in the years after Hitler’s rise to
power in Germany, and especially after the extent of the Holocaust became known, partly
because of Western sympathy with the Jewish people but also partly because most Western
countries favored sending Jewish refugees to Palestine rather than accepting significant numbers
of refugees themselves (Morris 161-164, 170-171; Rose 3). In the wake of the Nazi Holocaust
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and after the establishment of Israel, the idea and later reality of Jewish self-determination in the
form of a Jewish state in Palestine also became increasingly connected to Jewish identity,
including for many diaspora Jews. Zionist rhetoric that stresses the Jewish people’s right to selfdetermination continues to be a central argument for Israel’s existence as a Jewish-majority state.
Despite Israel’s rhetorical success among Western and American audiences, and its
continued military, economic, and political domination over the stateless and occupied
Palestinians, most Israelis and many of its supporters still view Israel in terms of perpetual
endangerment and victimhood, with the modern Israeli state being frequently linked to the
history of Jewish persecution. Given the lack of parity between the power of the occupier and the
occupied in this situation, some Palestinians and their supporters cannot understand why so many
Israelis and their Zionist diaspora Jewish supporters still feel like victims, and thus, critics of
Israel sometimes suspect that Jewish fears and allegations of antisemitism are not genuine.
But the rhetorical and psychological processes that create this fear and sense of
victimhood become more comprehensible in light of Jewish history and past traumatic
experiences with antisemitism and antisemitic violence that have either been directly
experienced or recounted to subsequent generations. Upon first arriving in Palestine in the late
1800s, Zionist immigrants often viewed their interactions with the local indigenous Palestinians
through the lens of their experiences in Europe where Jews had faced harsh discrimination,
persecution, and pogroms for hundreds of years. Thus, Zionist Jewish immigrants in Palestine
frequently interpreted Palestinian hostility as resulting from a pre-existing cultural antisemitism
rather than as a common reaction to displacement, dispossession, and perceived economic
threats, which is very similar to the indigenous resistance against other settler-colonial projects
around the world throughout history (Said, “Zionism” 29; Morris 43-45; Rabkin, What Is 175).
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Since Pinsker’s and Herzl’s early Zionist writings, Zionist leaders have often framed the Zionist
project to create a Jewish state as the only way to have a safe haven and long-term security for
the Jewish people who have faced centuries of persecution, especially in Europe (Morris 15-17,
20-25). Not only is Israel viewed as a safe haven by many Israeli Jews, but also many diaspora
Jews see Israel and its Law of Return as an insurance policy against future outbreaks of
antisemitic violence (Defamation; Green, David, “This Day”).
Through the Burkean rhetorical process of “us vs. them” identification and division,
growing Jewish identification with Zionism and Israel has also led to the indigenous Palestinian
“Others” being viewed as dangerous and antisemitic obstacles standing in the way of Jewish
safety, security, and salvation; thus, Palestinian resistance becomes associated with familiar
hateful and violent attacks on the Jewish people (Burke 20-27; Rowland and Frank 1-17). Within
this context, it becomes understandable how Zionists came to believe that establishing a Jewish
state in Palestine required any means necessary and how Zionist leaders’ talk of the “transfer” or
ethnic cleansing of significant numbers of indigenous Palestinians outside of the boundaries of a
new Jewish state while denying them the right to return could be framed as an unfortunate but
necessary evil (Pappé, The Ethnic; Morris 21-22, 253-254). And then later Israeli military actions
and state repression, including the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, have also been
presented as necessary for “security” reasons (Morris 329-331). The fact that some Palestinian
factions have supported and carried out violent attacks against Israelis, including civilians, also
serves to bolster such security claims.
This line of reasoning and discourse continues to lead many Israelis and their supporters
to believe the following narrative, more or less: that Israel wants peace and has no desire to
oppress and occupy Palestinians, but Israel unfortunately has no choice and “no partner for
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peace,” nor is a two-state solution currently feasible, because violent and antisemitic
Palestinian/Arab/Islamic terrorists will continue to commit acts of violent terrorism, fire rockets,
and attempt to “drive the Jews into the sea” if the Palestinians are not effectively controlled for
necessary “security” reasons (StandWithUs; Said, The Question xxi). From the beginning of
Zionist immigration to Palestine until today, the Orientalist and Islamophobic attitudes of many
Westerners also lead many people to favor the Zionist narrative and have enabled some of
Israel’s supporters to frame Palestinians as bloodthirsty Islamic terrorists who have no desire to
live in peace, only understand violence, etc. This type of rhetorical framing became even more
widespread and resonant after 9/11 and the US War on Terror.
Palestinians tend to perceive and frame events very differently from most Israeli Jews,
mainstream diaspora Jewish organizations, and other advocates for Israel. Similarly to the
indigenous Native American inhabitants of North America, when Zionist immigrants began
arriving in Palestine, the Palestinian Arabs were a largely agrarian people with strong
attachments to the land who felt threatened by the increasing numbers of European Jewish
immigrants whose arrival also often led to their dispossession from lands where they had lived
and worked for generations5 (Khalidi, Palestinian Identity 96-117). After years of dispossession,
violence, and repression, “us versus them” rhetoric and discursive processes of identification and
division further led the indigenous Palestinians Arabs to develop a stronger national identity and
view Zionist Israeli Jews as an existential and daily threat to their lives and well being (Khalidi,

5

While there are many valid similarities between the settler colonial policies of European colonists in US history
and Zionist and Israeli policies, no two situations are the same, and there are also many differences between the
cases, as each case of settler colonialism has unique features. In the case of Palestine/Israel, this process of
Palestinian dispossession first began when early Zionists purchased land from Ottoman landlords who then evicted
Palestinian tenant farmers (at the time of the 1947 UN Partition Plan, Zionists owned approximately 7% of the land);
Palestinian dispossession was later accelerated through war and forced ethnic cleansing during 1947-48 (Khalidi,
Palestinian Identity 96-117; Makdisi; Pappé, The Ethnic 187-190; Harms and Ferry 94-102; Morris 184, 222-259,
269-281).
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Palestinian Identity; Rotberg). While Israeli leaders often blame alleged antisemitic Palestinian
incitement for Palestinian violence against Israel, Palestinians point to many years of continuing
Israeli repression and dispossession as the cause for Palestinian resentment and frustration
(Ehrenreich; Hotovely; Rotberg). And when radical Israeli settlers commit terrorist attacks
against West Bank Palestinians, Palestinians argue that Israeli settlement policies and racist
incitement against Palestinians by Israeli leaders are at fault (Khalek, “US Media”; Abunimah,
“Anti-Arab”; Melhem).
Omar Barghouti, one of the founders of the BDS movement, member of the Palestinian
Boycott National Committee (BNC), and drafter of the 2005 BDS Call, summarizes what he sees
as the most important rhetorical and framing strategy for the BDS movement and pro-BDS
discourse: “the indisputable Palestinian claim to equal humanity should be the primary slogan
raised, because it lays the proper moral and political foundation for effectively addressing the
myriad injustices against all three segments of the Palestinian people. It is also based on
universal values that resonate with people the world over” (Barghouti, “Putting” 56). It is these
values promoted in pro-BDS discourse that have resonated with many racial and social justice
activists around the world, including in the US and Europe, leading to the growth of the BDS
movement in recent years.
Most American audiences have historically tended to sympathize with Israel more than
the Palestinians, partly as a reflection of the shared values and history of both countries as
settler-colonies and also mirroring political discourse and mainstream news media coverage of
the situation. The pro-Israel consensus in the US, however, has started to shift in recent years as
criticism of Israel and sympathy with Palestinians becomes more common, especially on the
progressive left (“Americans’ Views”; Horovitz, “Israel Losing”; Telhami, “Americans Are,”

23
“American Attitudes”; Tibon). For example, 2016 and 2020 US Democratic primary candidate
and senator, Bernie Sanders (who is also Jewish), has publicly criticized Israeli policies and the
Netanyahu government and expressed sympathy for Palestinians on multiple occasions (Beinart,
“Bernie Sanders”; Yglesias; Zonszein). Even though he has stated his personal opposition to
BDS, the public acceptance of Sanders’ criticisms of Israel could portend a wider openness
among liberal audiences for pro-BDS discourse and framing in the future, which is already
reflected in recent statements made by other 2020 Democratic presidential primary candidates,
Elizabeth Warren and Pete Buttigieg at J-Street’s 2019 conference (Kristof; Cohen, Roger;
Beinart, “Bernie Sanders,” “How to Stop”; Zonszein; Sanders).
Criticism of Israel is becoming more common not only among liberal Americans but also
younger generations of Jews in the diaspora as well, and many younger diaspora Jews who have
only known Israel as an occupying power rather than a fledgling state are gravitating to
Palestinian solidarity activism (Beinart, The Crisis; Borschel-Dan; Maltz, “Vast Numbers,” “The
Pro-Palestinian”; Omer, Days of Awe; Sunshine). American Jews are also disproportionately
represented in pro-BDS activist groups, especially on US college campuses (Beinart, “How to
Stop”; Omer, Days of Awe; Maltz, “The Pro-Palestinian”). For an increasing number of young
progressive Jewish American students, their Jewish identity is connected to support for
intersectional movements for justice, and their perception of Jewish history is that of supporting
struggles for justice and civil rights rather than supporting Israel, which is increasingly viewed as
a belligerent and oppressive settler-colonial state much like the US (Horovitz, “Israel Losing”;
Omer, Days of Awe; Sunshine; Maltz; Waxman, “As Israel Turns,” Trouble).
While there are two distinct narratives and dueling discourses in regard to the conflict
between Israel and the Palestinians, and both peoples have committed violent acts against each
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other throughout the years, the situation is not a conflict of two equal sides. Since Israel’s
founding in 1948, and especially after the 1967 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Israel
has maintained its power and control over the Palestinians, while the Palestinians continue to
struggle and resist from the position of an oppressed, stateless, and occupied people. Despite the
limited autonomy given to the Israeli-approved Palestinian Authority (PA) under the Oslo
Accords and the 2005 Israeli withdrawal of its military and settlers from inside of Gaza, Israel
still has ultimate control and military domination over the daily lives of Palestinians through its
ongoing occupation of the West Bank and siege of Gaza. Understanding this historical and
rhetorical context is an important step to understanding the rhetorical situation and rhetorical
strategies of the BDS movement.
Chapter Descriptions
In Chapter 2 I review scholarship pertinent to understanding the rhetorical situation and
rhetorical framing strategies for pro-BDS discourse, especially relevant rhetorical scholarship,
but also interdisciplinary research on the BDS movement, Palestinian resistance, postcolonial
theory, peace and nonviolence studies, social movement studies, social movement rhetoric, and
the discourse of Palestine/Israel more generally in order to provide useful context to set up my
later rhetorical frame analysis. In Chapter 3, I develop and discuss the methodology for my
project, which focuses on rhetorical frame analysis of selected pro-BDS texts with microrhetorical frame analysis of a selection of the most representative and important texts. I also
discuss and develop my primary framework for analysis that takes the form of a heuristic I use to
code my selected texts for analysis. This heuristic framework includes concepts from rhetorical
theory, social movement rhetoric, and frame analysis. I use this framework to analyze selected
texts in the following case study chapters.
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Chapters 4 and 5 include my in-depth rhetorical frame analysis and discussion of the
specific framing strategies for the official (Chapter 4) and vernacular (Chapter 5) texts I
examine. In these chapters, after some discussion of patterns found in my initial coding, I go
more in-depth to do a micro-rhetorical frame analysis of selected representative texts. In Chapter
4, I analyze the rhetorical situations and framing for official pro-BDS rhetoric (including the
original 2005 BDS call put out by the Palestinian Boycott National Committee (BNC)). In
addition to examining the BDS call, I also look at selected official statements from the BNC and
op-eds from BDS co-founder and BNC spokesperson, Omar Barghouti. In Chapter 5, I build on
Hauser’s discussion of the importance of examining the vernacular rhetoric of social movements
to see how this discourse may differ from the more official leaders’ discourse. I gathered and
analyzed texts that represent the pro-BDS discourse of student activists taking part in the annual
Israeli Apartheid Week (IAW) actions at universities in the Washington D.C. area (including
Georgetown, George Washington University, George Mason University, and American
University). I examine dozens of leaflets, posters, displays, flyers, and online statements from
student members of Students for Justice in Palestine and/or other Palestinian solidarity groups at
these universities.
In Chapter 6, my concluding chapter, I review the results of my analysis and discuss the
potential resonance or fitness of pro-BDS discourse framing for its audiences in light of my
results. Using Hauser’s discussion of “fitting” rhetorical responses and sociological frame
analysts’ discussion of frame resonance (Benford and Snow), I attempt to discuss how resonant,
fitting, and potentially effective this body of pro-BDS discourse would likely be for their
targeted audiences, considering what is knowable about those audiences beliefs, values, prior
knowledge, etc. While it is impossible to accurately determine how persuasive particular texts
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are for their intended audiences, I use the concepts of fitness and resonance to establish a
probability of rhetorical resonance (similar to effectiveness) in light of the rhetorical situations
and context. I also describe strategies that pro-BDS rhetors could potentially adopt in order to
more effectively address the rhetorical situation, obstacles, and constraints.
Hopefully my project can help scholars of rhetoric and other fields to gain a better
understanding of contemporary social movement rhetoric, pro-BDS discourse in particular, its
rhetorical situation and framing, and the challenges faced by activist-rhetors. I also hope this
research can assist BDS activists and rhetors to critically examine their rhetorical strategies and
consider adjusting them when appropriate in order to reach wider audiences and avoid triggering
affective responses when possible. My project can also serve as a blueprint for scholars wishing
to develop and apply a similar rhetorical framing analysis heuristic to other social movements’
discourses.
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR UNDERSTANDING
PALESTINE/ISRAEL DISCOURSE AND THE BDS MOVEMENT

In order to provide some context and justification for my rhetorical frame analysis of
BDS discourse and the coding heuristic I have developed, I will first review the various
perspectives from which different scholars and disciplines have approached the topic of the BDS
movement and the Palestine/Israel. I will review relevant scholarship to date, discuss the
limitations of this scholarship for a complete understanding of BDS movement rhetoric, and
propose examining framing strategies with a rhetorical lens as a corrective to existing gaps in the
research. This literature review will reveal not only why rhetorical frame analysis is a useful
method to help fill gaps in the extant research on these topics, but it will also serve to set up my
later rhetorical frame analysis and discussion of the rhetorical situation and rhetorical framing
strategies for pro-BDS discourse.
First, I will present a general overview of scholarship that relates most closely to
rhetorical analysis of BDS discourse, including analyses of Palestine/Israel rhetoric, some from
the field of rhetoric and composition and communications, and some from related fields
(including linguistic discourse analysis, etc.), to review the various approaches to analyzing
discourse on this topic to help me locate existing gaps that may warrant further exploration and
also to provide some useful examples as I develop my methods and heuristic for analysis. This
review will also provide me with some useful background and context as I consider various
aspects of the rhetorical situation and ecologies for pro-BDS discourse in later chapters. I then
discuss the foundational role of postcolonial theory in the study of Palestine/Israel discourse,
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especially since the field has helped elucidate colonial and anti-colonial discourses, including
discourses around Palestine/Israel. After this, I explore interdisciplinary approaches to the topic
of the BDS movement and present scholarship about the history, rhetorical situation, and
common arguments on both sides of the BDS debate. I then discuss how social movement
studies and movement rhetorics can offer useful examples for my own research. Finally, toward
the end of this chapter, I review the small number of BDS movement discourse analyses
performed by peace studies and conflict resolution scholars that relate most closely to my own
project. These studies offer some productive avenues for studying BDS movement rhetoric, but
because they come from outside of the rhetorical field, they also leave out some elements that a
rhetorical frame analysis could address more in depth to achieve a deeper understanding of the
BDS movement, its framing and rhetorical strategies, and how resonant these strategies may be
for targeted audiences.
The situation in Palestine/Israel and Palestinian resistance to the Zionist project have
been studied by various disciplines and scholarly perspectives. Scholars from fields such as
postcolonial theory (Said; Feldman; Salaita); peace studies and conflict resolution (Chaitin et al.;
Hallward; Omer); political science (Pearlman; Roy; Bakan and Abu-Laban; Morrison); history
(Khalidi; Morris); cultural studies (Bakan and Abu-Laban; Butler; Siapera); communications and
discourse studies (Wolfsfeld; Bazzi; Beckerman; Kampf; Rowland and Frank; Gavriely-Nuri);
internet and new media studies (Nabulsi; Najjar; Aouragh; Siapera); and other disciplines have
all tackled this deep-seated “conflict” from various angles. Existing scholarship has addressed
myriad aspects of the situation, including mass media coverage (Wolfsfeld; Bazzi; Bekerman;
Kampf); Israeli and Palestinian symbol use and narratives (Adwan et al.; Rowland and Frank;
Rotberg); Palestinian resistance (both nonviolent and violent) (Pearlman; Sharp; Mishal and
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Aharoni); anti-colonial discourse and postcolonial theory (Said; Feldman; Salaita); Palestinian
internet activism (Nabulsi; Najjar; Aouragh; Tawil-Souri and Aouragh; Siapera); the question of
antisemitism and its contemporary definitions (Bronner; Hirsh; Klug; Kiewe); the history and
material effects of Zionism and Israel’s settler-colonial policies (Said; Khalidi; Roy; Zreik;
Makdisi; Morris; Pappé); and transnational Palestinian solidarity activism (Chaitin et al.;
Hallward; Ananth; Omer; Bakan and Abu-Laban; Siapera; Morrison). While a few rhetorical
scholars have examined the discourse of Palestine/Israel (Abraham; Kiewe; Bawarshi; Kleine;
Bernard-Donals; Rowland; Frank; Ginsburg; Crosswhite), none so far have focused on BDS
movement discourse specifically, and the few scholars who have studied the BDS movement and
its discourse come from outside of the field of rhetorical studies (Hallward; Omer; Yi and
Phillips; Bakan and Abu-Laban; Morrison; Chaitin et al.). Thus, my research could help play a
role in filling this gap in the study of pro-BDS discourse from a rhetorical perspective.
Though I will discuss the concepts and functions of “frames” and “framing” more in
depth in Chapter 3, some of the scholarship I review in this chapter also addresses frames, so it
will be useful to include a brief definition here. According to Kuypers, frames can be found in
the concepts, key words, symbols, metaphors, visual images, and names assigned to ideas,
people, and actions; frames are used “to define problems, diagnose causes, make moral
judgments, and suggest remedies”; and frames function as “central organizing ideas within a
narrative account of an issue or event” that serve as “interpretive cues for otherwise neutral
facts” (Rhetorical Criticism 185, 182). It may be helpful to think of framing like the frame of a
picture or painting: only certain images appear within the frame while others are excluded, and
what appears inside of the frame affects how viewers understand and interpret the events or
subjects depicted. In regard to how frames are used by social movements, Benford and Snow
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argue that the most important framing tasks of social movement actors are to diagnose problems,
propose solutions, and motivate supporters (615). Ultimately, to a greater extent than rhetorical
criticism or frame analysis alone, rhetorical frame analysis can help scholars identify the
assumptions, beliefs, and ideology underlying the rhetorical appeals and arguments used by
activist-rhetors and the lenses through which activist-rhetors hope audiences will view the
problem and potential solutions. Identifying and analyzing these frames can also help us more
fully understand the resonance or fitness of social movement discourse by determining how
consistent such frames are with the material realities of the situation and common perceptions
promoted in the public sphere. Analyzing frames can also help shed light on aspects of the
rhetorical situation for pro-BDS discourse without relying on a biased version of controversial
historical events.
Rhetorical Scholarship on Palestine/Israel and the BDS Movement
To understand Palestinian resistance rhetoric and framing, including that of the BDS
movement, it is important to look at how Palestinians have both materially and discursively
resisted the Zionist project, along with how the situation in Palestine/Israel has been presented by
mass media and public figures on all sides. Reviewing scholarship related to Palestine/Israel
discourse can serve to both identify gaps in rhetorical research on this topic and also provide a
useful sampling of approaches that I can apply to developing my own methods and heuristic for
coding pro-BDS texts.
While scholars from the fields of rhetoric and discourse studies have examined various
aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its discourse, rhetoric scholars have so far largely
overlooked BDS movement discourse (Abraham, “Recognizing” 121-123). Though her work
often focuses on critical theory and gender studies, Judith Butler has also written about BDS and
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critiqued Zionism in ways that sometimes overlap with rhetorical theory (Parting Ways). The
discourse of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more generally has been examined by several
disciplines, including communications, political science, discourse analysis, and critical
discourse analysis, scholarship which can provide useful context for understanding the rhetorical
situation for pro-BDS discourse (Bazzi; Roy; Bekerman; Kampf; Mandelbaum; Peled-Elhanan
and Yellin; Richardson and Barkho; Gavriely-Nuri; Rowland and Frank; Shupak). Though
communications scholars have not rhetorically analyzed pro-BDS discourse, several studies from
the communications field have examined news media accounts and political rhetoric of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the US, Europe, the Arab world, and in Israel and the Occupied
Palestinian territories (Bazzi; Rowland and Frank; Richardson and Barkho; Kampf; GavrielyNuri; Wolfsfeld; Gamson; Shupak).
Several studies from the fields of communications, discourse analysis, and social
movement studies examine rhetoric and discourse relating to the broader issue of Palestine/Israel
and thus demonstrate a variety of productive approaches. For example, Bazzi uses comparative
discourse analysis to examine Western English-language and Arabic news sources covering the
conflict, and Sudeshna Roy applies critical discourse analysis to The New York Times’ opinion
pieces about Palestine/Israel. Bekerman performs a rhetorical cultural analysis of intergroup
Jewish-Palestinian dialogue encounters, Kampf analyzes official Israeli and Palestinian
recognition statements and discusses their role in the peace process, and Mandelbaum examines
the new Zionist “national left” discourse in Israel and compares it to some emerging alternative
discourses. While these studies serve as useful examples of a variety of ways to approach
analysis of discourse related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, none of them focuses specifically
on Palestinian solidarity or pro-BDS rhetoric.
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Some scholars have also taken a multimodal approach to researching Palestine/Israel
discourse, looking not just at linguistic elements of discourse but also at visual elements. These
researchers include Peled-Elhanan and Yellin in their multimodal semiotic analysis of Israeli
geography textbooks and Richardson and Barkho’s multimodal critical discourse analysis of
BBC broadcasts relating to the conflict. Another related approach to analyzing discourse of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the cultural critical discourse analysis (CCDA) of Gavriely-Nuri,
whose studies of the term “peace” and other cultural codes and metaphors in Israeli discourse use
a cultural approach to CDA that ultimately seeks to “remove unique obstacles and cultural
barriers to the realization of peace processes” (Gavriely-Nuri, “The Idiosyncratic” 565).
Though not all of her scholarship is strictly rhetorical, Judith Butler’s writings on
Zionism and Palestine/Israel, including her book Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of
Zionism, touch on rhetorical theory and engage with Jewish philosophers, including Buber,
Levinas, Arendt, and others to offer a discursive Jewish critique of Zionism and promote a vision
of future coexistence of Israelis and Palestinians in a binational state. Butler is also known as a
prominent Jewish academic supporter of BDS, and she discusses the BDS movement and the
discourse around it in several interviews and appearances, including talks in which she analyzes
arguments for and against BDS and argues that support for BDS is not inherently antisemitic
(Jewish Voice for Peace, Judith Butler; Butler, “Judith Butler’s Remarks”).
While BDS movement discourse itself has not been the focus of rhetorical scholarship,
the most in-depth rhetorical study of discourse related to Palestine/Israel is found in the
collection of essays, Toward a Critical Rhetoric on the Israel-Palestine Conflict, edited by
Matthew Abraham. In “Developing Activist Rhetorics on Israel-Palestine: Resisting the
Depoliticization of the American Academy” and his book, Out of Bounds: Academic Freedom
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and the Question of Palestine, Abraham examines how pro-Israel bias has served to stifle
criticism of Israeli policy in the US academy and public sphere. With his contributions in
Toward a Critical Rhetoric, Abraham argues that rhetoricians should turn more attention to the
discourse of the Israel-Palestine conflict in order to understand why participants in discussions of
Palestine/Israel so frequently devolve into unproductive position-taking and the “desire to prove
the Other wrong,” when a more useful discursive strategy would involve Ratcliffe’s “rhetorical
listening” as a step toward “moving a conversation about the conflict forward, while avoiding the
discursive pitfalls hampering the peace process” (“Editor’s Introduction” 4-5). Abraham argues
that affectiveness, belatedness, and transference all tend to intervene, often unconsciously, to
disrupt potentially productive discussions of Palestine/Israel:
While conflations of Jewish memory leading up to Nazi Holocaust with the supposed
present-day security threats Israel faces are natural and difficult to avoid, critical
rhetoricians should work to differentiate the relevant contexts to reduce the affective,
transferential, and belated effects of the past, which all too frequently are deformed in the
present in the service of a partisan politics. Attempts to hold the present hostage to the
past prevent meaningful rhetorical interventions around crucial issues” (“Reluctant” 187).
Studying the rhetorical framing strategies and frames found in pro-BDS discourse can help
scholars differentiate some of the contexts relevant to understanding the current debates around
BDS and Palestine/Israel.
Other chapters in Toward a Critical Rhetoric build on Abraham’s contributions and seek
to discover how rhetoricians can contribute to a greater understanding of rhetorical obstacles in
regard to Palestine/Israel and how to overcome them. In “Discourse on the Israel-Palestine
Conflict: Rhetorical Memory and Uptake,” Bawarshi also connects current rhetorical challenges
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in discussing Palestine/Israel with past memories that serve as “uptakes” triggered by certain
words and phrases that recall past traumas or are similar to antisemitic tropes, leading some
people to assume antisemitic intent even when there may be none: “Our uptake memory is what
we bring to a rhetorical encounter, and it is what helps us select from, define, and make sense of
that encounter” (13). In other essays in Abraham’s book, Kiewe argues for the importance of
understanding the roots of historical antisemitism as they relate to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
Bernard-Donals proposes taking an exilic rhetorical position which reflects the historical
experiences of exile shared by both Jews and Palestinians; Kleine advocates for combining
Ratcliffe’s “rhetorical listening” with Freire’s notion of mutually liberatory discourse; Rowland
analyzes speeches by Netanyahu and Obama to reveal how Netanyahu’s worldview is
unhelpfully limited by a “terministic screen” that interprets events through the memory of the
Holocaust; Frank argues for the adoption of the “middle voice” in order to resolve conflicts
between dueling narratives; Ginsburg examines Israeli poetry to show how Israelis are often
limited in being able to understand the Palestinian perspective; and Crosswhite argues that to
change the distorted discourse around Palestine/Israel we must seek out examples of discursive
practices that model cooperation and productive conflict. Each essay in this book touches on
similar themes and patterns in rhetorical practices regarding Palestine/Israel, which Abraham
summarizes thusly: “The essays in this collection advance an ambitious goal: a comprehensive
and careful treatment of the often divisive rhetorics surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict that
is focused on producing empathic understanding and increasing cross-cultural identification”
(“Conclusion” 186).
Some other scholarship that is relevant to a rhetorical perspective on Palestine/Israel
includes research on the narratives, symbol use, and mythologies of both Israelis and
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Palestinians. In addition to their contributions to Toward a Critical Rhetoric on the IsraelPalestine Conflict, Rowland and Frank also collaborated on an earlier book, Shared
Land/Conflicting Identity: Trajectories of Israeli and Palestinian Symbol Use, in which they
draw on Kenneth Burke’s work on identification and division to examine Israeli and Palestinian
use of symbols and myths in the public sphere that work to paint the other side as evil, a
discursive pattern that the authors argue must be disrupted and transformed in order to pave the
way for future peace and coexistence. They argue that, “Each myth defined identity based on
contact with the land and denied the legitimate rights of any other group,” and these conflicting
symbol systems have up until now prevented Israelis and Palestinians from making peace (14).
In Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict: History’s Double Helix, edited by Rotberg,
both Israeli and Palestinian authors discuss the competing historical narratives of both sides that
serve to undermine prospects for a resolution of grievances. Even though the contributors to this
book approach these dueling narratives mostly as historical scholars, their accounts of the
competing narratives and their context in contemporary relations between Israelis and
Palestinians help elucidate the historical context and rhetorical framing patterns found in the
discourse of both Israelis and Palestinians.
Postcolonial Theory and Palestine/Israel
Since Edward Said’s early writings on Palestine and Zionism in the 1970s, postcolonial
scholars have been elucidating colonial and anti-colonial discourses, including examining the
situation in Palestine/Israel in addition to other colonial and postcolonial societies. Thus, a
review of how postcolonial theory has contributed to the understanding of Palestine/Israel and
Palestinian solidarity and resistance rhetorics, along with pro-Israel discourse, is essential for any
study of BDS movement rhetoric and framing strategies. Postcolonialism addresses the situation
in Palestine/Israel aptly because the Zionist project has achieved and maintained the goal of
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establishing a Jewish state in the ancient Jewish homeland through a settler-colonial project that
was initially supported by Britain and other twentieth-century imperial powers, and which
continues to be supported by the US and other Western nations today. The Zionist project, and
later Israel, have also carried out various policies that have dispossessed and repressed the
indigenous Palestinians in ways that parallel other settler-colonial projects (Morris 38-39; Said,
“Zionism” 9-10, 23; Busbridge; Zreik; Wolfe; Veracini; Tapper and Sucharov 61-62). Thus,
postcolonial theory is an essential area of scholarship that can help elucidate Palestinian
motivations and historicize their discourses of struggle against Zionism.
Originating from Edward Said’s work in colonial discourse analysis, postcolonial theory
developed out of analyses of colonial, imperial, and neo-imperial discourses (Williams and
Chrisman 5). Postcolonial scholars examine the discourses of the colonized and formerly
colonized subjects, as well as that of the colonizers and later neo-imperialist powers. Shome
summarizes postcolonialism as a critical perspective that tries to reveal the imperialism and
Eurocentrism in both public and academic western discourses (592). Williams and Chrisman
explain the purpose and motivation behind postcolonial theory and analysis thusly:
“If texts exist in. . . a dialectical relationship with their social and historical context—
produced by, but also productive of, particular forms of knowledge, ideologies, power
relations, institutions and practices—then an analysis of the texts of imperialism has a
particular urgency, given their implication in far-reaching, and continuing, systems of
domination and economic exploitation. This involves an understanding of present
circumstances as well as the ways in which these are informed by, perpetuate, and differ
from situations which preceded them, and the complex interrelation of history and the
present moment provides the terrain on which colonial discourse analysis and postcolonial theory operate” (4).
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Williams and Chrisman also discuss postcolonial theory in light of Said’s concept of Orientalism
and Foucault’s discussion about the relationship between power and knowledge, asserting that
“colonial discourse analysis and post-colonial theory are thus critiques of the process of
production of knowledge about the Other,” and colonial discourse analysis and postcolonial
analysis are often concerned with “the ways in which the ‘subaltern’6 native subject is
constructed within these discourses” (8, 16).
Postcolonial scholars, like many Palestinian activists, have situated the Palestinian
struggle as a settler-colonial project rather than using a conflict paradigm that typically presents
both sides as equally at fault for any hostilities (Said, The Question, “Zionism”; Abunimah,
“Finkelstein”; Barghouti, Boycott, “Putting”; Taraki 449; Busbridge; Zreik; Wolfe; Veracini;
Feldman; Pappé, The Ethnic, Israel and South Africa). Postcolonial scholars have also revealed
how Zionist policies and Palestinian oppression have often been justified with Orientalist,
Islamophobic, and colonialist discourses that present the Palestinians as barbaric, blood-thirsty
terrorist “Others” driven by antisemitism to kill Jews (Said, “Zionism” 9-10).
Edward Said was not only a founder of postcolonial theory but also a Palestinian exile
from a refugee family who wrote frequently about the Palestinian struggle against Zionism, and
his works are important for understanding the history of Palestinian resistance discourse, much
of which has influenced the contemporary BDS movement. Two of his most seminal works
include Orientalism (1978) and The Question of Palestine (1979), both of which deal with how
Muslims, Arabs, and Palestinians in particular are represented by the West as violent, barbaric,
terrorist “Others,” which denies their humanity, ignores their oppression, and delegitimizes their
struggles for liberation. In his preface to the 1992 edition of The Question of Palestine, Said
6

The postcolonial use of the term “subaltern,” which can be traced originally to Antonio Gramsci, refers to the
native subject in the developing world who is often represented as a secondary “Other” by colonial discourses
(Williams and Chrisman 16-17). Also see Gayatri Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?”
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summarizes how he views the ongoing colonial situation as portrayed in Western discourse—a
narrative that still holds sway today:
Ever since its founding in 1948, Israel has enjoyed an astonishing dominance in matters
of scholarship, political discourse, international presence, and valorization. . . In all this,
Palestinians were either ‘Arabs,’ or anonymous creatures of the sort that could only
disrupt and disfigure a wonderfully idyllic narrative. Still more important, Israel
represented (if it did not always play the role of) a nation in search of peace, while the
Arabs were warlike, bloodthirsty, bent on extermination, and prey to irrational violence,
more or less forever. (xiv)
Despite the increasing right-wing radicalization of Israeli politics and policy and the turn toward
nonviolent resistance in recent years by many Palestinians, the Orientalist Israeli Zionist
narrative still dominates media coverage and perceptions in the West, and especially in the U.S.
Said’s work and that of other postcolonial scholars continues to be useful for understanding the
context of the BDS movement, which was conceived in an ongoing colonial context and within a
larger global anti-colonial struggle for social justice and human rights (The Question x).
Like many other postcolonial scholars and Palestinian solidarity activists affiliated with
the BDS movement, Said uses historical examples of Zionist and Israeli policies of violence,
repression, and ethnic cleansing against Palestinians to support his claim that Zionism is an
unjust settler-colonial project that has sought to create a Jewish-majority state on Palestinian land
at the expense of the indigenous Palestinian inhabitants (Said, “Zionism” 9-10). He also points
out that early Zionist leaders openly framed Zionism “as a Jewish movement for colonial
settlement in the Orient,” during the era when colonialism was still practiced and accepted by
most of Europe (“Zionism” 23). And while he repeatedly condemns Palestinian terrorism against
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Israeli civilians and argues for the efficacy and moral authority of nonviolent resistance, Said
also explains Palestinian violence using analogies to other anti-colonial struggles in which
violence against colonial occupation has often been excused or tolerated by Westerners,
including in regard to the situations in South Africa, Algeria, and other anti-colonial struggles
(“Zionism” 11-12; The Question x, xx-xxxi). Said also expresses an understanding of Jewish
fears and acknowledges the extent of historical antisemitism in Europe and elsewhere
(“Zionism” 17-18). But he, like many other critics of Israel, emphasizes that Palestinians played
no part in the Holocaust or European antisemitism and thus do not deserve to have their human
rights and right to self-determination denied to make way for the Jewish state (“Zionism” 23-29).
Other postcolonial scholars, along with a few historians, have offered various analyses of
Israeli settler-colonialism and the discourse of Palestine/Israel. Feldman discusses the history of
anti-colonial and antiracist movements in the US and their relationship to Palestine/Israel, and he
traces the theoretical history of Zionism as a racist settler-colonial state to an earlier era, in
particular Fayez Sayegh’s scholarship for the Palestine Research Center, including the 1965
pamphlet “Zionist Colonialism of Palestine” (Feldman 37). According to Makdisi, “most
Palestinians understand that Zionism wasn’t only a colonial project, but in addition a response to
the legacy of European anti-Semitism that culminated in the Holocaust, and an expression of the
need that Jews felt for a homeland of their own” (287). He further argues, however, that, “the
creation of a Jewish majority in any part of an historically multicultural and religiously
heterogeneous Palestine has always required—and its maintenance will always require—the use
of violence” (288). Israeli Jewish historian Ilan Pappé also situates Israel as a settler-colonial
state: “Although the Zionist project had its own specific features, it can quite comfortably be
located within nineteenth-century colonialisms” (Israel and South Africa 6).
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Following in Said’s footsteps, several other scholars use postcolonial theory to explain
the context for the BDS movement and Palestinian resistance to Zionist settler-colonialism. For
example, Bakan and Abu-Laban echo Said when they blame entrenched Orientalism as a major
reason for the suspicion of Palestinian solidarity discourses in much of the academic and political
establishments (33). They paint the BDS movement as a counter-hegemonic movement that has
served as “an anti-racist challenge to the Orientalist and Islamophobic messaging associated with
the George [W.] Bush era and the war on terror” (Bakan and Abu-Laban 48). Hasian and Flores
use postcolonialism and critical rhetoric to examine the discourse of the First Palestinian Intifada
(1987-1991) and explore how the intifada helped reinforce and constitute an evolving Palestinian
identity (89-106). In their discussion of the academic boycott component of the BDS movement,
Lloyd and Schueller also explain the situation in Palestine/Israel using a postcolonial frame: “in
the time-honored manner of settler colonialism, a powerful and well-armed state seeks to
extinguish the cultural life and identity of an indigenous people” (9).
Another example of recent scholarship that includes a post-colonial perspective on
Palestine/Israel is the 2019 special edition of the Journal of Palestine Studies that focuses on
Black-Palestinian transnational solidarity (BPTS). In this edition, various scholars discuss the
historical and contemporary connections between black activism in the US and Palestinian
solidarity activism going back decades. Erakat and Hill review the history of links between the
Black radical tradition and pro-Palestinian activism and situate this linkage within the history of
anti-colonial struggles:
Elements of the Black radical tradition that allied with the Palestinian struggle understood
it not only as a principled response to a specific historical injustice, but also as the
signpost of an analytical understanding of imperialism, colonialism, and white supremacy
as global phenomena that subsume the Black American condition. Palestine, which
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represents the fulcrum of U.S. imperial exploits in the Middle East, vividly evokes this
internationalist analytic and has thus been a touchstone of multiple Black radical
movements. (Erakat and Lamont Hill 8)
The authors argue that while this linkage has a long history, the current renewal of BPTS can be
traced to 2014 when both black and Palestinian activists began to discursively link activism
around the protest movement in Ferguson to Palestinian protest against the 2014 Israeli attacks
on Gaza (8). As editor Rashid Khalidi explains, the various essays in this issue discuss the
historical and recent connections between the black and Palestinian struggles and “chart new
avenues for both intellectual and political engagement around these issues” (Khalidi, “From” 5).
This issue includes some useful historical context that helps reveal why and how pro-BDS
framing and rhetorical strategies tend to resonate with not only black activists in the US but also
with other audiences who hold anti-colonial beliefs.
Although Zionism and the creation of Israel are often presented as a case of settlercolonialism, some scholars question the applicability of the settler-colonial paradigm in the case
of Palestine/Israel. For example, Fleischacker points out that, unlike most other settler-colonial
societies, Zionist Jews lacked a “metropole” to which they could return if and when the Zionist
project failed (whereas French Algerians could have returned to France, English colonists to
England, and so on) (67). Polakow-Suransky discusses how “many Israelis saw their
independence as a postcolonial triumph akin to the successful liberation struggles of newly
independent African and Asian countries and they bristled at any attempt to equate Zionism with
European colonialism” (5). Raef Zreik argues that what the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine
have experienced as a settler-colonial project to dispossess Palestinians and take their land,
Jewish Zionists have simultaneously viewed as a nationalist movement for Jewish liberation and
self-determination:
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Zionism is a settler-colonial project, but not only that. It combines the image of the
refugee with the image of the soldier, the powerless with the powerful, the victim with
the victimizer, the colonizer with the colonized, a settler project and a national project at
the same time. The Europeans see the back of the Jewish refugee fleeing for his life. The
Palestinian sees the face of the settler colonialist taking over his land. (358-359)
A few scholars have also disputed the settler-colonial characterization. These scholars
often argue that the influence of postcolonial theory in the academy has led to an ideological bias
against Israel since many postcolonial scholars often see the colonizer/colonized dichotomy in
black and white terms, with Palestinians represented as the oppressed subaltern “Others” and
Israel and Zionism as the oppressive colonizers (Shimoni 859-860; Sicher 1; Rynhold 16;
Grossman). Shimoni argues that the settler-colonial perspective oversimplifies the conflict and
that some aspects of postcolonial theory can apply to early Zionism, with Zionist Jews being the
oppressed subalterns in Europe (860-862). Many of these critiques of the settler-colonial
paradigm overlook the dramatic power imbalance in Palestine/Israel since 1948, an imbalance
which supports the characterization of Palestine/Israel as a settler-colonial society, especially
after the post-1967 growth of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the annexation of East
Jerusalem, and recent proposals to annex more Palestinian land (Thrall, “Trump’s Middle East”).
When examining the rhetorical situation and ecology for the Palestinian rights struggle
and pro-BDS movement discourse, postcolonial theory can offer much useful historical, political,
and discursive context, especially since the BDS Movement uses the settler-colonial frame when
describing the situation in Palestine/Israel. Postcolonial scholarship, however, lacks an in-depth
focus on the rhetorical situation and rhetorical strategies used by Palestinians and their
supporters in resistance discourse, including pro-BDS rhetoric. Though Said and other
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postcolonial scholars acknowledge some of the rhetorical obstacles faced by Palestinian activists,
including that “no other movement in history has had so difficult an opponent: a people
recognized as the classical victim of history,” postcolonial scholarship has not fully investigated
and explained the rhetorical constraints faced by the Palestinian-led BDS movement nor the
rhetorical and framing strategies used by BDS movement activist-rhetors (Said, Question xxii).
An in-depth exploration of the rhetorical situation and framing of pro-BDS discourse thus
requires scholars to go beyond the postcolonial approach and examine the situation from a
rhetorical perspective, which also demands a stronger focus on audience and the fitness or
resonance of rhetorical moves and framing. A rhetorical lens that reveals common pro-BDS
framing strategies can also elucidate the content of pro-BDS discourse for audiences that are
more often exposed to the frames used by Israel’s advocates, which can, in turn, help people
understand where discussions of the situation in Palestine/Israel too often fall back into proIsrael and anti-Palestinian narratives that ignore the Palestinian perspective and framing.
Interdisciplinary Scholarship on the BDS Movement and Palestinian Resistance
In addition to postcolonial scholarship, interdisciplinary scholarship about Palestinian
resistance to Israeli settler-colonialism and BDS movement discourse can not only help shed
light on the history, political context, and rhetorical situation and ecology for pro-BDS discourse,
but also present the common arguments on both sides of the BDS debate. This research from the
fields of peace studies, conflict resolution, political science, cultural studies, internet studies, and
other fields can help fill in the outlines of the BDS debate and BDS-related scholarship and thus
help provide context to set up my rhetorical frame analysis (Hallward; Pearlman; Bakan and
Abu-Laban; Siapera; Omer; Butler; Morrison). For example, some elements of the immediate
historical context and kairos, or timing, for the BDS call can be found in interdisciplinary
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scholarship and include the ending of the violent and ineffective Second Intifada (or “al-Aqsa
Intifada”) and the construction of Israel’s separation barrier in the West Bank, which has
confiscated Palestinian lands, separated many Palestinians from their farms and livelihoods, and
made travel between West Bank cities much more difficult for Palestinians (Bakan and AbuLaban 39; Morrison, “The Emergence” 231-237). Among the rest of Israel’s ongoing policies of
occupation, including checkpoints, curfews, night raids, detentions without trials, home
demolitions, etc., Israel’s separation barrier was a significant impetus for the 2005 BDS Call,
which was issued on the one-year anniversary of the International Court of Justice ruling
declaring the wall illegal (Bakan and Abu-Laban 39; Morrison, “The Emergence” 231-237).
Hassan argues that since the end of the Oslo era and the death of esteemed Palestinian figures
like Arafat, Edward Said, and the poet Mahmoud Darwish, the BDS movement fills “a political
vacuum, taking on the role once held by the PLO to build Palestinian unity around a common
goal and mobilize international solidarity” in the quest for Palestinian liberation (27). Other,
more recent events have spurred the growth of BDS activism, including the 2008-2009 and 2014
Israeli assaults on Gaza, the Goldstone Report, the flotillas for Gaza, the 2015 reelection of
Netanyahu, and other events in the region7 (UN Human Rights Council; “Whitewash Protocol”;
Nabulsi 106; Booth).
Other scholars from multiple disciplines offer contextualization for BDS discourse in
their discussion of earlier initiatives that used BDS tactics but predated the official Palestinian
7

Each of the following events have been referenced as formative for spurring increased Palestinian solidarity
activism and support for BDS: the 2008-2009 Israeli war on Gaza (also known as Operation Cast Lead); the 2009
UN Human Rights Council’s “Goldstone Report” on Operation Cast Lead by the United Nations Fact Finding
Mission on the Gaza Conflict headed by Justice Richard Goldstone that determined that both Israel and Hamas may
have committed war crimes against civilians during the conflict; Israel’s 2014 war on Gaza (Operation Protective
Edge) for which Israel was heavily criticized for causing the high number of civilian casualties since 1967; and the
widely condemned 2010 Israeli attack on the Turkish Mavi Marmara, part of the flotilla of ships full of Palestinian
solidarity activists seeking to break the Israeli siege to deliver aid to Gaza (UN Human Rights Council; “Whitewash
Protocol”; Nabulsi 106; Booth).
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BDS Call in 2005. According to Feld, many activists from the US, Europe, and even Israel,
called for boycotts of Israeli or settlement products beginning in the 1980s and going through the
2000s up until the official Palestinian BDS call in 2005 (134). The 2001 World Conference
Against Racism held in Durban, South Africa, during the height of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (or
Second Intifada) was one of the first times that NGOs and activists united in advocating use of
the apartheid analogy and the BDS strategy in relation to the situation in Palestine/Israel (Erakat;
Morrison, “The Emergence” 238-239). Feld includes a detailed discussion of the competing
narratives around the Durban I and II conferences in relation to the debates over Palestine/Israel
(134-143). Even though the final draft resolutions were toned down quite a bit, pro-Israel
organizations and US government representatives harshly criticized the conference and walked
out of Durban I after claiming it was anti-Israel and antisemitic for its criticism of Israel and for
equating Israel’s discriminatory treatment of Palestinians with “apartheid,” in early draft
language (Feld 137). Kiewe explains another reason why some supporters of Israel viewed the
2001 Durban conference as antisemitic: because several virulently anti-Semitic flyers and posters
were displayed or passed out by some protestors (70). According to Clarke, early divestment
campaigns in the US began on American and European college campuses during the Al-Aqsa
Intifada; by 2003, more than 50 campuses had joined this new divestment movement (Clarke 45;
Morrison “The Emergence” 241-246). One of the earliest divestment “battles” occurred in 2002
when professors at Harvard and MIT petitioned the universities to divest from Israel (Clarke 45;
Morrison, “The Emergence” 245-246). Clarke points out that the student movement then went
into decline after the US invasion of Iraq as energies shifted to opposition to the war until it was
reborn in 2004 when the Presbyterian Church voted for divestment (46). McMahon also
discusses the 2004 call from the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of
Israel (PACBI) as an important precursor to the 2005 BDS Call (69). Morrison describes the

46
PACBI call for boycott as precedent for the 2005 Call, and she also reviews other early examples
of boycott initiatives between 2000 and 2005, including several initiatives during the Al-Aqsa
Intifada from churches, college students in the US, and community-based organizations:
Students for Justice in Palestine’s first divestment campaign in 2001, Hilary and Steve Rose’s
2002 open letter in The Guardian calling for an academic boycott of Israel, 2002 MIT and
Harvard divestment petitions, and several church-related divestment campaigns after the death of
American activist Rachel Corrie in 20038 (“The Emergence” 241-247).
Some common counter arguments and critiques of BDS from Israel advocates also
originated during this earlier period and include charges of antisemitism and complaints of
“delegitimizing” the Jewish state, “singling out” Jews and Israel, and applying a “doublestandard” to Israel by not focusing on other worse human-rights abusers (the latter two charges
were similarly levied against supporters of the boycott of apartheid South Africa) (Brackman;
Clarke 48; Ananth 129-131; Reut Institute, “Building a Political” 13-14; Rosenfeld; Kriek; Dohi;
Khalek, “How Today’s”; Bueckert). For the 2002 Harvard-MIT and 2004 Presbyterian calls for
divestment, critics and pro-Israel advocates argued that it was representative of a form of “new
anti-Semitism” that denies Jews the right to self-determination through a two-state solution and
focuses unfairly on Israel as a target of criticism (Clarke 45-46; Rosenfeld). Rabbi Abraham
Cooper of the Simon Wiesenthal Center referred to the 2004 Presbyterian action as being
“functionally anti-Semitic,” similarly to Summers and Foxman’s claim of “effective antiSemitism”—a claim still frequently made about BDS today (Clarke 48). Fishman presents a
common anti-BDS view by arguing that pro-BDS discourse “combines anti-Semitism with antiZionism,” which “is all the more dangerous because under the guise of a quest for justice its
advocates skillfully conceal the strategic objective of isolating and destroying the Jewish state”
8

Rachel Corrie was an International Solidarity Movement (ISM) activist who was killed in 2003 by an Israeli
bulldozer while trying to protect a Palestinian home from demolition in Gaza (Gordon).
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(412). This equating of anti-Zionism with antisemitism is also prominently featured in the 2019
The New Anti-Semites report co-authored by StopAntiSemitism.org and the Zachar Legal
Institute and endorsed by several right-leaning pro-Israel organizations (The New Anti-Semites).
This report relies on a series of anecdotal examples to link the BDS Movement with antisemitism
by using the controversial expanded International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)
definition of antisemitism that equates anti-Zionism with antisemitism and includes harsh
critiques of Israel in its definition of antisemitism (e.g., making comparisons with Israel and
Nazism). These arguments painting the BDS movement as antisemitic are an important part of
the context and constraints faced by pro-BDS activist-rhetors as they attempt to present their own
arguments and counterframing in support of Palestinian rights.
Several scholars attempt to define the problem of how the BDS movement and
Palestinian solidarity activists should address the frequent antisemitism charge against BDS. For
example, in Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism, Judith Butler counters the
argument that BDS is anti-Semitic by drawing on the writings of Levinas, Benjamin, Arendt, and
others to separate Jewishness and Judaism from Zionism and explore how Jewish philosophy and
the history of Jewish struggles for social justice can be used to support a critique of Israeli policy
that is not antisemitic in either function or intent (1-4). On the other hand, Omer argues that
trying to distinguish Judaism from Zionism, and thus avoid charges of antisemitism, sometimes
leads the Palestine solidarity movement to “dismiss Judaism and Jewish histories as irrelevant to
its critique of Israeli policies,” which she sees as counterproductive (“It’s Nothing” 503). Omer
also argues that the global Palestinian solidarity movement, which includes BDS, should
incorporate conflict resolution strategies that recognize the Jewish Zionist narrative in addition to
the Palestinian one—rather than oversimplifying the conflict into an easy “oppressor” vs.
“oppressed” framework—if it is to be more effective and avoid charges of antisemitism (“It’s

48
Nothing” 502). Yi and Phillips argue that those on both sides of the BDS debate, “are locked in
competing narratives of victimization,” and thus, “the moralistic BDS campaign against Israeli
‘oppression’ predictably meets a counter-campaign that charges BDS supporters with implicit or
explicit ‘anti-Semitism’” (307). They further argue that “this Manichean contest erodes mutual
trust and security, hardens each party’s position, and shrinks the space for internal dissent” (307).
Lloyd and Schueller counter the antisemitism charge against BDS by explaining why they
believe Israel is an appropriate target for boycott: Israel is dependent on other nations, it has a
relatively open public sphere and ability for citizens to influence the government because of their
desire to be seen as a “democratic” and civilized nation, Palestinians support the boycott, Israel
could conceivably adhere to the stated BDS principles, and the boycott is based on nonviolent
principles (2).
The debate over the political outcome of a one-state versus a two-state solution is also
relevant to the antisemitism charge against the BDS movement. The BDS movement and call is
conceived as a “rights-based” approach that deliberately avoids taking a stand on the political
outcome of a one-state or two-state solution and instead focuses on the acquisition of human
rights for all sectors of the Palestinian people. However, because some BDS leaders, including
Omar Barghouti, have personally advocated for a one-state solution, many critics of BDS paint
the entire movement as advocating a one-state solution, which is seen by many Jews and Israel
advocates as an inherently antisemitic attempt to deny Jews the right to self-determination
(Barghouti, “Putting” 57; Reut Institute, “Building a Political” 14; Erakat; Chaitin et al., “BDS”).
This association weakens the credibility or ethos of the BDS movement and pro-BDS activistrhetors in the eyes of many liberal Zionists and supporters of a two-state solution. This
connection between BDS and the one-state solution by BDS critics further overlooks the fact that
many Palestinians and BDS activists also favor a two-state solution, including about half of
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Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank, as a 2015 survey indicated (Sawafta). These
critics also often present the call for the right of return as merely an attempt to “destroy” Israel,
an argument which ignores the precedent and justifications for the right of return in international
law and overlooks the fact that many Palestinians believe this right could be implemented in a
practical way as part of a two-state solution (Hallward, Transnational 110; Palestinian Center for
Policy and Survey Research, “Results”; Fishman).
Several scholars have discussed the implications of BDS activists’ frequent use of the
term “apartheid” and the South Africa analogy in reference to Israeli policies toward the
Palestinians, which can also provide useful context for my rhetorical frame analysis of pro-BDS
discourse. Di Stefano and Henaway examine parallels between the South African and
Palestinian-led BDS campaigns and argue that, like the anti-apartheid BDS campaign targeting
South Africa, BDS for Palestinians is also an effective way to nonviolently campaign for human
rights, build international solidarity, and end Israel’s colonial occupation (19). The annual Israeli
Apartheid Week (IAW) events on US and European college campuses in recent years have been
one avenue for BDS activists to discursively connect the situation in Palestine/Israel to a familiar
analogy and reframe the issue as one of racial oppression and discrimination rather than a
“conflict” between two equal sides (Erakat). Though it can be a useful analogy to link the
situation in Palestine/Israel to an earlier struggle for equality that most older Americans
remember well, the use of the apartheid framework also incites fear in many supporters of Israel
that BDS seeks a one-state solution and thus the end of Jewish self-determination in Israel
similar to the end of white rule in South Africa through the “one person, one vote” strategy of the
anti-apartheid struggle (Erakat; Morrison, “The Emergence” 249-250; Reut Institute, “Building a
Political” 13). Some supporters of Israel have even claimed that the apartheid analogy is
inherently anti-Semitic because it “demonizes” Israel, and opposition to IAW organizing has
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even led to some cases in which university administrators have labeled IAW discourse as hate
speech and even banned IAW activism altogether, which has occurred at Exeter and Central
Lancashire universities in the UK in 2017, Northeastern University in Boston and Barnard
College in 2014, Fordham University in 2017 where the university banned Students for Justice in
Palestine from Fordham campus altogether, and a handful of Canadian universities where IAW
posters were banned in 2009 (Weale and Morris; Butnick; Redden, “Fordham Denies”; AbuLaban and Bakan 323-325).
In addition to analyses of the apartheid analogy and framing, some scholars have also
written about the relationship between the Israeli government and apartheid South Africa—
including both a discussion of similarities and differences between Israeli discriminatory policies
and South African apartheid and a description of the official relationship between the two
governments during the apartheid era. In the introduction to their edited collection, Soske and
Jacobs summarize the debate about whether it is appropriate to apply the apartheid label to
Israeli policies:
On one level, the parallels are unmistakable. Apartheid South Africa and Israel both
originated through a process of conquest and settlement justified largely on the grounds
of religion and ethnic nationalism. Both pursued a legalized, large-scale program of
displacing the earlier inhabitants from their land. Both instituted a variety of
discriminatory laws based on racial or ethnic grounds. In South Africa itself, the
comparison is so widely accepted. . . that it is generally uncontroversial. Leading
members of the antiapartheid struggle, including the Archbishop Desmond Tutu and
Jewish activists such as Ronnie Kasrils, have repeatedly averred that the conditions in the
West Bank and Gaza are ‘worse’ than apartheid. (4)
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They go on to explain that, “no historical analogy is ever exact” and “comparisons reveal
differences even as they underline similarities” (4). Other scholarship that examines the links
between South Africa and Israel includes the collection edited by Israeli historian Ilan Pappé,
Israel and South Africa: The Many Faces of Apartheid, which also investigates the similarities
and differences between the colonialisms of these two cases. Sasha Polakow-Suransky goes
beyond the apartheid analogy to describe the close alliance that developed between Israel and the
South African apartheid regime.
Other interdisciplinary scholarship addresses the issue of academic freedom and the
perceived risks of speaking out in favor of BDS and Palestinian rights in American higher
education—a discussion that is relevant to understanding some of the constraints on pro-BDS
discourse. While critics of BDS and the academic boycott of Israel claim that such a boycott
hurts academic freedom for Israeli academics, supporters counter that Israeli academic
institutions are complicit in Israeli abuses against the Palestinians and that Israel’s policies harm
the academic freedom of Palestinians (PACBI). Abu-Laban and Bakan echo the argument of
many pro-BDS and pro-Palestinian activists and assert that to claim critics of Israel are
motivated by antisemitism “serves to silence public discourse and limit freedom of expression”
(323). In Uncivil Rites: Palestine and the Limits of Academic Freedom, Steven Salaita discusses
his own loss of academic freedom when his tenure-track position at UIUC was rescinded because
of his outspoken critiques of Israel and activism on behalf of Palestinian rights. In Out of
Bounds: Academic Freedom and the Question of Palestine, Abraham describes cases of U.S.
scholars critical of the Israeli narrative facing vilification and abuse both from within and
without the academy, leading to a perceived risk associated with doing Israel-Palestine
scholarship (79-82). This risk has been heightened recently by the Trump administration’s
official adoption of the controversial IHRA definition of antisemitism in its efforts to define anti-
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Zionist advocacy for Palestinian rights as antisemitic, which will likely lead to further repression
of pro-Palestinian and pro-BDS activism on college campuses as some aspects of BDS activism
and rhetoric can be restricted and punished under this new interpretation of Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act (Kushner; Redden, “Trump Order”)9.
Some scholars of Palestinian and BDS activism focus on how the internet and social
media is used both as a tool and as a virtual public sphere for transnational organizing and
activism. Nabulsi and Aouragh both highlight the ways that digital activism, including in the
BDS movement, has enabled a virtual mobility for Palestinians living in the occupied territories
and the diaspora (Nabulsi 116; Aouragh 75). In her study of the use of #Palestine on Twitter,
Siapera found that the BDS campaign was the topic of many activist-related tweets that were
“not only factual/informational, but also emotive, rhetorical and offering encouragement” about
BDS and Palestinian solidarity activism, suggesting implications for further rhetorical study of
BDS-related social media (550-551). Hitchcock rhetorically analyzes BDS movement social
media discourse and argues that the movement’s social media usage facilitates on-the-ground
actions and delivers information to supporters while mostly avoiding the emotional connection
and audience interactivity common to some other recent movements. Abu-Ayyash examines how
Palestinian solidarity activists in the UK and Ireland used Twitter during Israel’s 2014 war on
Gaza to introduce Palestinian stories to an international audience, provide information, and
organize local solidarity actions while promoting human rights discourse about the situation.
Aouragh brings together Habermas and Anderson to argue that, “with greater diversification of
media structures, citizens have become attached to a (mediated) ‘global’ public sphere and
transnational imagined community” in which “online mobility became part of the alternatives to
overcome that lack of mobility” (Aouragh 26, 75).
9

A few weeks after the Trump Administration announced this new policy, the Harvard Law Review published a
Note arguing that student activism on behalf of BDS and Palestinian rights is not a form of discrimination that
should fall under civil rights protections (“Wielding Antidiscrimination Law”).
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Some recent texts present overviews of various issues and debates related to
Palestine/Israel and the BDS movement and are useful resources to help scholars understand
various perspectives on different elements of the debates over Palestine/Israel and BDS. For
example, Social Justice and Israel/Palestine, edited by Tapper and Sucharov, incorporates many
short essays by contributing scholars discussing a range of issues relevant to how Palestine/Israel
fits into contemporary social justice activism, including essays on settler-colonialism,
international law, refugees, apartheid, intersectionality, and the BDS movement. This text
includes contributions offering a variety of perspectives on the issues included, some from a proIsrael view and some that take a pro-Palestinian and pro-BDS perspective. For a review of
Zionist arguments against the BDS movement and in defense of Israel and the two-state solution,
Cary Nelson’s Dreams Deferred: A Concise Guide to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict & the
Movement to Boycott Israel strives to be an anti-BDS encyclopedia and includes contributions on
a range of topics related to the history of Israel, Zionism, the BDS movement, and other Israel
and BDS-related issues. Nelson intends for his book to function as “a concise, accessible guide
to the key terms and issues at stake,” and he asserts that the book’s contributors are
“unequivocally opposed to the effort to boycott and eliminate the State of Israel” (5-6). These
two texts offer insights into some of the arguments both for and against BDS.
Social Movement Studies and Movement Rhetorics
In the absence of significant rhetorical scholarship on the discourse and actions of the
Palestinian-led BDS movement, it is useful to examine how social movement research can offer
productive strategies and examples that can be incorporated into a rhetorical framing study of
pro-BDS discourse. Social movement studies typically take two directions—one being a subfield
of sociology, and the other, a subfield of rhetoric. Thus, social movement theory offers a way to
connect social movement rhetorics with the sociological study of social movements and
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interdisciplinary research on Palestinian resistance discourse, which can help elucidate the
context for various rhetorical strategies, appeals, and framing choices of the BDS movement.
While I will go more in-depth into the larger field of social movement rhetoric in the next
chapter, in this section I review how social movement rhetorical studies and multidisciplinary
social movement research address similar human rights movements to that of the BDS
movement in order to help construct my own rhetorical framing analysis.
One angle from which scholars could approach pro-BDS discourse is to draw upon the
analogy between Palestine/Israel and South Africa to look at the similarities and differences
between the discourses in each case. While several scholars mentioned earlier have also
promoted or investigated the apartheid comparison, some rhetorical social movement scholarship
has examined the discourse of the South African anti-apartheid movement in depth, thus offering
examples of how rhetorical theory can be useful for understanding the role social movement
discourse plays in resolving long-term injustices like the situation in Palestine/Israel. Because the
South African anti-apartheid movement is also a stated inspiration for the Palestinian-led BDS
movement, such research is useful and relevant to my study and can help me develop my
heuristic questions for analysis. For example, in Finding the Words: A Rhetorical History of
South Africa’s Transition from Apartheid to Democracy, Moriarty examines how Burkean
identification relates to the changing discourse of leaders of both the ANC and the apartheid
government of South Africa to argue that, “South Africa’s rhetoric of violent conflict rested on
constructions of the opposition as mortal enemies, violent foes who not only wanted to share
political power, but wanted to destroy the other group as well” (9). Moriarty argues that the main
reason why South Africa avoided the violent civil wars that accompanied the transition from
white minority rule in other African countries is that “its political leaders changed the way they
talked about the political scene” (3). He argues that the primary ways in which leaders on both
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sides shifted how they discussed the situation included how they used identification and division
to define the opposition versus the “us,” along with how they characterized relationships between
important actors and identified who the major actors were in the first place (3). In another
rhetorical study of South African discourse, An African Athens: Rhetoric and the Shaping of
Democracy in South Africa, Salazar discusses the rhetorical aspects of South Africa’s transition
to democracy at the end of apartheid. He focuses on the rhetoric of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission report and the 1996 South African constitution after the end of apartheid, and his
discussion can, in some ways, be seen as a blueprint for the deliberative discourse of democratic
decolonization in Palestine/Israel. I will discuss my heuristic questions for coding more in-depth
in Chapter 3, including how I incorporate Moriarty’s focus on Burkean identification and
division as part of my own analysis of pro-BDS discourse.
Social movement scholars who take a sociological approach can also offer useful
methods and theories to help ground a rhetorical study of social movement discourse. For
example, Keck and Sikkink’s research on transnational advocacy networks suggests that the
failure of Palestinians and their supporters to achieve any significant gains via traditional
channels of domestic and international advocacy may be a primary reason for the emergence of
the transnational BDS movement:
Transnational advocacy networks appear most likely to emerge around those issues
where (1) channels between domestic groups and their governments are blocked or
hampered or where such channels are ineffective for resolving a conflict, setting into
motion the ‘boomerang’ pattern of influence characteristic of these networks. . . Where
channels of participation are blocked, the international arena may be the only means that
domestic activists have to gain attention to their issues. (12)
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Thus, rather than a unique example of unfairly singling out the Jewish state, as BDS critics
claim, international solidarity with the Palestinian-led BDS movement may instead reflect a
common occurrence and feature of international human rights campaigns that seek international
solidarity when domestic protest and pressure is blocked or ineffective, which is the case for
Palestinians living under the harsh repression of both Israel’s occupying forces and, more
recently, the Palestinian Authority as well (Israel and Palestine; “Palestine: Authorities”).
Other social movement scholars focus on how counterpublics develop social movement
and human rights frames and define conceptions of “justice.” Kennedy discusses the role of a
transnational public sphere for international activist discourses and the problem of the competing
narratives (similar to frames) of “human rights” versus “security,” a narrative battle that often
arises in discussions of Palestine/Israel and one that is relevant to my study of framing (72-73).
Amartya Sen examines the concept of “justice” and the role of the public sphere in determining
what is “just,” arguing that, “The role of unrestricted public reasoning is quite central to
democratic politics in general and to the pursuit of social justice in particular” (44). He also
connects “justice” to the concept of “fairness,” and emphasizes the necessity of avoiding bias in
our determinations of justice, as well as “taking note of the interests and concerns of others as
well, and in particular the need to avoid being influenced by our respective vested interests, or by
our personal priorities or eccentricities or prejudices” (54). In addition to her important work on
counterpublics, Nancy Fraser discusses the limitations of defining justice based on the artificial
Westphalian borders of nation states. She argues that “misframing” happening when people cast
“what are actually transnational injustices as national matters” and when “affected non-citizens
are wrongly excluded from consideration” (6). Her discussion is reminiscent of the “misframing”
that occurs when the injustices faced by Palestinians are divided up and diluted through the
process of separating the Palestinian people into the distinct categories of refugees, those living
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under occupation, and Palestinian citizens of Israel, even though the source of injustice is the
same for all three segments of the Palestinian population.
Research on Palestinian Resistance, Solidarity, and BDS Movement Discourse
In this last section, I review the small number analyses of BDS movement discourse that
relate most closely to my own project and thus help provide some useful examples for my
research. These studies offer some productive avenues for studying BDS movement rhetoric, but
because they come primarily from the fields of peace studies and conflict resolution and are thus
outside of the rhetorical field, they overlook some discursive components that a rhetorical frame
analysis could address to achieve a deeper understanding of pro-BDS framing and rhetorical
strategies, including how resonant and fitting these strategies may be for targeted audiences.
Studies of the history of Palestinian nonviolent activism provide useful background for
understanding how the BDS movement emerged out of a tradition of Palestinian popular
resistance and demonstrate that nonviolent tactics, including boycotts, have been part of the
Palestinian struggle since before the founding of Israel. Scholarship about the history of
Palestinian nonviolent activism often focus on the First Intifada, in which the vast majority of
organized actions, including boycotts, strikes, tax refusal, mass protests, etc., were nonviolent in
nature, even though some participants also threw stones and Molotov cocktails (Sharp 3; AbuNimer 90; Mishal and Aharoni 39-43; Hallward and Shaver 541; Grant). Mishal and Aharoni
emphasize that the majority of official communiqués issued by Palestinian leaders of the First
Intifada advocated for nonviolent forms of resistance (39-43). Several other peace and conflict
resolution scholars also discuss Palestinian nonviolent activism in more recent decades
(Hallward; Kaufman et al.; Pearlman; Darweish and Rigby; Abu-Nimer; Chaitin et al.). Arens
and Kaufman analyze Israeli perceptions of Palestinian resistance actions in light of collective

58
Jewish memories of victimhood and conclude by arguing that purely nonviolent Palestinian
actions are most effective for a Jewish audience (231). In her study of the Palestinian national
movement’s use of both violent and nonviolent strategies, Pearlman emphasizes that mass
nonviolent protest requires that a movement “have or create internal cohesion,” which
fragmented Palestinian political institutions have typically lacked because they are divided
between Hamas, Fatah, and other rival Palestinian factions and split between the West Bank and
Gaza, thus making a coordinated nonviolent movement based in the Occupied Territories
difficult (16).
Chaitin et al. bring a conflict resolution perspective to one of the very few studies of both
pro- and anti-BDS movement discourse in “‘BDS – It’s Complicated’: Israeli, Jewish, and
Others’ Views on the Boycott of Israel” and “Polarized Words: Discourse on the Boycott of
Israel, Social Justice and Conflict Resolution.” In “‘BDS – It’s Complicated,’” Chaitin et al.
surveyed attitudes of Jews and non-Jews from Israel and other western countries regarding BDS
and antisemitism and found that non-Jews were less likely to view BDS as being antisemitic and
more likely to favor BDS when compared with Jewish respondents. In “Polarized Words,” the
authors again analyzed attitudes toward BDS, this time by analyzing the language used to discuss
the issue, and they found that both supporters and opponents of BDS often used polarizing
language of attack, ethnocentrism, “us” vs. “them” rhetoric, and emotionally loaded terms, all of
which amounts to “rhetorical violence that expressed opposite ideological-political perspectives,
with each side disregarding the legitimacy of the ‘other’” (287). The authors further argue that a
social justice perspective on BDS tends to focus only on Palestinian rights while ignoring Israeli
Jewish rights, and they advocate for a conflict-resolution approach to the subject of BDS that
would include dialogue to educate people on both sides of the debate, encourage more nuanced
intellectual discussion, and avoid the current unproductive polarization around BDS (287-289).
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While Chaitin et al. examine discourse and attitudes on both sides of the BDS debate, and they
include a useful literature review of other research on the BDS movement, they do not focus on
framing, nor do they consider other rhetorical aspects of BDS discourse.
Atalia Omer considers identity and framing in relation to Palestinian solidarity activism
and discourses in her study of American Jews who are redefining their Jewish identity by
questioning Zionism and supporting Palestinian rights in Days of Awe: Reimagining Jewishness
in Solidarity with Palestinians. Omer, an Israeli scholar of religion, conflict, and peace studies,
conducted in-depth interviews with dozens of Jewish Palestinian solidarity activists to find out
how their understandings and common framings of Palestine/Israel changed as a result of their
questioning of mainstream Jewish and Zionist doxa regarding Palestine/Israel. She finds that
“ethical outrage, solidarity with Palestinians, and struggles for social justice in other areas
motivate activists to reimagine Jewishness through liturgical and hermeneutical innovation and
social protest” (7). Though Omer does not focus in depth on framing, her research offers a useful
exploration of how some American Jews come to understand the Palestinian perspective and
decide to become activists in solidarity with Palestinians—and how they end up moving from
accepting a pro-Israel framing of the situation to instead understand the situation in terms of
oppression, human rights, and injustice. Omer argues that many of these Jewish Palestinian
solidarity activists, who belong to groups like JVP, JFREJ, INN, CJNV, ATL, Open Hillel, and
other groups that support Palestinian rights and an end to the occupation (and in some cases who
support the BDS movement as well), have often experienced cognitive dissonance resulting from
their encounters with the Palestinian perspective after having been incubated in Zionist pro-Israel
narratives for much of their lives: “The psychological stress caused by such dissonance often
drives them to a transformative process that ultimately disrupts ontological and epistemological
certainties as well as the narratives that undergird them” (71). Omer’s research also reveals how
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many Jewish activists came to Palestinian solidarity through intersectional organizing and
activism after being politicized through other social movements, including LGBTQ+ rights,
antiracism, anti-war activism, women’s rights, etc., thus emphasizing the role of intersectionality
in linking many social movements to Palestinian solidarity and BDS (79-94). Omer’s work sheds
light on the mechanisms that induce many American Jews to support Palestinians and the BDS
movement, including the important roles played by identity, solidarity, and framing.
One study that does touch on framing in relation to BDS discourse is Suzanne Morrison’s
examination of the early development of the BDS movement and her in-depth look at the “We
Divest” campaign, in which she looks at social movement framing in relation to the BDS
movement (Morrison, “The Emergence”; Morrison, “Organizing the Boycott”). In “The
Emergence of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Movement,” after reviewing some aspects
of the political and social context that served as opportunities to mobilize supporters for the BDS
movement, Morrison devotes a few paragraphs to a brief overview of the early BDS movement’s
use of collective action frames to justify targeting Israel with a South African model of BDS as a
remedy for Israel’s violations of international law, infringement of Palestinian human rights, and
apartheid-like policies (247-250). While Morrison’s study considers BDS framing and offers
some useful discussion of BDS frames that I also examine in my own research, she approaches
her analysis from a political science perspective rather than a rhetorical one, and her work does
not address my own particular research questions.
Another scholar of BDS discourse who comes closest to a rhetorical approach to
Palestinian solidarity discourse is Maia Carter Hallward. In Transnational Activism and the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Hallward uses a peace studies lens and applies discourse analysis to
case studies of BDS initiatives in order to examine the controversies and debates on both sides
regarding specific BDS campaigns. Rather than looking at the effectiveness of claims on either
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side of the debate, however, she examines BDS discourse “to demonstrate how sets of
assumptions about the issues at hand in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, vary in their conception
of ‘peace,’ and draw upon different forms of rhetorical, material, and relational power” (2).
Though she doesn’t cite Burke’s work on identification and division, Hallward also touches on
issues of identification in her analysis of BDS discourse on both sides of the debate:
The BDS movement is so contentious in the United States because of the centrality of
debates about identity, and the mobilization of fear regarding the safety of the identities
in question. Polarization surrounding BDS tactics is emphasized by opponents of BDS
who portray pro-BDS activists as part of a coherent, homogenized ‘out-group’ that poses
a threat to a particular ‘in-group.’ (33)
Some of Hallward’s work sometimes directly or indirectly touches on elements of
audience and rhetorical strategies, though she does not investigate either issue in depth. For
example, her argument echoes Abraham’s and Bawarshi’s discussion of affect, transference,
belatedness, and uptake memories in their contributions to Toward a Critical Rhetoric on the
Israel-Palestine Conflict by pointing out how BDS opponents “have drawn on collective
memories of Jewish victimhood and trauma to frame BDS efforts as a threat not only to Jewish
identity but also to the State of Israel” (36). She also describes how BDS activists tend to focus
on the grassroots level while anti-BDS activists often prefer to target figures of power and
authority, such as college administrators, politicians, and other officials (59). She also
emphasizes the differences between the peace studies approach that aligns with postcolonial
theory and pro-BDS discourse versus a conflict resolution approach that is more typical of
Israel’s advocates:
Nonviolent resistance tends to seek fundamental system-level change and generally
operates in situations of asymmetric power. Consequently, the focus and language of
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nonviolence is different from that used for dialog and conflict resolution, which often
presumes symmetrical parties and often seeks to preserve the status quo with slight
modifications to end overt conflict. (105)
Hallward even briefly addresses audience and potential rhetorical effectiveness or fitness:
By connecting the values of their audiences—peace, justice, environmental sustainability,
and human rights—with their BDS campaigns, activists hoped their audiences would
experience cognitive dissonance, rethink their views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and the US role in sustaining Israel’s occupation, and engage in concrete action for
change. (189)
Hallward’s research also illustrates how Orientalism and Islamophobia work in the context of the
BDS debate in the US, such that “anti-Muslim bias and the negative stereotypes of Muslims
especially prevalent in the United States since the September 11, 2001, attacks” have led to
Jewish voices often being privileged in BDS debates and Jews being frequently “sought out for
their opinions on BDS campaigns, whereas Muslim and Arab community members often felt
silenced” (183).
As indicated by this review of interdisciplinary research on discourse related to
Palestine/Israel and the BDS movement, while some useful and productive scholarship has
investigated the history of Palestinian resistance to Israeli settler colonialism and the discourse of
the Palestinian solidarity movement, there has been very little attention from rhetoric scholars
specifically to the discourse of pro-BDS movement activist-rhetors. Neither the rhetoric of
official movement leaders, nor that of rank-and-file supporters has been investigated in depth
from a rhetorical perspective, which leaves a significant gap in the study of this transnational
social movement.
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Conclusion
This review of interdisciplinary scholarship on the BDS movement has helped me, and
hopefully other scholars as well, discern where gaps in scholarly approaches exist, provide some
useful examples to help me develop my heuristic for analysis, and furnish me with some useful
background and context as I consider various aspects of the rhetorical situation and ecologies for
pro-BDS discourse in later chapters. Reviewing this research demonstrates that while much is
known about BDS, there are still significant gaps in the rhetorical understanding of pro-BDS
discourse. Extant scholarship from various disciplines reveals some important elements of the
historical and political context for BDS and transnational nonviolent Palestinian solidarity
activism, including some aspects of the kairos of why the BDS call was launched when it was
(after the end of the Second Intifada and the ICJ ruling that declared the Israeli separation barrier
illegal) and how changing events in the region and internationally have impacted audience
reaction and support for pro-BDS discourse (including the Gaza Wars in 2008-2009 and 2014,
etc.); the basic arguments for and against BDS and its focus on Palestinian rights; how some
audiences in the West have perceived the BDS movement so far; and some rhetorical challenges
and obstacles faced by BDS activists, including Islamophobia, Western sensitivity to
antisemitism and memory of past Jewish trauma, and the competing narratives and framing of
“human rights” versus “security.” Social movement theory also offers a useful complement to
rhetorical and interdisciplinary approaches to the study of pro-BDS discourse. The existing
interdisciplinary scholarship, however, neglects in-depth rhetorical analysis of the strategies and
appeals used by BDS leaders and grassroots-level activists and the resonance of these appeals
with the BDS movement’s audiences given the constraints of the evolving rhetorical situation
and ecology. Thus, investigating pro-BDS discourse more holistically requires a rhetorical lens,
and, as I argue more in-depth in the next chapter, rhetorical frame analysis is a particularly
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productive approach that will address these gaps and help scholars come to a deeper
understanding of the BDS movement and its rhetorical moves.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

My review of existing relevant interdisciplinary research into Palestine/Israel and BDS
movement-related discourse in Chapter 2 demonstrates that no rhetorical studies have yet
focused on analyzing the discourse of the Palestinian-led BDS movement.10 Therefore, in order
to investigate pro-BDS discourse in depth to answer my research questions about how official
and vernacular pro-BDS activist-rhetors frame the BDS movement, their goals, and their
responses to evolving rhetorical situations and challenges, including sensitivity to antisemitism,
as well as to look at how they tailor these frames for different audiences and how resonant or
fitting these framing strategies are likely to be for these audiences, I have built my own approach
to rhetorical frame analysis by developing a multidisciplinary heuristic list of questions for
coding that borrows concepts and methods from rhetorical theory and criticism, social movement
rhetorics, and both sociological and communications-related frame analysis. This rhetorical
frame analysis study can enable academic audiences and rhetoric scholars to gain a deeper
understanding of the ideology, arguments, assumptions, and potential effectiveness and
resonance of this controversial social movement’s rhetoric and, in the process, examine a large
enough corpora of pro-BDS texts to be able to draw generalizable conclusions about pro-BDS
10

Though it does not approach the topic from a rhetorical perspective, one study that does touch on framing in
relation to BDS discourse that I also mention in Chapter 2 is Suzanne Morrison’s examination of the early
development of the BDS movement and her analysis of the “We Divest” campaign, in which she touches on social
movement framing in relation to the BDS movement (Morrison, “The Emergence”; Morrison, “Organizing the
Boycott”). In “The Emergence of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Movement,” after reviewing some aspects
of the political and social context that served as opportunities to mobilize supporters for the BDS movement,
Morrison devotes a few paragraphs to a brief overview of the early BDS movement’s use of collective action frames
to justify targeting Israel with a South African model of BDS as a remedy for Israel’s violations of international law,
infringement of Palestinian human rights, and apartheid-like policies (247-250). These frames discussed by
Morrison also match with the common more recent framing strategies I have found in my research of pro-BDS texts.
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framing. In this chapter, I describe the methodology and methods I have developed and
employed in my rhetorical frame analysis of both official and vernacular pro-BDS texts. I will
describe my process step by step in order to present my approach as a possible blueprint for
similar rhetorical frame analyses that could be applied to the discourse of other social
movements as well.
Why Frame Analysis?
Before settling on frame analysis as a central part of my rhetorical analysis methodology,
I examined other aspects of rhetorical theory and methods for analysis. Because the BDS
movement is part of a larger transnational social movement for Palestinian rights, social
movement criticism, sometimes also called movement rhetorics or movement studies, would be
the methodology and subfield of rhetorical studies most relevant to the study of pro-BDS
discourse. Brock links social movement criticism with other sociological approaches, including
sociolinguistic, feminist, and generic approaches (21). Cathcart asserts that movements
themselves are rhetorical acts, and so understanding the rhetoric of a social movement will
enable scholars to understand the movement itself and the ways movements use language to
induce individuals in the audience to identify with the movement (361). According to Griffin, in
order to analyze a rhetorical movement, it needs to be “isolated, analyzed, evaluated, and
described, so that [the critic] can say, for the particular historical movement which he
investigates: this was the pattern of public discussion, the configuration of discourse, the
physiognomy of persuasion, peculiar to the movement” (185). There are multiple approaches
within movement criticism, and Riches and Sillars admit that rhetorical movement studies lack a
clear form, definition, or methodology (287).
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While doing research into methods of social movement rhetorical criticism and
ideological criticism, I discovered that the subfield of social movement criticism lacks a specific
agreed-upon set of methods for analysis. During my research, I was also introduced to frame
analysis as a possible method for studying social movement rhetoric. One of the sources that
drew my attention to frame analysis as a possible methodology for my project was Stevens and
Malesh’s Active Voices: Composing a Rhetoric of Social Movements. In their introduction,
Malesh and Stevens review some of the multidisciplinary theories relevant to the rhetorical study
of social movements and argue for the inclusion of framing analysis to “offer an interdisciplinary
portal through which rhetoricians can engage social movement scholarship” (10). The authors
briefly discuss the history of how Goffman’s sociological frame analysis was first applied to the
study of social movement discourse when social movement scholars like Snow et al. began
studying social movement frames in order “to account for how individuals come to align their
often apparently divergent understandings into shared interpretations that can support collective
action” (10). From this first brief account of frame analysis, I then investigated social movement
frame analysis scholarship more in depth and determined that it could be fruitfully combined
with some other concepts and methods from rhetorical theory to serve as a useful method for
answering my research questions. Another text from social movement rhetoric I drew from when
developing my coding heuristic is What Democracy Looks Like: The Rhetoric of Social
Movements and Counterpublics edited by Foust et al. This text reviews various theories and
research from the rhetorical study of counterpublics and social movements, and later chapters
include case study analyses of social movements and campaigns related to women’s health
clinics, gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights, Latinx vernacular discourse, activism in China, and
rhetoric about Wikileaks. In addition to Stevens and Malesh’s call to include framing analysis in
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the rhetorical study of social movements, I have also incorporated several relevant methods and
questions for analysis from these chapters and case studies into my heuristic for rhetorical frame
analysis. After briefly reviewing some important applications of frame analysis to the study of
social movements and their discourse, I will then describe my own methods and processes for
research and coding in detail.
While rhetorical analysis is useful for attending to rhetorical situation, audience, and
other aspects of discourse and language use in context, frame analysis can reveal the underlying
frames that have come to be regarded “as a central dynamic in understanding the character and
course of social movements” (Benford and Snow 611). Originally derived from Erving
Goffman’s sociological scholarship, frame analysis has often been used in the field of sociology
to analyze social movement discourse (Goffman; Benford and Snow; Johnston and
Klandermans; Kuypers; Zald; Hope; Tarrow). In addition to the sociological study of social
movement discourse, the concept of framing processes has also been applied in the fields of
cognitive psychology, social psychology, linguistics, communications and media studies,
political science (Benford and Snow 611; Lakoff; Noakes and Johnston 3)11. Kuypers describes
“framing” as “the process whereby communicators act. . . to construct a particular point of view

11

Some useful studies of political and social movement framing strategies from the field of cognitive science can
also be found in the work of cognitive linguist George Lakoff. In addition to his scholarly publications, Lakoff’s The
Political Mind: A Cognitive Scientist’s Guide to Your Brain and its Politics and Don’t Think of an Elephant: Know
Your Values and Frame the Debate are written for a wider audience and have been used by many progressive
activists as handbooks for how to successfully frame a variety of progressive issues (Parrot; Bai). Lakoff has long
argued that conservative politicians and activists in the US have been more effective at framing political issues to
support their views and that progressives need to focus more on framing if they are to be politically successful in the
future (Political Mind, Don’t Think). Lakoff’s view of framing is based on cognitive linguistics, and he argues that
“within the brain itself, frames are natural structures that have evolved from what brains do and are put together out
of simple units” and that narratives are more complex stories made of smaller units of frames that “use cultural
prototypes, themes, images, and icons” to tell stories about people and events (Political Mind 23). Lakoff’s
discussion of the use of frames and metaphors in political narratives is also useful for my rhetorical frame analysis
of pro-BDS discourse by offering methods for identifying frames and discerning the ideologies behind framing
choices.
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that encourages the facts of a given situation to be viewed in a particular manner, with some facts
made more or less noticeable (even ignored) than others” (182). Noakes and Johnston offer a
simple explanation of the utility of the framing concept for understanding social movement
discourse:
In the simplest of terms, framing functions in much the same way as a frame around a
picture: attention gets focused on what is relevant and important and away from
extraneous items in the field of view. Even when oppression is intense or when leaders’
tactics open up clear opportunities for action, individuals must be convinced that an
injustice has occurred, persuaded that collective action is called for, and motivated to act
if a social movement is to occur. (Noakes and Johnston 2)
Two of the most important scholars of social movement framing are Benford and Snow,
who, along with several other important scholars, have developed many of the accepted theories
about the nature and functions of framing in social movement discourse. They describe
“collective action frames” as being used by social movements to simplify and condense aspects
of the world in order to mobilize supporters, gain bystander converts, and refute opponents—all
clearly rhetorical goals of social movement rhetors (614). Benford and Snow also argue that the
most important framing tasks of social movement actors are to diagnose problems, propose
solutions, and motivate supporters (615). Through his work on transnational social movements,
Sidney Tarrow also emphasizes the importance of framing and the difficulty in using frames to
overcome preexisting doxa: “Presenting frames that are new and challenging but still resonate
with existing cultural understandings is a delicate balancing act, especially since society’s
‘common sense’ buttresses the position of elites and defends inherited inequalities” (61). For
example, though it seemed natural for some people to translate the equality or equal rights frame
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from the founders’ concept of white men landowners’ equality (i.e., “all men are created equal”)
to the US civil rights movement and then later to the women’s movement, others’ “common
sense” did not view these later civil rights movements as analogous because of racist and sexist
beliefs that African Americans and women were inherently different and unequal to white men.
This challenge seems especially applicable to pro-BDS discourse that has to contend with
preexisting anti-Palestinian, Orientalist, and Islamophobic beliefs and stereotypes among US and
Western audiences that promote views of Palestinians as hateful and violent and of Jews and
Israelis as perpetual victims. Keck and Sikkink also highlight the importance of framing for what
they refer to as “transnational advocacy networks.” They argue that effective framing is essential
to the success of transnational networks of human rights activists:
An effective frame must show that a given state of affairs is neither natural nor
accidental, identify the responsible party or parties, and propose credible solutions. These
aims require clear, powerful messages that appeal to shared principles. . . To be credible
the information produced must be reliable and well documented. To gain attention, the
information must be timely and dramatic. (19)
In Speaking Rights to Power: Constructing Political Will, Brysk examines the discourse
and framing strategies used by human rights struggles and emphasizes the importance of
persuasion and rhetoric to human rights work:
The struggle for human rights depends on recognizing suffering, connecting to its
victims, and mobilizing political will to transform the power structures that are the source
of abuse or neglect. . . In our times, the struggle for human rights depends increasingly on
mobilizing persuasive rhetoric to garner global solidarity—speaking rights to power. (1)
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She further argues that in order to understand why certain human rights struggles succeed when
others fail, “we need to analyze the successful strategies and appeals that have defied the odds
and brought attention and action to far-flung human rights struggles” (1). Her studies have led
her to the conclusion that successful human rights campaigns “follow the same rhetorical
strategies of successful political campaigns: employing charismatic or authoritative speakers,
compelling narratives, plots performed in public space, well-framed messages, skillful use of
appropriate media, and targeting audiences” (3). Brysk’s study of human rights campaigns
illustrates the importance of framing for a study of pro-BDS discourse.
Johnston’s and Noakes’ collection, Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the
Framing Perspective, provides a historical review of how frame analysis has been applied to
social movement discourse and a few useful examples of social movement frame analysis. The
book’s introduction brings together research on framing from the past 20 years and asserts that
frame analysis was first applied to social movement discourse in Todd Gitlin’s 1980 text on
media framing of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) (Noakes and Johnston 3; Gitlin).
Noakes and Johnston also highlight Gamson et al.’s 1982 Encounters with Unjust Authority for
introducing the idea that social movement actors often have to “break the frame” or reframe
situations and events in a different way from the dominant elite media and political frames,
which some other social movement scholars would refer to as “counterframing” (Noakes and
Johnston 3; Gamson et al.). Subsequent chapters discuss the framing processes of various social
movements, including the suffragist movement, gay liberation, Eastern European social
movements, the Puerto Rican identity movement, and others. Some of these studies focus on
media frames and some focus on the framing of social movement leaders and/or participants.
This collection demonstrates some methods for doing frame analysis of social movement
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discourse, including how to identify frames from the language used, analyze counterframing, and
discern ideology from frames, all of which I have incorporated into my heuristic for analysis.
Another benefit of combining a frame analysis approach with concepts from rhetorical
theory to investigate pro-BDS discourse is that focusing on framing can help me avoid having to
proffer an unbiased version of Palestine/Israel history when discussing events relevant to proBDS discourse. Because the history of Palestine/Israel is so contested, selecting which historical
events to highlight and taking the role of arbiter of “the facts” of the situation becomes an
impossible task that compromises my own position as a researcher rather than a proponent of a
particular perspective on the situation. By focusing on framing, I can let the pro-BDS texts
themselves reveal what historical events, policies, etc. are viewed as relevant context and
exigencies through the frames chosen by pro-BDS rhetors. For example, as part of the framing
strategies in the original 2005 BDS Call, the newly-formed BDS movement indicates what recent
and ongoing events serve as exigencies that explain and justify the creation of the 2005 Call and
the BDS movement itself (for a more in-depth discussion of the 2005 BDS Call, see Chapter 4).
Selecting Corpora of Texts: Both Official and Vernacular
Before I could develop and apply a heuristic list of questions for coding, I first had to
select a corpora of pro-BDS texts to code and analyze that would be representative of pro-BDS
discourse more generally. My use of “discourse” adheres to Foucault’s use of the term, which
includes multiple texts of different formats that represent a community of speakers, sometimes
called a “discourse community,” that produces, maintains, and polices what counts as truth or not
(Foucault). For example, both pro-BDS leaders and grassroots student activists would be part of
a larger transnational BDS movement discourse community. Thus, I tried to select a sample of
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texts for my corpora that are representative of texts produced by the larger BDS movement
discourse community.
While many rhetorical scholars of social movements traditionally focus on the rhetoric of
movement leaders (Griffin; Simons), other rhetoricians advocate for analyzing the vernacular
rhetoric of rank-and-file members (Hauser, Vernacular Voices; Hauser and McClellan). I have
chosen to study the discourse of both leaders and grassroots members of the BDS movement to
provide a more comprehensive picture of BDS movement discourse than would be gained from
examining the discourse of movement leaders alone. In Active Voices, DeGenero argues that,
“Too many times, scholars of rhetoric “have constructed ‘great man’ narratives that focus on
leaders and elites” (199). Hauser and McClellan build on this assertion to argue that “a mature
theory of social movements must account for resistance performed in the intertextual symbolic
exchanges of everyday discourse” (26). They further explain that, “National and international
discourse communities, and—more importantly for movement studies—counterpublic and
subaltern spheres, all speak a distinct language and perform a specific cultural inscription in their
everyday interactions: this is what we refer to as a community’s vernacular rhetoric” (29).
Taking a cue from DeGenero and Hauser and McClellan, I have chosen to analyze the discourse
of official BDS movement leaders along with the more vernacular rhetoric of pro-BDS student
activist-rhetors on US college campuses in order to get a more well-rounded understanding of the
rhetorical moves made by this BDS movement discourse community. Comparing the framing
strategies of both official and vernacular pro-BDS discourse enables me to determine the
consistency of frames used by leaders and grassroots activists in the US, as the BDS movement
is in reality a loose network of many local organizations in addition to the official Palestinian
leadership. For example, if different and contradictory frames are used by varied groups at the
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leadership versus grassroots levels, then such a lack of consistency could affect the resonance of
BDS framing for various audiences. I also recognize and discuss instances when the line between
official and vernacular rhetoric becomes blurred, including when student activists borrow
materials from the leadership of Palestinian or other BDS organizations.
In selecting my corpora, I used a sampling method similar to the initial sampling method
commonly used in grounded theory, even though I do not adopt grounded theory as my entire
methodology. As Corbin and Strauss explain, researchers should take the idea or phenomenon
they want to study and then look for “groups of individuals, an organization, or community
representative of that phenomenon can be selected for study. For example, if a researcher wants
to study nurses' work, he or she would go to where nurses are working—a hospital, clinic, or
home (or all three)—to watch what they do” (8). Therefore, since I wanted to study both official
and vernacular student-created pro-BDS discourse, I had to figure out where and when BDS
leaders and student activists engage in their pro-BDS activism—where and when I would find
pro-BDS rhetors and their pro-BDS texts. In the case of BDS movement leaders, I looked to the
official website of the BDS Movement and texts written by Omar Barghouti, the co-founder,
frequent spokesperson for the BDS Movement, and member of the BNC. For student discourse, I
decided to focus on the most important time of the year for Palestinian solidarity activism on US
college campuses: Israeli Apartheid Week (IAW).
To select my sample of official pro-BDS texts, I turned to both the Palestinian Boycott
National Committee (BNC) official leadership body of the Palestinian-led BDS Movement and
BDS co-founder and spokesperson Omar Barghouti. In addition to examining the 2005 BDS Call
statement put out by the BNC and later published on the official BDS Movement website, I also
examined over 200 official statements from the BNC found on the BDS Movement website from
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the earliest posts in 2008 up to posts from May 2017 when I finished collecting BNC statements
for my analysis, along with the pages “Intro to BDS,” “Israel Settler Colonialism and
Apartheid,” and “FAQs” (all found at www.bdsmovement.net and listed in the Appendix). I also
analyze several Omar Barghouti op-eds, articles, and interviews published in Western and
American news sources between 2006 and 2017 (including texts found in the New York Times,
New York Daily News, The Nation, and The Intercept) and an article from the Journal of
Palestine Studies, along with his 2011 book, Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions: The Global
Struggle for Palestinian Rights, which has been referred to as the BDS handbook or “manifesto”
(“Boycott, Divestment”). I chose all of these texts in order to find samples that would best
represent the official positions of the Palestinian leadership of the BDS movement. I tried to
select a large enough corpora of texts so that my findings would be more generalizable and be
most likely to accurately represent the typical framing and rhetorical strategies of BDS
movement leaders.
In addition to analyzing official BDS movement discourse, I also wanted to look at more
vernacular pro-BDS discourse, so I used convenience sampling and turned to local BDS activism
in the Washington D.C. metro area where I lived at the time. To maximize the pro-BDS texts I
could gather in a limited time frame and target the time of year with the highest level of
Palestinian solidarity activism on US college campuses, I chose to attend annual Israeli
Apartheid Week (IAW) actions at four local universities, including Georgetown, George Mason
University, George Washington University, and American University, all of which had active
pro-BDS student organizations [Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) for three of them and
Students Against Israeli Apartheid (SAIA) at George Mason]. During March and April of 2017, I
attended IAW events at each of these universities, and I took careful notes on speakers and
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discussions and gathered physical copies or photographs of dozens of leaflets, posters, displays,
flyers, etc. I also gathered all Facebook posts from each student group that either related to IAW
events or were posted during each university’s designated IAW. Because of limits to my own
schedule and the fact that some universities’ IAW events overlapped, I was only able to attend
one or two events at each university (two at all universities except American University, where I
was only able to attend one event).
I have chosen not to include the names of any student activists I encountered in my
research because of the risks associated with pro-BDS activism in the US, partly due to online
blacklists like the websites Canary Mission and the AMCHA Initiative, along with anti-BDS
legislation that has passed or been introduced in several US states and at the federal level.
Though I do not include any identifying information about student activists, I do at times include
the names of well known outside speakers or public figures associated with these events since
they are already renowned and public about their Palestine advocacy.
For both official and vernacular pro-BDS discourse, I chose to analyze English language
texts because the BDS movement primarily publishes its materials in English. The BNC and its
spokespersons target an international audience of supporters and potential participants who are
united by English as the most common international language. The BDS movement’s website is
published in English, as are Barghouti’s op-eds and interviews. Not only does the BDS
movement use English to target an international audience, but also English is the primary
language of Americans, an important intended audience for BDS discourse because the US
government is Israel’s main ally and sponsor and provides Israel with over $3 billion per year in
military and other foreign aid, more than any other ally (Spetalnick; United States).
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Developing an Interdisciplinary Heuristic for Coding
Because frame analysis, ideological rhetorical criticism, social movement rhetoric, and
several other methods of rhetorical criticism all attempt to investigate and discern the ideologies
and messages incorporated in social movements’ rhetorical strategies, these various theories all
fit together well for analyzing the rhetorical strategies of BDS movement discourse. Therefore, I
decided to use interdisciplinary concepts from all of the above theories and methodologies to
develop my own heuristic list of questions to guide my coding and analysis of my corpora of
pro-BDS texts to help decipher the rhetorical and framing strategies of the BDS movement and
answer my research questions: How do official and vernacular pro-BDS activist-rhetors frame
the movement and their goals? How do they frame their responses to the evolving rhetorical
situations and challenges (including Western sensitivity to antisemitism)? How do they tailor
these frames for different audiences? And how resonant are these rhetorical framing strategies
likely to be for targeted audiences?
After introducing my list of heuristic questions, in the sections that follow, I discuss the
theories and concepts on which the questions are based, explain how and why I developed each
one, and describe what I hoped to learn from using them as a basis for coding my corpora of proBDS texts. After discussing each heuristic question, I then explain my process for gathering,
coding, and analyzing my corpora of texts. The questions are as follows:
1. Rhetorical situation and ecology: what are the exigencies, constraints, kairos, and
intended audiences of pro-BDS rhetoric and its framing? (Rhetorical situation: Bitzer;
Vatz; Cosigny; Edbauer; Kuypers) What contextual factors work to facilitate or constrain
framing processes? (Benford and Snow 611).
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2. How does pro-BDS movement discourse frame the BDS movement and the situation in
Palestine/Israel? How do these discursive texts “define problems, diagnose causes, make
moral judgments, and suggest remedies”? (Kuypers, “Framing Analysis” in Rhetorical
Criticism 195).
3. What master and primary/issue frames does pro-BDS discourse rely on? (Goffman;
Benford & Snow 619).
4. Regarding ethos/credibility: How consistent and empirically credible is pro-BDS
framing? (Benford & Snow 619-620).
5. What beliefs, values, and assumptions are revealed by pro-BDS frames? (Ideological
criticism: Foss; etc.).
6. How do BDS activist-rhetors use language and framing to try to compel their audiences
to identify with the movement and with the Palestinian struggle? (Social movement
criticism: Cathcart; Burke. Frame analysis: Benford and Snow 631; Gamson,
“Constructing” 90).
7. How does pro-BDS discourse use “counterframing” to respond to the frequent charges of
anti-Semitism and that BDS is a “war by other means” seeking to “destroy” Israel?
(Benford and Snow 617).
8. What role(s) does the speaker/writer adopt throughout the text, and is this role consistent?
How do these roles affect the framing of the text at different points? (Johnston, “A
Methodology” 224-226).
9. How “fitting” and “resonant” are common frames likely to be for the intended audiences?
(Benford and Snow 619-622; Hauser, Introduction 57-58).
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10. How do pro-BDS rhetors use pathos or emotional language and appeals to motivate
potential supporters and audiences? (Snow et al., “The Framing Perspective” 397;
Aristotle).
Rhetorical Situation and Ecology
The first question comprising my heuristic involves an essential component of any
rhetorical study, the rhetorical situation: what are the exigencies, constraints, kairos, and
intended audiences of pro-BDS rhetoric and framing, and what contextual factors work to
facilitate or constrain framing processes? (Bitzer; Vatz; Cosigny; Edbauer; Kuypers; Benford
and Snow 611). Edbauer’s theory of rhetorical ecologies is an appropriate framework for
understanding the rhetorical situation, exigencies, and constraints for social movement rhetorics,
including pro-BDS discourse, because not only is social movement discourse a form of public
rhetoric, but, especially in the case of pro-BDS discourse, rhetors’ texts and framing tend to be
frequently re-read in different “temporal, historical, and lived fluxes” (Edbauer 9). For example,
pro-BDS discourse involves many different speakers and audiences—both local and
transnational—making it impossible to discreetly separate out these elements of the rhetorical
situation. In the case of the Palestinian BDS National Committee (BNC), it is not even clear how
many rhetors are involved in creating official BNC statements. Moreover, because regional and
global events regularly arise to direct media and audiences’ attention to Palestine/Israel at
unexpected times (e.g., Trump’s 2017 Jerusalem embassy move announcement, the 2018 Great
Return March in Gaza, and Trump’s proposed 2020 Peace to Prosperity plan that allows Israel to
annex large portions of the West Bank, etc.), the situation for pro-BDS texts often functions as
more of an ecology than a static rhetorical situation (Halbfinger, “Netanyahu”; Thrall, “Trump’s
Middle East”; Peace to Prosperity). Thus, individual pro-BDS texts are situated within a

80
changing ecology against which the texts and their audiences, exigencies, and constraints shift
over time as they are circulated across digital networks and re-read at different times and places.
As Edbauer describes, “the social field is not comprised of discrete sites but from events that are
shifting and moving, grafted onto and connected with other events” (10). This moving and
shifting in connection with events is especially true for pro-BDS discourse, which tends to take
on new importance and gain new supporters (and critics) every time local, regional, or global
events draw attention to Palestine/Israel. For example, when transnational audiences encounter
the 2005 BDS Call years after it was created, the ecology for pro-BDS discourse may have
changed significantly, and the exigencies, audiences, and constraints may look very different
now than they did in 2005.
Edbauer’s discussion of rhetorical ecologies also fits well with a study of discourse
related to Palestine/Israel because of the ways that belatedness and transference end up importing
much of the Jewish history of trauma into contemporary discussions, including in discussions
relating to the BDS movement (Abraham, “Recognizing the Effects,” “Reluctant”; Bawarshi).
Abraham’s argument about the roles of affect, transference, and belatedness and Bawarshi’s
discussion of “uptake memories” both suggest that Edbauer’s concept of rhetorical ecologies is a
more useful model for understanding the rhetorical situation than previous models describing a
rhetorical situation more fixed in place and time (Abraham, “Reluctant”). In the case of
Palestine/Israel, because thousands of years of Jewish history are often brought into current
discussions of the contemporary State of Israel and Zionism, pro-BDS rhetors often find
themselves forced to confront otherwise unrelated past Jewish trauma. This helps explain why
many contemporary discussions of current events in Palestine/Israel get sidetracked by
accusations of antisemitism: because pro-BDS or pro-Palestinian rhetors are not only dealing
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with the current situation, which is one of an extreme power imbalance between Israel and the
Palestinians, but also confronting past traumas that invoke strong emotions and often make
conversations difficult.
While I rely on Edbauer’s rhetorical ecology model in my discussions of the rhetorical
situations for pro-BDS discourse and to help me develop my coding heuristic, I also use Bitzer’s
common terminology for the elements of the rhetorical situation while acknowledging that these
elements and their boundaries are not static and fixed but rather change over time in different
contexts in which pro-BDS texts circulate. To analyze the audiences and evolving rhetorical
situations and ecologies for BDS movement discourse and framing strategies, I must consider not
only how exigencies, kairos, constraints, and audiences may affect rhetors’ framing choices but
also how the elements of the rhetorical situation shift and flow across time and transnational
networks of activist-rhetors who both respond to and create exigencies. Framing relates most
closely to exigence, constraints, context, and purposes. An examination of frames alone,
however, would leave much of the rhetorical situation and context out. Thus, to get the full
picture of all elements of the rhetorical situation and framing, rhetorical frame analysis must
consider both.
To understand the different exigencies for pro-BDS discourse, it is important to examine
the historical and political contexts, including factors that are long-term, global, regional, local,
and immediate. Considering the different interpretations of rhetorical situation and exigencies
coming from Bitzer, Vatz, Cosigny, and Edbauer, some of the exigencies demand a response and
are external, some exigencies are created by activists for a given time, place, and kairos, and
some exigencies shift and change and may be re-read later at different times and in different
contexts. According to Edbauer’s discussion of rhetorical ecologies, the exigence is less of a
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distinct element of a fixed rhetorical situation and is instead “a complex of various
audience/speaker perceptions and institutional or material constraints”; she also argues that,
“there can be no pure exigence that does not involve various mixes of felt interests” (8). In order
to try to capture as much relevant information as possible about the various exigencies for proBDS discourse, I try to consider some of these audience and rhetor perceptions, constraints, and
“mixes of felt interests.” (Edbauer 8). I also consider how exigencies can be shaped by external
and rhetor-created events and interests. For example, statements from the official Palestinian
leadership of the BDS movement are often created by necessity to respond to specific and
newsworthy global or regional events, but BDS movement leaders also choose to take advantage
of anniversaries, deaths of supporters, or international actions to craft statements and responses
in a certain time and context to emphasize the importance of the BDS movement and one of its
primary exigencies and frames—to address the ongoing failure of the international community to
hold Israel accountable for its violations of Palestinian human rights (see Chapter 4 for more indepth discussion of this and other frames). Some of the longer-term external exigencies for BDS
movement discourse include the ongoing oppressive and discriminatory settler-colonial policies
that Palestinians have endured since the 1947-1948 founding of Israel, which involved the
dispossession of Palestinians by Zionist forces during what is referred to by Israelis as their War
of Independence and by Palestinians as their Nakba (“catastrophe”).
An accounting of the rhetorical situation also requires attention to the classical Greek
concepts of kairos and phronesis—“timeliness” and “appropriateness,” which assumes
knowledge about context and audience expectations and helps connect the audience, context, and
text (Leach 212). When it comes to pro-BDS discourse, the concept of kairos not only relates to
the immediate timing and exigence for particular pro-BDS texts but also calls to mind Omar
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Barghouti’s repeated invocation of the idea that the BDS movement is on the cusp of its “South
Africa moment” (Barghouti, Boycott 215; Mamdani). In his discussions of the “South Africa
moment,” Barghouti suggests that as support for Palestinian rights and BDS grows alongside
criticism of Israel, at some point, BDS will acquire a similar level of global public support to the
South African anti-apartheid struggle. The relevance of kairos to pro-BDS discourse is also
evident in the 2009 Palestinian Christian call to BDS directed to Christians around the world,
titled “Kairos Palestine,” which argues that the time has come for Christians to support
Palestinian rights (“Kairos Document”).
In addition to these other factors, rhetorical analysis and consideration of the rhetorical
situation must also attend to the audience for a text or rhetorical act, a focus that is also essential
for understanding pro-BDS movement rhetoric, framing strategies, and their potential resonance
or fitness. Rhetorical critics typically try to figure out what the audience already knows about the
speaker, the subject, and current related events (Andrews 29). A main intention of BDS activists’
rhetoric is to persuade audiences to become sympathetic with and even join in their struggle for
justice and human rights for Palestinians, so the appropriateness of the movement’s rhetorical
strategies for their intended audiences and rhetorical situation and ecology is important.
Especially for a discourse of the marginalized rather than the hegemonic discourse of those in
power, the ideas, beliefs, attitudes, and arguments contained in the discourse matter mainly to the
degree they are potentially persuasive to the intended audiences of mostly Western potential
allies and solidarity activists. Discourses of the powerful tend to already be accepted, repeated
endlessly in the public sphere, and acted upon by the majority of a society, but discourses of
resistance to power need to be able to break through the dominant narratives and framing to
persuade intended audiences. In this case, the dominant narrative is often the pro-Israel or Zionist
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narrative. In the case of pro-BDS rhetoric, it is also important to recognize how Western and
especially American audiences’ sensitivity to antisemitism serves as an important element of
audiences’ beliefs as part of the larger context, as well as a rhetorical constraint. As Said argues
about the Palestinian struggle for liberation, “no other movement in history has had so difficult
an opponent: a people recognized as the classical victim of history” (The Question xxii).
Pre-existing dominant media frames are also a part of the rhetorical situation that
function as constraints on what frames can be used successfully and how resonant those frames
will be for audiences. For example, the frames most commonly used by the mainstream news
media will act as constraints on the frames that can be used in current coverage. News media
outlets rarely contradict common, familiar frames used in the past, though they may introduce
new ones or make changes when events demand. Common pre-existing frames found in the
public sphere also affect what frames audiences will be open-minded to, thus serving as
constraints on audiences’ understanding of news and social movement discourse. A few
communications scholars have used frame analysis to examine media coverage of events in
Palestine/Israel, and their findings reveal some of the common media frames with which
audiences for BDS discourse would likely be familiar. For example, Wolfsfeld investigates the
mass media frames most commonly used in unequal political conflicts, including the Palestinian
First Intifada, in which the common frames of law and order (with Israel imposing law and order
on unruly Palestinians) and injustice and defiance (with Palestinians defying Israel’s injustice)
dominated news coverage of the uprising. Gamson’s 1992 study of mass media frames, which
includes a section on Palestine/Israel, found that the most commonly repeated media frames of
the conflict by focus group participants include feuding neighbors, Arab intransigence, Israeli
expansionism, and strategic interests (Talking 54-56). In his 2018 book, The Wrong Story:
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Palestine, Israel and the Media, media studies scholar Greg Shupak analyzes The New York
Times coverage during the most recent Gaza wars (2008-2009 and 2014) and finds that the most
commonly used frames favor the Israeli narrative and include both sides, moderates vs.
extremists, and the right to self-defense. It is these commonly repeated frames, especially feuding
neighbors, both sides, and Israel’s right to self-defense that often tend to direct many Americans
toward an understanding of the situation in recent years that favors the Israeli perspective and
overlooks or ignores the occupation and oppression of Palestinians, whose grievances fuel
Palestinian resistance and the BDS movement. While these framing analyses related to
Palestine/Israel discourse do not address the BDS movement specifically, they can help scholars
understand some of the common media frames that audiences for pro-BDS discourse would
likely be familiar with and which may also serve as constraints on audience receptivity to proBDS discourse.
Understanding pro-BDS discourse also requires gaining insight into the central long-term
exigence for BDS movement discourse: Israel’s ongoing oppressive and discriminatory policies
against Palestinians. Therefore, my first heuristic question examines historical facts and events
related to oppressive Israeli policies that are referenced directly or inferred in much pro-BDS
discourse and may serve as either external or activist-created exigencies. This question also leads
me to discover what relevant immediate and local external exigencies occurred in the region that
helped give birth to the 2005 BDS Call and movement in the first place (discussed more in depth
in Chapter 4).
Identifying Frames
For my second heuristic question, in order to identify the common frames used by proBDS rhetors, I ask how pro-BDS movement discourse frames the BDS movement and the
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situation in Palestine/Israel, and how pro-BDS texts “define problems, diagnose causes, make
moral judgments, and suggest remedies”? (Kuypers, “Framing Analysis” in Rhetorical Criticism
195). Before I could identify frames in pro-BDS texts, I first had to understand what exactly I
would be looking for and how I would discern frames in the texts. Goffman’s original definition
of “frames” posits them as “definitions of a situation” or “schemata of interpretation” that “are
built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events—at least social
ones—and our subjective involvement in them” and allow individuals “to locate, perceive,
identify, and label” events in the world (10-11, 21). Frames point people to a particular
understanding of the answer to “what is it that’s going on here?” (Goffman 8). Goffman
describes “frame analysis” as “the examination in these terms of the organization of experience”
(11). Zald refers to frames as “the specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive
cues used to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative
modes of action” (262).
Few rhetorical scholars have combined frame analysis with rhetorical analysis, but
Kuypers is one communication researcher who has taken a distinctly rhetorical approach to
frame analysis and thus offers some useful discussion and examples. He defines the functions of
frames in a way that provides clues for where and how to look for frames in a text:
When highlighting some aspect of reality over other aspects, frames act to define
problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies. They are
located in the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture at large. Frames are
central organizing ideas within a narrative account of an issue or event; they provide the
interpretive cues for otherwise neutral facts. (Kuypers, “Framing Analysis” in Rhetorical
Criticism 182)
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Kuypers goes on to argue that frames reside in certain properties of the language use in rhetorical
narratives and offers helpful details about how to identify frames in rhetorical texts by looking at
key words, concepts, symbols, metaphors, visual images, and names assigned to actions, ideas,
and people (185). Kuypers suggests that frame analysts should ask how “language choices invite
us to understand an issue or event,” and he directs scholars to first look for themes and then
determine how those themes are framed (Kuypers “Framing Analysis” in Doing News 298). He
distinguishes between themes and frames this way: “A theme is the subject of discussion, or that
which is the subject of the thought expressed. The frame, of course, is suggesting a particular
interpretation of the theme” (“Framing Analysis” in Doing News 302). Kuypers further suggests
close textual reading to discern themes and frames (“Framing Analysis” in Doing News 302).
Using the various definitions of frames from these scholars, I use close reading of proBDS texts to examine patterns in pro-BDS rhetors’ language to look for how these texts use
symbols, metaphors, explicit words and phrases, and implicit assumptions and suggestions to
present events and Israeli policies in a way that suggests “what is it that’s going on here?” in
terms of the definition of problems, causes, moral judgments, and suggested remedies, which
also includes the justifications presented for the BDS movement itself (Kuypers “Framing
Analysis” in Rhetorical Criticism 195; Goffman 8; Zald 262). To identify frames, I also
incorporate a method similar to cluster-based rhetorical criticism in which I identify the most
frequently repeated words and themes and the words associated with these frequently repeated
words to help identify the frames related to these important concepts (Foss).
Master Frames Vs. Primary, Issue, and Collective Action Frames
Once I identify various common frames used, I also want to distinguish between different
types or levels of frames and how they relate to each other by asking what master and primary,
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issue, or collective action frames pro-BDS discourse relies on (Goffman; Benford & Snow 619).
According to various frame analysis scholars of social movement discourse, frames can be
categorized on different levels, with the lower, more specific levels being sometimes referred to
as “primary,” “issue,” or “collective action frames,” and the broader, more general higher-level
frames being referred to as “master frames” (and sometimes “meta-frames”) (Benford and Snow
614-619; Hope 5-6; Zald 262; Goffman 21-27). Because different frame analysis scholars use
different terms for different types of frames, I decided to focus primarily on distinguishing
between the more specific issue-oriented frames (i.e., primary, issue, collective action) and the
more general frames (i.e., master frames or meta-frames) that encompass the other more specific
frames.
While “primary” and “issue” frames can be found in regard to any discourse, it is
“collective action frames” that are most important for mobilizing supporters of social
movements. Benford and Snow define “collective action frames” as “action-oriented sets of
beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social
movement organization” (614). They argue that “collective action frames are constructed in part
as movement adherents negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic condition or
situation they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding who or what is to blame,
articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others to act in concert to affect change”
(615). Because they are more specific to various events, situations, and issues, scholars may find
several primary, issue, and collective action frames in the discourse of a social movement (Hope
5-6).
Master frames, on the other hand, are “quite broad in terms of scope, functioning as a
kind of master algorithm that colors and constrains the orientations and activities of other
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movements” (Benford and Snow 618). Master frames are more general umbrella frames that may
be applicable across many movements. Zald argues that large movements, or progenitor
movements, may provide master frames, which later movements may draw on (262). For
instance, the civil rights movement provides a “rights frame” that other later human rights or
civil rights movements often draw from (Benford and Snow 619; Gamson, Encounters 123,
Talking Politics 85; Zald 262). Master frames have also sometimes been referred to as “metaframes,” though “master frame” is the more common terms in recent scholarship (Hope 5-6).
Gamson argues that the most important master frame is the “injustice frame,” which he sees as
an essential part of any successful social movement that opposes an unjust authority: “An
injustice frame is an interpretation of what is happening that supports the conclusion that an
authority system is violating the shared moral principles of the participants. An alternative to the
legitimating frame, it provides a reason for noncompliance” (Gamson, Encounters 123).
To identify and distinguish between the more specific issue-based frames and the higherlevel, more general master frames, I begin by identifying all of the lower-level frames I can find
in the texts, and I then look for how they relate together and can be categorized under the larger
categories of the common master frames of injustice, human rights, and oppression. The process
for distinguishing between master frames and the lower-level primary or issue frames is also
similar to the way Corbin and Strauss describe the process of identifying higher-level and lowerlevel concepts in grounded theory: “Categories are higher in level and more abstract than the
concepts they represent. They are generated through the same analytic process of making
comparisons to highlight similarities and differences that is used to produce lower level
concepts” (7).
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Ethos and Credibility of Frames
In order to help understand how pro-BDS rhetors attempt to gain supporters through
rhetorical and framing strategies and how resonant those strategies may be, I also ask how
consistent and empirically credible pro-BDS frames may be for their intended audiences
(Benford and Snow 619-620). While ethos is a common rhetorical appeal that rhetorical critics
often attend to in traditional rhetorical analysis, in regard to framing, empirical credibility of a
frame “refers to the apparent fit between the framings and events in the world” (Benford and
Snow 620). In determining this, it is important to ask whether there is “culturally believable”
evidence in the real world for the claim(s) found in the frames; in particular, would the frames
likely be believable for intended audiences or “some segment of prospective or actual adherents”
(620). When considering this question, it is also important to consider that different audiences
will have been exposed to different information about the situation in Palestine/Israel, and this
background knowledge, including familiar mass media frames of Palestine/Israel, would affect
whether pro-BDS frames may appear empirically credible or not. For example, the existence of
Israel’s over 50-year-long military occupation of the West Bank would lend empirical credibility
for the occupation frame for audiences who are aware of this factual situation. In contrast, the
real-world Israeli policies that would support framing the situation as apartheid may be less
well-known or more contested for certain audiences, which could make this frame less
empirically credible than the occupation frame for a wider audience, though some audiences may
find the apartheid frame credible based on their particular background knowledge or
experiences.
In regard to determining empirical credibility, I also have to take care and be reflective of
my own position as both a researcher and someone who has my own particular background
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knowledge and experiences in relation to Palestine/Israel. Because I traveled to Israel and the
West Bank in 2009 while producing a documentary, I met and got to know many Israeli and
Palestinian activists, and I also experienced Israeli checkpoints, curfews, and crackdowns on
popular protests. When considering the empirical credibility of frames and potential resonance
for various audiences, I have to try to separate my own personal experiences from those of
intended audiences for pro-BDS discourse. My perspective, however, can also help me
understand why audiences who have actually been to the West Bank would likely find pro-BDS
framing more credible than audiences who have only heard about the situation from mainstream
US news media.
The empirical credibility of frames can also be related to the ethos or credibility of proBDS rhetors, and it can influence the overall resonance or fitness of pro-BDS framing for
different audiences, which is addressed in a later heuristic question that focuses on resonance.
Based on the controversy and debates around the BDS movement discussed in Chapter 1,
perceptions of the BDS movement as being antisemitic likely undermines the credibility of proBDS rhetors, which may then also detract from the perceived empirical credibility of pro-BDS
framing. Thus, I consider both the degree to which real-world facts and events support pro-BDS
framing but also how various audiences’ beliefs and background knowledge may affect
perceptions of the credibility of pro-BDS frames.
How Frames Reveal Beliefs, Values, Assumptions, and Ideology
To understand what pro-BDS framing and rhetorical strategies reveal about the ideology
of the BDS movement, I also ask what beliefs, values, and assumptions are revealed by pro-BDS
frames. This heuristic question not only overlaps with the focus on ideology in frame analysis,
but it is also closely related to ideological rhetorical criticism, which is a suitable method for
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examining pro-BDS discourse because it is typically grounded in a political ideology influenced
by postcolonial theory that uses international law and human rights to frame the IsraeliPalestinian conflict primarily in terms of a settler-colonial state oppressing and ethnically
cleansing the indigenous Palestinian population (Benford and Snow 612-614; Foss 209-212).
According to Foss, “when rhetorical critics are interested in rhetoric primarily for what it
suggests about beliefs and values, their focus is on ideology,” and when doing ideological
analysis, a rhetorical critic “looks beyond the surface structure of an artifact to discover the
beliefs, values, and assumptions it suggests” (209). Foss references semiotics and the work of
Roland Barthes as a foundation for ideological criticism, along with Marxism and Marxist critics
including Adorno, Althusser, Habermas, and Marcuse (211-212). In order to understand how and
why the BDS movement represents itself in certain ways for various audiences, an ideological
analysis is a necessary component.
Similarly to how I identify frames themselves, to identify beliefs, values, assumptions,
and ideology, I examine patterns in the language used (and not used) in pro-BDS texts. For
example, by using terms like “colonialism” and “settler-colonialism” and associating them with
descriptions of harmful and oppressive Israeli policies and violations of international law, rather
than using the term “conflict,” pro-BDS rhetors reveal an anti-colonial ideology. Thus, various
patterns of common language use and word choices can reveal the ideologies behind them.
Burkean Identification
In addition to ideological rhetorical criticism, Burke’s concept of identification also
offers a productive avenue for understanding how pro-BDS movement discourse works, leading
me to ask how BDS activist-rhetors use language and framing to try to compel their audiences to
identify with the movement and with the Palestinian struggle (Cathcart; Burke; Benford and
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Snow 631; Gamson, “Constructing” 90). Burke describes how rhetors attempt to make audiences
identify with them:
As for the relation between ‘identification’ and ‘persuasion’: we might well keep in mind
that a speaker persuades an audience by the use of stylistic identifications; his act of
persuasion may be for the purpose of causing the audience to identify itself with the
speaker’s interests; and the speaker draws on identification of interests to establish
rapport between himself and the audience. (46)
Burke further explains how the process of identification works: “You persuade a man only
insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea,
identifying your ways with his” (55). He also explains how the other side of identification is
division when the rhetor separates people into “us” and “them” and attempts to make the
audience identify and become “consubstantial” with the rhetor—“us”—while also dividing the
audience from an Other—“them” (21-23). Examining how pro-BDS movement rhetors use
identification and division is another productive element of an in-depth rhetorical frame analysis
of BDS movement discourse.
In addition to Burkean identification, frame analysis scholars have also focused on
identification as an important component of framing processes and frame analysis (Benford and
Snow 631; Gamson, “Constructing” 90, Talking Politics 7). Gamson names identity, or the
“process of defining this ‘we,’ typically in opposition to some ‘they’ who have different interests
or values,” along with injustice and agency, as one of the three essential components of
collective action frames (“Constructing” 90, Talking Politics 7). Gamson further argues that
collective action frames must necessarily be adversarial and involve frames in which “we stand
in opposition to or conflict with some they. They are responsible for some objectionable situation
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and have the power to change it by acting differently in some fashion. We and they are
differentiated rather than conflated” (italics added) (Talking Politics 85). While some BDS
critics may find pro-BDS rhetors’ attempts to encourage audiences to identify with Palestinians
and in opposition to Israel as a form of “demonizing” Israel and thus antisemitic, Gamson argues
that this “us” versus “them” identification and division is a necessary part of any social
movement’s discourse against a situation of injustice.
To analyze how pro-BDS discourse uses identification and division, I look at how proBDS rhetors attribute positive or negative qualities to different actors discussed. For example, if
Israel and supporters of Israel are portrayed as “oppressors” who are committing violations of
international law and human rights against Palestinians who are portrayed as victims, then such
language choices suggest pro-BDS rhetors are encouraging audiences to identify with
Palestinians as the “us” and against Israelis as “them.” Using analogies to the US civil rights
movement and the anti-apartheid movement can also promote such identification with US
audiences and those sympathetic to the anti-apartheid struggle against South Africa.
Counterframing
As part of determining how pro-BDS discourse attempts to overcome rhetorical
challenges, including frequent charges of antisemitism, I ask how pro-BDS discourse uses
“counterframing” to respond to the frequent charges of antisemitism and claims that BDS is a
“war by other means” seeking to “destroy” Israel (Benford and Snow 617; Hallward,
Transnational 2, 36, 110). According to Benford and Snow, “counterframing” refers to the
“refutations of the logic or efficacy of solutions advocated by opponents as well as a rationale for
its own remedies” (617). They explain how the frames used by opponents can “affect a
movement’s framings, on the one hand, by putting movement activists on the defensive, at least
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temporarily, and, on the other hand, by frequently forcing it to develop and elaborate prognoses
more clearly than otherwise might have been the case” (617). This discussion of counterframing
seems very applicable to the rhetorical situation faced by pro-BDS rhetors who are often
portrayed by their critics as being motivated by antisemitic hatred and engaged in a “war” to
“destroy” Israel—charges which require counterframing by the BDS movement in order to refute
such charges and gain supporters for the Palestinian cause.
In order to effectively determine how pro-BDS rhetors use counterframing, it is also
necessary to be aware of the common themes and frames used by Israel’s advocates to portray
the situation in Palestine/Israel and the BDS movement. Some of these common themes and
frames, which are often found in the mass media as well, include negative portrayals of the BDS
movement that charge BDS leaders and supporters with being antisemitic, waging a war to
destroy Israel, and unfairly singling out Israel, etc. (Hallward, Transnational 2; StandWithUs;
Reut Institute). In addition, other common pro-Israel themes and frames suggest that Israel is a
victim of antisemitic hatred from BDS activists, Israel seeks peace while Palestinians favor
violence, Israel is a democracy, Israel is a valuable ally to the US, Israel is in a “tough
neighborhood,” etc. (StandWithUs; Reut Institute). Thus, when examining pro-BDS
counterframing strategies, I will look for ways that pro-BDS texts offer framing to rebut these
pro-Israel themes. For example, one common type of counterframing that pro-BDS texts often
use involves attempts to counter the frequent charge that BDS is antisemitic (see Chapters 4-6
for more discussion of this).
Role Analysis
To see if the speakers take various roles throughout the texts and how these roles may
affect framing choices, I ask what roles the speaker or writer adopts, whether these roles are
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consistent, and how these roles seem to affect the framing of the text at different points (Johnston
224-226). According to Johnston, role analysis is another important aspect of framing to consider
and involves discerning what role the speaker or writer is taking on in a particular text or passage
and whether that role may shift during a text, which can then provide clues as to why the text’s
messages and framing may also shift (224-226). For example, sometimes speakers may step out
of their role as merely a spokesperson for activists or a group and instead take on the role of a
parent, child, teacher, doctor, or other role that can affect framing. Thus, I also consider how proBDS speakers and writers take on various roles as part of my heuristic for coding.
Fitness and Resonance
Because both rhetorical critics and frame analysts are concerned with the potential effects
of rhetorical texts on audiences, I also sought to ask how “fitting” and “resonant” framing
strategies are likely to be for the intended audiences (Benford and Snow 619-622; Hauser,
Introduction 57-58). According to Covino and Jolliffe, “rhetorical analysis is the study of
whether and how texts actually do affect, influence, or change auditors” (6). Wichelns says that
rhetorical criticism “is not concerned with permanence nor yet with beauty. It is concerned with
effect” (qtd. in Andrews 6). Zarefsky argues that rhetorical analysis or criticism “enables one to
assess whether and how particular works perform the two principal functions of rhetoric:
building community and inspiring people to achieve collective goals” (638). As Zarefsky
explains, once a rhetorician analyzes the rhetorical choices made in a text, then they are able to
“argue about why the rhetor made the choices that he or she did, to consider what reprisals were
invited by those choices, to theorize about the functions and consequences of the choices, and—
in light of all these factors—to evaluate the choices in the given case” (634). He further asserts
that rhetorical criticism explains texts “by providing answers to two general questions: (a)
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What’s going on here? and (b) So what?” (633). At a basic level, these two questions common in
rhetorical criticism reflect my goal in examining BDS movement discourse using rhetorical
frame analysis—to determine what is going on and why it matters.
Most rhetoricians these days acknowledge the difficulty of determining effectiveness
with any precision or certainty and instead seek to examine rhetorical processes while limiting
speculation about effectiveness to discussing the potential or probable effectiveness or “fitness”
of rhetorical strategies for targeted audiences (Hauser, Introduction 57-58; Zarefsky 633-637).
Hauser explains rhetorical “fitness” this way: “A fitting response is not necessarily a successful
one but one that is addressed to resolving the complex of factors that define the situation . . .
Determining whether any response is fitting requires that we understand how the rhetor’s
discourse reflects his or her definition of the situation and meshes with that of the audience”
(Introduction 57). He further explains that, “a fitting response is one that is potentially corrective
of the imperfection in the environment” (58). Examples of rhetoric that may correct
environmental imperfections would include discursive responses that change audiences’ minds
on an issue or go further to persuade elected officials to pass legislation or change policies to
address a problem, etc. Hauser explains his notion of rhetorical fitness through an extended
discussion of how the U.S. family of Cuban Elián González12 tailored appeals to gaining custody
of the child to various audiences based on each audience’s distinct beliefs, values, and abilities to
help them gain legal custody or capability to mediate change and thus “correct the imperfection
in the environment” (Hauser, Introduction 57-58). In the case of pro-BDS discourse, fitting
responses would be ones that help persuade target audiences to not only shift their understanding

12

González’s case and the international custody battle and political debate associated with it dominated headlines in
the US for several months in 1999 and 2000; his case became part of a larger political debate over Cuba and USCuba relations, etc. (Padgett).
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on the topic of Palestine/Israel to accept pro-BDS framing in place of pro-Israel framing, but also
to take action on behalf of Palestinian rights, which could include engaging in acts of protest or
solidarity or even changing government policies toward Israel, etc.
When applied to social movement discourse, frame analysis also attends to the potential
effects of framing choices by considering framing “resonance” for the target audiences. Benford
and Snow argue that scholars can determine the likely resonance of framing by looking at both
the potential resonance or ethos of the rhetor and the resonance of the frames themselves, given
how frames may align with an audience’s social, cultural, and political beliefs, which thus links
resonance to heuristic question four’s focus on “empirical credibility” (620-622). According to
Benford and Snow, “the greater the status and/or perceived expertise of the frame articulator
and/or the organization they represent from the vantage point of potential adherents and
constituents, the more plausible and resonant the framings or claims” (621). The authors also
focus on “narrative fidelity” as a way to determine frame resonance and encourage frame
analysts to ask whether framing is “culturally resonant,” or if frames “resonate with the targets’
cultural narrations,” which they discuss as being similar to cultural myths, assumptions, or
ideologies (622). Because rhetorical “fitness” also overlaps with frame “resonance,” I decided to
consider this question as part of my rhetorical frame analysis of pro-BDS texts as well.
Emotional Appeals
Another aspect of the rhetorical strategies I chose to consider as part of my heuristic
involves asking how pro-BDS rhetors use pathos or emotional language and appeals to motivate
potential supporters and audiences, which is a concern of both rhetorical critics and frame
analysts. Snow et al. argue that emotional appeals are typically “a central feature of motivational
framing,” which is the aspect of social movement framing that supports the agency aspect of
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collective action frames by “accenting the severity of the problem, the urgency of taking action
now rather than later, the probable efficacy of joining others in the cause, the moral priority of
doing so, and the enhancement or elevation of one’s status” (396-397). Gamson suggests that
effective social movement injustice frames necessarily call forth strong emotions in the audience
if they are to successfully motivate supporters to act:
Injustice focuses on the righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul.
Injustice, as I argued earlier, is a hot cognition, not merely an abstract intellectual
judgment about what is equitable. . . The heat of a moral judgment is intimately related to
beliefs about what acts or conditions have caused people to suffer undeserved hardship or
loss. . . [I]f one attributes undeserved suffering to malicious or selfish acts by clearly
identifiable persons or groups, the emotional component of an injustice frame will almost
certainly be there. Concreteness in the target. . . is a necessary condition for an injustice
frame. (Gamson, Talking Politics 32)
While emotional appeals may be commonly used by many social movements to
emphasize injustice and spur supporters to action, in the case of Palestine/Israel, emotion can
also sometimes serve to undermine discussions. Abraham argues that discussions about
Palestine/Israel are often sidetracked by emotions via affect, belatedness, and transference, “the
hidden energies and psychological forces at work in our argumentative dynamics about the
Israel-Palestine conflict” (“Reluctant Rhetoricians” 37-38). Bawarshi also explains how
emotions and their associated “rhetorical memories” can frequently trigger affective “uptakes”
and “habitual responses” in regard to Palestine/Israel that may include accusations of
antisemitism, so he recommends that to avoid triggering these unproductive responses, rhetors
should be “careful in our rhetorical choices so as to avoid loaded, memory triggering words”
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(18). Even though emotional appeals are typical of many injustice-focused human rights
movements, in the case of Palestine/Israel emotional language and rhetorical choices can
backfire as both Abraham and Bawarshi discuss. This tendency, along with the corresponding
requirement that social movements highlight injustice as part of campaigns for human rights,
puts pro-BDS rhetors in a tricky position and makes emotional appeals also a worthy subject of
attention when examining BDS movement framing. Therefore, I also examine pro-BDS rhetors’
language choices in regard to emotional appeals and emotionally loaded terms.
Coding Example
The following example was taken from my coding spreadsheet and shows the kinds of
notes I made in each column of the table for each text, with each section representing one of my
heuristic questions (plus one for initial “Open Coding” and one for “Other” potentially
significant information that didn’t otherwise fit clearly in one of the other categories). For each
text, I started with a brief summary and open coding to notice themes and ideas that seem
prominent. Next, I follow my 10-question coding heuristic to make note of rhetorical strategies
related to framing, identification, ideology, etc. I added a separate field for “Other” in which I
indicated other observations that may not have fit clearly into another category or overall
impressions. I performed this coding using an Excel spreadsheet with separate cells/columns
devoted to specific heuristic questions for each text. I explain my process in more detail in the
section following this example.
Text:
Palestinian BDS National Committee. “‘No New EU-Israel Action Plan in April
2009!’” BDS Movement, 9 July 2008, www.bdsmovement.net/news/%E2%80%
9Cno-new-eu-israel-action-plan-april-2009%E2%80%9D-1.
Open Coding & Summary:
BNC calls on EU NOT to upgrade its relationship with Israel and to suspend the EU
Association agreement. Claims Israel's violations of human rights are a 'breach of Clause
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2 of the agreement'. Describes: Israel's 'persistent violations of human rights and
international law'; 'illegal occupation'; 'massive colonization'; 'human rights violations';
'collective punishment'; 'construction of settlements'; (full-length statement included at
the bottom includes more detailed descriptions of Israel's violations). At end, also
compares arguments for dialogue and 'engagement' with Israel to those of 'constructive
engagement' with apartheid SA.
Rhetorical Situation & Ecology:
Exigencies: EU action to upgrade relations with Israel; Israeli actions against Gaza;
Ongoing Israel oppression. Purposes: To inform potential supporters of this situation and
encourage supporters to contact the EU; public shaming of EU for hypocritical decision.
Constraints: relevance to this particular EU action. Focus on human rights and
international law. Audiences: International English-speaking solidarity activists and
potential supporters; EU citizens and members.
Framing Strategies:
Define Problems: EU Association Council's decision to upgrade the EU-Israel
Association Agreement. Israeli human rights violations, colonization, and Apartheid.
Diagnose Causes: Israel's actions and treatment toward Palestinians, including the Zionist
movement and founding of the state. EU decision to upgrade relationship with Israel.
Make Moral Judgments: Israeli actions and oppression of Palestinians is morally wrong.
People of conscience are obligated to support Palestinian rights and BDS. Suggest
Remedies: Support BDS, reverse decision of EU to upgrade relations with Israel, end
Israeli oppression of Palestinians.
Master Frames:
Injustice/Justice; Oppressor/Oppressed; Human rights.
Primary/Issue/Collective Action Frames:
BDS as grassroots movement, Israeli violations of Palestinian human rights and
international law, occupation, colonization, illegal settlements, apartheid, collective
punishment, ethnic cleansing, Israeli oppression of Palestinians, settler colonialism.
Ethos & Credibility:
BNC says this statement is supported by 100 European civil society orgs. Presents
knowledge of clause 2 of agreement; human rights and international law framing.
Ideology—--Beliefs, Values, Assumptions:
Oppression is harmful & wrong; Israel and Zionism is oppressive; People who support
human rights should support Palestinians; International law matters and should be
followed.
Identification & Division:
Israel is oppressor, Palestinians and BDS movement represent the oppressed; people of
conscience support Palestinians and not Israel.
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Counterframing:
Palestinians as victims, not Israelis (inferred).
Roles:
Human right activist; Representative of Palestinian people and human rights activists;
Someone who shames people who offer support to Israel and its policies.
Resonance:
Fits with leftist social justice activist framing; Fits with human rights supporters; fits with
international solidarity activists. Doesn't fit with Zionist framing.
Pathos & Emotional Language:
“Massive colonization”; violations of international law are “persistent”; Israel's record of
“gravely violating” the EU's human rights regulations; refers to Israel’s “human rights
violations, collective punishment and construction of settlements and the Wall,” but
doesn’t use much emotional language to describe these violations; more emotional
language later regarding Gaza: “Israel still maintains its criminal one-year-long siege on
Gaza – described by the current UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, Prof. Richard
Falk as a ‘prelude to genocide’ – that has already cost the lives of 197 patients, mainly
children and elderly”; “malnourishment among children has increased.”
Other:
Only mentions "ethnic cleansing" in relation to the Nakba near the end of the full
statement; focuses more on human rights because "human rights" are mentioned in one of
the clauses of the EU agreement in question. More logos than pathos. Cites EU and
international law. Consistent with commonly used frames.
As the above coding example demonstrates, I use the heuristic questions to guide my
coding and analysis of the framing and rhetorical strategies for both official and vernacular proBDS discourse. While I initially only performed open coding on a small sample of texts from my
larger corpora, once I turned my attention to my full corpora of texts, I also began my coding
with an initial open coding and then reread each text to code it again using my heuristic
questions to help me label and categorize the key concepts, terms, themes, and frames, etc. This
example also reveals that some heuristic questions yield somewhat overlapping results, which
not only shows how the heuristic questions tie together, but also demonstrates how rhetorical and
framing strategies often coincide. Discovering overlapping results can also reinforce the strength
of findings. In the following section, I describe my coding process in more detail.
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Coding Process
After selecting my corpora of both official and vernacular pro-BDS texts and developing
my heuristic questions for analysis, I then had to code my corpora carefully to identify themes,
frames, and various rhetorical strategies according to my heuristic list of questions discussed
above. While I do not use grounded theory in its entirety as my primary methodology, I do
borrow some coding methods from both cluster criticism and grounded theory to help me
identify common patterns of themes and preliminary frames initially through an open coding
method in which I consider the frequency of words and phrases and relationship to other words
and concepts. Then, I went back and used some of my initial findings to help me refine my
heuristic questions and test some of my initial hypotheses about preliminary frames against the
rest of my data.
I chose to first code a small selection of my texts using an open coding method
commonly used in qualitative analysis and borrowed from grounded theory and generative and
cluster criticism (Charmaz; Corbin and Strauss; Foss). According to Charmaz, even when
researchers only make superficial use of grounded theory and do not pursue actual theory
construction, “its strategies can help qualitative researchers increase the analytic power of their
studies” (403). Foss describes an initial coding process similar to open coding as the first step of
generative criticism and directs scholars to start with an “initial broad-brush coding of the artifact
to discover its central features” (389). To select the BNC statements I would perform open
coding on initially, I chose the first statement from every two pages of results from a search for
statements from the BNC, which yielded 18 texts, and I also included the original 2005 BDS Call
and the “What is BDS?” page from the website as well, which gave me about 10% of the total
BNC corpora. For the initial open coding of Barghouti texts I chose to include in my sample the
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introduction to Barghouti’s book and two recent op-eds in which he provides broad justification
for the BDS movement because I thought these texts would provide a good representation of my
larger corpora. For the vernacular student texts, I selected texts from one IAW event from each
university, along with one Facebook post from each university student group during IAW, for a
total of two texts from each university. Once I selected my smaller sample for open coding, I
then used open coding to discover “significant words and images that mark the artifact” and any
repeated themes and patterns that emerged from key words, concepts, metaphors, themes,
arguments, evidence, names, etc. to help me develop my initial preliminary hypotheses about
themes, frames, and other elements of the language used that appear frequently in pro-BDS texts
(Foss 389). I used the criteria of frequency and intensity to identify common words, phrases,
themes, concepts, and preliminary frames, and I kept track of my data and coding in an Excel
spreadsheet (Foss 389).
Through this initial open coding process, I developed tentative hypotheses about what
themes, concepts, arguments, frames, and ideologies seemed to be most common, so I could then
test the rest of my data against these initial hypotheses and preliminary frames later on. I also
used memo writing to help me interrogate the significance of codes and preliminary categories of
themes and frames, as well as to help me identify gaps in the data or themes and concepts that I
had expected to find but were missing (Charmaz 405; Corbin and Strauss 10). After every coding
session, and sometimes even multiple times during a session, I would write brief dated memos to
myself in my research journal to help me think through my coding findings so far.
Another step of my early open coding process was to copy the entirety of the texts in my
initial open coding stage into a word cloud program to generate a visual representation of terms
that appeared most commonly throughout the texts—as well as terms that did not appear. This
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informal visual quantitative analysis of the texts helped me to notice that terms like “rights,”
“equality,” and “occupation” were used much more often than the nearly non-existent “peace”
and “conflict.” Like with my other open coding, I used this information to give me some ideas
and preliminary hypotheses that I could then test when I completed coding the rest of my corpora
using my heuristic.
During this recursive process, I also used my preliminary findings through open coding to
refine my heuristic list of questions. For example, I added a question focusing on emotional
appeal that was not originally in my list because I noticed that a small percentage of the texts I
had coded included significant emotional appeals even though most of them did not. I also
removed an initial heuristic question focusing on visual images because so few of the texts
included images, especially the official texts, so I decided to consider visual themes, arguments,
and framing as part of my coding of the printed texts rather than in a separate category of its
own. Finally, I also decided to add an “Other” category in my coding spreadsheet in which I
could place any other interesting or potentially significant information that did not clearly fit into
one of my other coding categories related to my heuristic questions.
Next, I performed subsequent more detailed coding using my updated heuristic questions,
the answers to which I coded in separate columns for each question in a table with a row for each
text using another Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. During this careful coding process I used my
heuristic questions as a guide to help me identify key words, concepts, frames, and rhetorical
strategies related to each of my questions, first for official BDS texts and then for vernacular
student-created texts. I also continued to write memos to myself in my research journal during
and after every coding session to help me refine my categories and findings for framing other
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rhetorical strategies. I also used this longer, more comprehensive coding process to test my initial
hypotheses about preliminary framing categories.
During this coding process, I also selected a smaller sample of my official and vernacular
texts (about 25 texts total) on which to perform a more in-depth microanalysis by choosing texts
that seemed representative of the various categories of frames, purposes, and other rhetorical
strategies. Johnston proposes using “microanalysis” to analyze important documents more in
depth, and he recommends selecting texts for microanalysis “from critical junctures in the
movement, or when the text is articulated particularly well, or when the text is highly
representative”; he argues that this added level of scrutiny can “increase validity of
interpretation, capture data that would otherwise be lost, and reveal connections in different parts
of the text that give insight into the thought processes of the producer” (229). For this
microanalysis, I reread and re-coded this smaller sample of representative texts again to see if
any other frames or themes emerged that I didn’t notice the first time. I also used this
microanalysis to help me identify the important and representative quotes and examples I
reference and discuss more in depth in my later data chapters.
This iterative, multi-step coding process helped me consider the validity of my early
hypotheses about the most common and significant key concepts, themes, and frames I found in
my initial open coding as I returned to later stages of coding more texts in my corpora. This
aspect of my project shares similarities to aspects of grounded theory, as described by Corbin
and Strauss:
Every concept brought into the study or discovered in the research process is at first
considered provisional. Each concept earns its way into the theory by repeatedly being
present in interviews, documents, and observations in one form or another—or by being
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significantly absent (i.e., it should be present, but isn't, so that questions must be asked).
Requiring that a concept's relevance to an evolving theory (as a condition,
action/interaction, or consequence) be demonstrated is one way that grounded theory
helps to guard against researcher bias. No matter how enamored the investigator may be
of a particular concept, if its relevance to the phenomenon under question is not proven
through continued scrutiny, it must be discarded. Grounding concepts in the reality of
data thus gives this method theory-observation congruence or compatibility. (7)
One tricky aspect of qualitative analysis is navigating researcher bias and trying to
minimize its effect on the coding, analysis, and interpretation of data. Kuypers argues that
analysts seeking to identify frames must “be especially careful to examine the entire rhetorical
artifact before determining what frames are operating. That is to say, do not assume a particular
frame is operating and then go look for it. The best framing analyses allow the rhetorical artifacts
to speak for themselves” (“Framing Analysis” in Rhetorical Criticism 198). Acknowledging the
impossibility of completely eliminating researcher bias, I tried to be careful when coding to let
the texts speak for themselves as much as possible rather than inadvertently imposing frames that
I expected to find, which I did partly through my careful iterative coding process and frequent
reflective research memos.
Another way I tried to confirm my findings and interpretation of common frames and
themes and also help to account for my own possible biases was by incorporating a quantitative
element into an otherwise qualitative rhetorical framing analysis. To do this, I copied and pasted
the entirety of every text I coded into one document for my official corpora of texts and another
for vernacular. I then entered the entire corpora into an online open-source text analyzer
(http://textalyser.net/) to test the word and phrase frequency counts against my own findings and
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to also compare the official and vernacular corpora for any notable differences between the most
frequently-repeated words in each, along with another instance when I added them both together
to discover the word and phrase frequencies of my entire corpora of pro-BDS texts. Though I did
not conduct a rigorous scientific quantitative analysis, discovering what words and phrases were
used most often in these texts served to reinforce my own qualitative estimation of which frames
were most commonly used and support my findings of strong parallels between the frames
emphasized by both official BDS movement leaders and the more vernacular discourse of
student activists.
This discussion of my coding process is meant to be an example of my research and
thinking process. Because of considerations of space, the scope of the study, and my desire to
demonstrate breadth rather than depth, my analyses in chapters 4 and 5 will focus on the most
significant findings from the data rather than detailed descriptions of my analysis and coding
process for each text.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I explain how rhetorical frame analysis can help reveal underlying
ideologies and break down arguments to their most basic level, which can enable rhetoric
scholars to better understand how social movement discourse may or may not resonate with
audiences’ beliefs and assumptions. Frames are the basic building blocks that audiences use to
understand foundational issues and unstated assumptions, and when these foundations are
missing, audiences will not be as receptive to higher-level arguments, evidence, and rhetorical
strategies and appeals. Examining the rhetorical framing strategies of a social movement’s
discourse allows us to understand the lenses through which the activist-rhetors want audiences to
view the problem, which include the assumptions and beliefs underlying the rhetorical appeals
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and arguments used. Once these frames are identified, we can also better understand the
resonance or fitness of social movement discourse by analyzing how empirically consistent such
frames are with the material realities of the situation and common perceptions found in the
public sphere. Reviewing interdisciplinary frame analysis scholarship reveals that rhetorical
analysis and frame analysis overlap significantly and can productively complement each other
when researching social movement discourse.
I have tried to describe my methods and processes for performing rhetorical frame
analysis so that other scholars and students may be able to replicate my coding and analysis or
develop their own original multidisciplinary heuristic for coding. I have explained the relevant
theories that I used to develop and adapt each of my heuristic questions, and I have also tried to
explain the various steps of my research process, including identifying and gathering my corpora
of texts and performing an iterative coding process that draws from elements of grounded theory
and generative and cluster criticism. After I completed my coding process, I then went back and
reviewed my results and my research memos in order to finish my analysis and interpretation of
my data. I will discuss my analysis of data in more detail in the next two chapters. Chapter 4 will
include my discussion of official BDS discourse, and Chapter 5 will cover my analysis of
vernacular student-created pro-BDS texts.
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CHAPTER IV
RHETORICAL FRAME ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL PRO-BDS TEXTS

For my analysis of the rhetorical framing strategies of official BDS discourse, I turn to
the corpora of official statements put out by the Palestinian BDS National Committee (BNC)
found on the official BDS Movement website (bdsmovement.net), along with several op-eds and
a book written by BDS movement co-founder and spokesperson, Omar Barghouti. In addition to
using my rhetorical framing analysis heuristic to code and analyze Barghouti’s texts, along with
the over 200 total official BNC statements released on the website (from the earliest statement
released in 2008 until the summer of 2017), I also selected a smaller corpora of these texts (about
10%) on which to perform a more in-depth micro-level rhetorical frame analysis. After initially
coding each text using my heuristic questions for rhetorical frame analysis, I then selected two to
three representative texts, including the 2005 BDS Call (about 10% of my smaller corpora or 1%
of the total texts) to investigate and discuss their rhetorical framing strategies in more depth in
this chapter. I use my heuristic questions for rhetorical frame analysis to examine each text and
determine their framing strategies by looking at a range of factors related to framing. I also note
any other rhetorical or discursive patterns commonly found in my larger corpora that also are
manifest in these selected official texts. While many rhetorical scholars of social movements
focus on the rhetoric of movement leaders (Griffin; Simons), I take a cue from other rhetoricians
who advocate for analyzing the vernacular rhetoric of rank-and-file members in order to get a
more nuanced view of how individual members’ and supporters’ own personal views interact
with and complement or contradict movement leaders’ own ideologies and framing of issues
(discussed more in depth in Chapter 3) (Hauser; Hauser and McClellan). In this chapter, I will
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focus on the discourse of official movement leaders, while in Chapter 5, I will turn to analyzing
more vernacular student-created pro-BDS texts from Israeli Apartheid Week (IAW) events at
local universities in the Washington D.C. area.
Rhetorical Situations and Ecologies for Official BDS Movement Discourse
Before getting into a more in-depth discussion of my data and analysis of the framing
strategies found in the official pro-BDS texts I studied, I will briefly review some of the most
relevant elements of the rhetorical situations and ecologies for official pro-BDS discourse more
broadly, including the various short and long-term exigencies referenced or called forth by proBDS rhetors, along with relevant political and historical context, rhetors, audiences, constraints.
To understand many of the framing and rhetorical choices made by pro-BDS rhetors, it is
necessary to first understand how elements of the rhetorical situation and ecology serve to
motivate and constrain these choices and affect audiences’ potential receptiveness to pro-BDS
discourse. Official pro-BDS movement discourse tends to focus on three primary exigencies: the
failure of the international community, Israel’s violations of international law and denial of
Palestinian rights, and Israeli impunity, and these exigencies also overlap with common frames
found throughout official pro-BDS discourse, as I will discuss more in depth later in this chapter.
In regard to the specific official pro-BDS texts I focus my analysis on in this chapter,
although most of the elements of the rhetorical situation and ecology are the same as those for
pro-BDS discourse more generally, a few elements vary somewhat. For example, while Omar
Barghouti’s audience for his book, Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions: The Global Struggle for
Palestinian Rights, is almost identical to that of the BNC statements (transnational Englishspeaking Western Palestinian solidarity activists), his op-eds in several US newspapers are
targeted more specifically for an American audience but also more widely to a mainstream
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liberal audience, rather than to already sympathetic activists. This explains why his framing
strategies (discussed later in this chapter), analogies, arguments, etc. include more frequent
references to US history and attitudes than are found in the official BNC statements. His op-eds
also more often acknowledge and refute common US and Western critiques of BDS than is the
case for BNC statements.
In the following sections of this chapter, I discuss the results of my rhetorical framing
analysis with particular focus on my micro-level analysis of selected official pro-BDS texts. The
corpora includes texts with purposes such as general justifications for BDS (mostly Barghouti),
announcements of BDS successes, statements of solidarity with other struggles for justice around
the world, condemnations of complicity with or support for Israel, appeals for Gaza, and
responses to critics. In addition to discussing the results of my micro-analysis of these selected
representative texts drawn from my larger corpora, in these sections, I also briefly discuss or
quote from other relevant texts from the BNC or Barghouti to provide additional examples and
evidence of BDS framing strategies.
Official BNC Statements
The 2005 BDS Call
The first official BNC statement released is also the foundational text of the Palestinianled BDS movement: the 2005 BDS Call. Because the 2005 official BDS Call is arguably the
most important text of the BDS movement, I have included it here in its entirety with its original
wording and format:
One year after the historic Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
which found Israel's Wall built on occupied Palestinian territory to be illegal; Israel
continues its construction of the colonial Wall with total disregard to the Court's decision.
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Thirty eight years into Israel's occupation of the Palestinian West Bank (including East
Jerusalem), Gaza Strip and the Syrian Golan Heights, Israel continues to expand Jewish
colonies. It has unilaterally annexed occupied East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights and
is now de facto annexing large parts of the West Bank by means of the Wall. Israel is also
preparing - in the shadow of its planned redeployment from the Gaza Strip - to build and
expand colonies in the West Bank. Fifty seven years after the state of Israel was built
mainly on land ethnically cleansed of its Palestinian owners, a majority of Palestinians
are refugees, most of whom are stateless. Moreover, Israel's entrenched system of racial
discrimination against its own Arab-Palestinian citizens remains intact.

In light of Israel's persistent violations of international law; and

Given that, since 1948, hundreds of UN resolutions have condemned Israel's colonial and
discriminatory policies as illegal and called for immediate, adequate and effective
remedies; and

Given that all forms of international intervention and peace-making have until now failed
to convince or force Israel to comply with humanitarian law, to respect fundamental
human rights and to end its occupation and oppression of the people of Palestine; and

In view of the fact that people of conscience in the international community have
historically shouldered the moral responsibility to fight injustice, as exemplified in the
struggle to abolish apartheid in South Africa through diverse forms of boycott,
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divestment and sanctions; and Inspired by the struggle of South Africans against
apartheid and in the spirit of international solidarity, moral consistency and resistance to
injustice and oppression;

We, representatives of Palestinian civil society, call upon international civil society
organizations and people of conscience all over the world to impose broad boycotts and
implement divestment initiatives against Israel similar to those applied to South Africa in
the apartheid era. We appeal to you to pressure your respective states to impose
embargoes and sanctions against Israel. We also invite conscientious Israelis to support
this Call, for the sake of justice and genuine peace.

These non-violent punitive measures should be maintained until Israel meets its
obligation to recognize the Palestinian people's inalienable right to self-determination and
fully complies with the precepts of international law by:

1. Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall
2. Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full
equality; and
3. Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to
their homes and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194. (“Palestinian Civil”)
The rhetorical situation for the BDS Call and the birth of the official BDS movement
includes some immediate and identifiable external exigencies, many of which are stated within
the call itself, including the one-year anniversary of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
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ruling declaring the Israeli separation barrier illegal; the continued construction of the separation
barrier; the failure of peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians to produce any significant
recent progress (i.e., 2005) toward a two-state solution or resolution to the conflict; the
continuing expansion of illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank; and the ongoing problem of
the failure of the international community to hold Israel accountable for its continued violations
of international law and denial of Palestinian human rights (“Palestinian Civil”). Other external
and ongoing exigencies not stated within the text of the call itself consist of the recent end of the
violent Second Intifada (2000-2005; also known as the “Al-Aqsa Intifada”), which failed to
achieve any significant gains for Palestinians, and the continued and even increasing oppression
and settler colonial policies endured by Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza (e.g.,
increasing number of checkpoints and restrictions on freedom of movement and travel, home
demolitions, curfews, administrative detentions, etc.).
Another exigency for the 2005 BDS Call and also the BDS movement itself was the
recent movement in the West (especially in Europe and the US) during the Second Intifada to
protest Israel’s harsh repression of Palestinians with boycott campaigns and other solidarity
actions, which also included requests by Western solidarity activists for Palestinian guidance on
principles and goals of boycott campaigns (Barghouti, Boycott 19; Clarke; Rose and Rose).
Earlier calls for boycott and divestment from Israel arose during the Second Intifada beginning in
2001, including calls originating from US and European college-based activists and academics
(Barghouti, Boycott 19-20; Rose and Rose; Clarke). Then, in 2004, the Palestinian Campaign for
the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) was launched toward the end of the
Second Intifada after the collapse of the Oslo peace process and after Palestinians had been
suffering for almost four years from harsh Israeli repression in response to Palestinian suicide
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bombings (Barghouti, Boycott 19-20; PACBI, “Call”). PACBI was later folded into the
Palestinian BDS National Committee (BNC) to oversee the academic and cultural boycott
aspects of the BDS movement (PACBI, “Call”; “Palestinian Campaign”). Some of the language
of the later 2005 BDS Call echoes statements and themes from the 2004 PACBI Call, including
references to the failure of the international community to hold Israel accountable, ongoing
oppressive Israeli policies, and the South African anti-apartheid movement (PACBI, “Call”). The
earlier PACBI statement also includes an acknowledgement that Palestinian solidarity activists
calling for boycott campaigns during the Second Intifada had requested that Palestinian activists
release their own statement of principles and goals for international solidarity activists to follow:
“Recognizing that the growing international boycott movement against Israel has expressed the
need for a Palestinian frame of reference outlining guiding principles” (PACBI, “Call”).
The 2005 BDS Call itself is a good example of how rhetorical texts can be re-read over
time in different historical fluxes, as Edbauer explains in her discussion of rhetorical ecologies as
shifting rather than static rhetorical situations described by Bitzer and other earlier scholars.
While the 2005 BDS Call responds to several immediate external exigencies, in the years after
the call was released and after the BDS movement has grown and gained international support as
well as harsh condemnation from Israel’s advocates, different audiences may re-read the 2005
document and its rhetorical situation and exigencies in a different light. For example, each time
Israel has launched a military assault on Gaza since then, the BDS movement has gained new
supporters who oppose what they perceive as Israel’s disproportionate response to Hamas
rockets and collective punishment of Palestinian civilians living in Gaza (Thrall, “BDS,” “How
the Battle”). Someone sympathetic to the suffering of Palestinians in Gaza reading the 2005 Call
for the first time after the 2008-2009 or 2014 Israeli assaults on Gaza may see the BDS call and
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its demands as extremely reasonable for their focus on nonviolent BDS (as opposed to the rocket
attacks from Gaza often discussed in US media) and the fact that the 2005 Call concentrates
more on other discriminatory and oppressive policies that deny Palestinian human rights without
mentioning the recent violent military assaults on Gaza that resulted in hundreds of civilian
deaths. In light of the lack of a strong international response to Israel’s Gaza assaults, later
readers of the 2005 BDS Call may also find the references to the failure of the international
community to intervene and hold Israel accountable particularly apt and salient in the context of
later realities. At the same time, later readers who are more sympathetic to Israel may become
more critical of the text and perceived exigencies for the 2005 BDS Call after exposure to proIsrael public relations in the mainstream US news media during the Gaza Wars.
Other examples of real-world events may also affect how audiences perceive the 2005
BDS Call and pro-BDS discourse generally as part of shifting rhetorical ecologies. For example,
the Israeli killing of mostly nonviolent Palestinian demonstrators from Gaza during the 20182019 Great Return Marches and protests; the Israeli government’s increasing anti-democratic
and right-wing shifts; and Donald Trump’s professed support for Israel’s right-wing government
and US policy changes, including moving the US embassy to Jerusalem in 2017 and proposing
his controversial and one-sided Peace to Prosperity plan in 202013, could cause some liberal
critics of Trump and Netanyahu in the US and around the world to become more open to proBDS discourse than they would have been previously when support for Israel was still
considered a bipartisan position shared by conservatives and liberals alike. Moreover, after the
13

In addition to this policy change, the Trump administration also recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in
2019 and Trump officials have dropped the use of the term “occupation” in administration documents and some
have made statements suggesting increased acceptance or tolerance toward Israeli annexation of at least parts of the
West Bank (Holland and Mason; “US Envoy”). And in January of 2020, the Trump administration also released its
Peace to Prosperity plan that involves Israel’s annexation of large portions of Palestinian territory that would divide
up the West Bank; many critics, including Israelis, have likened the plan to official apartheid (Thrall, “Trump’s
Middle East”; Peace to Prosperity; Sokatch; Levy; “Trump’s Peace Sham”; “B’Tselem).
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harsh response of pro-Israel advocates to the growth of BDS and the passage of several anti-BDS
laws in several US states, the exigencies for the 2005 BDS Call may be re-read again in a new
context in which public support for BDS could be seen as a risky legal liability. Thus, there are
many ways that pro-BDS texts and their exigencies can be re-read and re-interpreted over time in
different historical contexts and fluxes. Understanding these exigencies is necessary for
understanding the context for the 2005 BDS Call, the common justification for the use of BDS
tactics and the existence of the BDS movement itself, as well as the purpose, framing, and
rhetorical strategies and appeals of pro-BDS discourse.
A full rhetorical understanding of pro-BDS discourse and its framing strategies also
requires examining the audiences for pro-BDS texts, which applies to the 2005 BDS Call and
pro-BDS discourse more generally. According to Bitzer, “a rhetorical audience consists only of
those persons who are capable of being influenced by discourse and of being mediators of
change” (8). While pro-BDS activist-rhetors, like other social movement rhetors, tend to focus
on sympathetic audiences that can be called to action in support of the cause of Palestinian
rights, there are a variety of primary and secondary local, regional, and international audiences
for pro-BDS discourse as well. Audiences for the 2005 BDS Call are similar to those for all proBDS discourse and include international Palestinian solidarity activists; social justice activists
who may not currently focus on Palestinian rights but whose values align with those expressed in
the call; social and racial justice activists who previously supported the South African antiapartheid struggle, which is stated as inspiration for the BDS movement in the call itself; and a
wider audience of potentially sympathetic Western, international, and even Israeli audiences
whom the BDS Call “invite[s] to support this Call, for the sake of justice and genuine peace”
(“Palestinian Civil”).
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US citizens and activists are an especially important audience for pro-BDS discourse
because the US is Israel’s primary benefactor in the international arena. The typical rhetorical
focus on receptive audiences means that right-wing Christian and Jewish Zionists would not
typically be intended audiences for BDS discourse because they are likely not “capable of being
influenced by discourse” or being “mediators of change” (Bitzer 8). Some liberal Zionists, on the
other hand, profess adherence to universal values such as equality, human rights, etc., values that
often conflict with Israel’s actual discriminatory policies against Palestinians. Thus, some liberal
Zionists may be persuadable by pro-BDS discourse that connects with these common values and
beliefs, as evidenced by the growing numbers of Jewish BDS supporters and anti-Zionists in
recent years, many of whom previously held more pro-Israel Zionist views (Omer, Days of Awe
19-21; Beinart, The Crisis). However, because Zionism has become fused with Jewish identity
for many liberal Zionists in recent decades, this overlapping sense of identity and the doxa that
BDS is antisemitic may serve to trigger affective “uptake memories” that import Jewish history
and trauma into discussions of Palestine/Israel and BDS, as discussed by Bawarshi and Abraham
(Abraham, “Reluctant”). This situation may, in turn, affect the perceptions of BDS among many
liberal Zionist Jews and may prevent them from being more open-minded to pro-BDS discourse
(Bawarshi; Katz).
The proliferation of messages and texts across transnational social media also means that
it is often impossible to limit pro-BDS rhetoric to targeted audiences, which has implications for
both audience reception and the circulation of texts. For example, pro-BDS texts and events
shared online can often unintentionally reach hostile pro-Israel audiences whose opinions and
responses to pro-BDS discourse often take up more space in the public sphere than pro-BDS
discourse does. And when video clips of pro-BDS rhetorical acts can be re-edited and shared
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across a variety of social media and other online platforms—and even tracked and responded to
in real time by pro-Israel activists using sophisticated algorithms—then it is hard to predict
which audiences will encounter pro-BDS rhetoric as it circulates (“Watch the Film”; Daro;
Kubovich).
Another way that the audiences for pro-BDS discourse are hard to pin down is that proBDS activist-rhetors who create pro-BDS rhetoric themselves are also among the intended
audiences for pro-BDS discourse: transnational pro-Palestinian activists and college students
participating in Palestinian solidarity organizations like Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP),
college and community activists in Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP), and members of other
Palestinian solidarity organizations and networks around the world, including the US Campaign
for Palestinian Rights (USCPR), CODEPINK, American Muslims for Palestine (AMP),
Palestinian Solidarity Campaign (UK), and others. These transnational activist networks are
primary audiences for many official pro-BDS texts intended to spread news of BDS
achievements and campaigns, inform activists about possible future campaign targets, remind
people about Palestinians’ principles, respond to charges of anti-Semitism, etc. These audiences
are usually already in agreement with the BDS movement and its goals and principles, so the
primary purposes of pro-BDS texts directed at these activists are to deliver useful information,
along with praise for efforts and successes or condemnation of Israeli actions and those
individuals or corporations who reject BDS and choose to “cross the picket line.” For these
audiences, while official pro-BDS texts may sometimes serve to remind activists of Palestinians’
principles and goals, they generally do not focus on trying to persuade those who already support
the cause.
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One way to tell that the 2005 BDS Call and other official pro-BDS discourse is intended
for a transnational audience is because their statements and website primarily use English. While
some documents include translated versions, including Arabic, Hebrew, French, Spanish, etc.,
the primary language used is English rather than Arabic. English is the primary international
language, as well as the current most common language between Palestinians and Israeli Jews
(since younger Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and the diaspora are less likely to learn
Hebrew now that fewer Palestinians work or travel inside of Israel). Some official BDS texts are
also directed more specifically to audiences in countries where a particular campaign or action is
directed. For example, BNC statements have directly responded to BDS-related actions or
campaigns in Spain, France, South Africa, Brazil, and other countries, and in those cases, the
statements are usually also available in the home language from that particular country even
though the primary language for each statement is still English (Palestinian BDS National
Committee, “Palestinians and Brazilians”).
Regarding the writers of the 2005 BDS Call, while it does not list specific authors by
name, it does include a long list of over 100 Palestinian civil society organizations that have
signed onto the call and who represent Palestinians under occupation in the West Bank and Gaza,
along with Palestinian citizens of Israel, and Palestinian refugees. Because Omar Barghouti is an
official BDS spokesperson and co-founder of the BDS movement, he also surely played a
significant role in writing the call, though other Palestinian BNC members may have also had a
hand in crafting the text. It is also likely that representatives of the signatory organizations had
read and approved of the final text of the July 2005 Call before its release.
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Framing Strategies in the 2005 BDS Call
The BDS Call cites the South African anti-apartheid movement and BDS campaign as an
inspiration, which indirectly introduces the apartheid frame often used in pro-BDS discourse to
describe the discrimination faced by Palestinians under Israeli rule. The South African antiapartheid movement and its discourse may also thus serve as a constraint on how audiences
perceive Palestinian pro-BDS discourse. While BDS supporters typically agree that Israel
practices a form of apartheid against Palestinians, and many of them also support a one-state
solution similar to the end of apartheid in South Africa, critics of BDS who oppose a one-state
solution claim the BDS movement promotes only a one-state solution even though the BDS
movement does not take a position on the final status of one or two states and instead focuses on
specific rights that address all segments of the Palestinian population14. Despite it being a mostly
uncontroversial aspect of the anti-apartheid movement, the “one man, one vote” version of a onestate solution in the case of Palestine/Israel would mean the potential end of Israel as Jewishmajority state, a prospect opposed by most Israelis and supporters of Israel, including many
liberal Zionists who may be otherwise critical of Israeli policy. Thus, the rhetorical link between
these two movements can serve to both clarify and confuse the goals and rhetorical framing
strategies of the Palestinian-led BDS movement for different audiences.
In addition to the introduction of the apartheid frame, rather than a “conflict” of two
equal sides that requires “peace,” the 2005 BDS Call rejects the conflict paradigm and framing
and instead defines the problem as discrimination, colonization, and oppression of Palestinians,
which unjustly violate Palestinians’ human rights. The statement infers that these problems are
14

As the BNC and Omar Barghouti have explained on multiple occasions, the reason the BDS movement does not
take a position on a final outcome of one state or two is because Palestinians themselves, including signatories to the
2005 Call, are split over their support for one or two states (Beinart and Barghouti, “A Candid Conversation”;
Palestinian BDS National Committee and Gaza Student Organizations; Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey
Research “Palestinian-Israeli Pulse,” “Palestinian Public Opinion”).
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caused by Israel’s oppressive and colonial policies and actions, but the statement does not
mention Zionism or any particular ideology as the ultimate cause of Israel’s behavior. The only
other cause mentioned besides Israeli colonialism itself is the failure of the international
community to hold Israel accountable (also related to the international complicity frame), thus
leading to Israeli impunity as a primary culprit and frame presented for understanding the
situation and justifying the necessity of the BDS Call and movement. The 2005 BDS Call judges
these problematic and oppressive Israeli actions against the Palestinians to be morally wrong,
and the solution offered is for “people of conscience in the international community” to take on
“the moral responsibility to fight injustice” by engaging in a transnational grassroots BDS
movement “inspired by the struggle of South Africans against apartheid” to finally hold Israel
accountable for its ongoing violations of international law and Palestinian human rights.
By discussing the problems, causes, moral judgments, and solutions, the 2005 BDS Call
introduces master and issue frames that work together to create common collective action frames
commonly found throughout much official pro-BDS discourse and that serve to frame audiences’
understanding of the situation in Palestine/Israel and spur collective action and support for the
BDS movement by defining the nature of Israeli oppression of Palestinians, the rights sought,
and the BDS movement itself. These frames include the following: settler-colonialism,
occupation, discrimination, ethnic cleansing, violations of international law, Israeli impunity,
refugee rights, international solidarity, nonviolence, equality, self-determination, BDS as a
grassroots movement, Israeli impunity, and the failure of the international community and related
international complicity15.
15

While the 2005 BDS Call does not directly refer to Israeli policies as apartheid, which is common in other official
BDS texts, the 2005 Call does introduce the apartheid framing by emphasizing the need for a BDS remedy similar to
the South African anti-apartheid movement.
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Even though the term “settler-colonialism” is not included in the BDS Call, the text does
reference colonialism multiple times in the first paragraph alone to set up the settler-colonialism
frame: “the colonial Wall,” “Jewish colonies,” “colonies” in the West Bank, and “colonial and
discriminatory policies.” And, later, the first of the three central demands of the BDS call is that
Israel complies with international law by “ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab
lands and dismantling the Wall.”16 The other two central demands include (2) “Recognizing the
fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality,” and (3)
“Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes
and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194.” The settler-colonialism frame positions the
BDS call and movement within a long history of anti-colonial struggles going back to the
twentieth century and situates Palestine/Israel within the same framing as other settler-colonial
societies in which more powerful foreign, typically European, settler-colonists displace and
oppress the indigenous inhabitants, such as in the cases of the US, Canada, Australia, Britain (in
Northern Ireland), Cyprus, South Africa, Algeria, etc. The settler-colonialism frame also serves
to contradict and reframe the preferred pro-Israel framing of the situation in Palestine/Israel as a
“conflict” between two equal sides (for a more in-depth discussion of the use of settlercolonialism as a paradigm for understanding the situation in Palestine/Israel see Chapter 2).
In addition to the 2005 BDS Call, it is common throughout official BDS discourse to
encounter the phrase, “occupation, settler-colonialism, and apartheid” in reference to Israel’s
oppressive and discriminatory policies against Palestinians. Most Israelis and pro-Israel
advocates reject the apartheid and settler-colonialism framing and instead claim that the over 52year-old occupation is only temporary and that many of these seemingly discriminatory policies
16

Later versions of these three demands include a revised version of this first passage to clarify its focus on
Palestinian lands recognized as being occupied by the UN, and so references to the three demands now often state
“all Arab lands occupied in 1967” (italics added).
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are justified and necessary for “security” reasons (Fishman; Morris 329-331). Some of these
policies, however, seem to contradict the notion of security, and some Israeli intelligence and
military figures have argued that they may even harm Israeli security (Landsmann). For example,
building a separation barrier along the internationally-recognized Green Line (the 1949
Armistice Line) separating Israel from the West Bank ostensibly to prevent terrorists from
crossing into Israel to carry out attacks, as happened during the Second Intifada, has a securitybased justification, but confiscating significant amounts of private Palestinian lands and parts of
the West Bank in the process seems to go beyond legitimate security justifications. Likewise,
when Israeli authorities demolish the homes of Palestinians who have built additions without
proper building permits (because Palestinians face many institutional barriers to acquiring the
necessary permits and are not permitted to expand the borders of Palestinian towns), it seems to
be a policy designed to make life difficult for Palestinians rather than increase security for
Israelis (“Planning Policy”). Collective punishment of whole Palestinian towns, neighborhoods,
or even the whole population of the West Bank or Gaza in response to a terror attack carried out
by one or more individual Palestinians also seems to contradict legitimate security needs and
instead may breed more insecurity (“Civilians Under Siege”; “40,000”; “Home Demolitions”).
Even though Israel’s advocates usually disagree with the apartheid label, pro-BDS activists
routinely reference Israeli “apartheid” and “settler-colonial” policies not only as common frames
for understanding the situation in Palestine/Israel but also as primary and ongoing exigencies for
the BDS movement and its discourse as a whole.
The Israeli military occupation is also referenced several times in the 2005 BDS Call as
another frame for understanding the situation. These references include “occupied Palestinian
territory,” “occupation of the Palestinian West Bank (including East Jerusalem), Gaza Strip and
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the Syrian Golan Heights,” “occupied East Jerusalem,” “occupation and oppression,” and
“occupation and colonization.” The military occupation of the West Bank and the blockade of
Gaza also represent another long-term exigence for the BDS movement and its discourse. Both
official and vernacular pro-BDS discourse frequently references the various oppressive and
discriminatory occupation policies targeting Palestinians living in the occupied West Bank,
Gaza, and East Jerusalem. These policies include the following: land confiscation; home
demolitions; military closures and curfews imposed on Palestinians cities and villages; military
checkpoints inside of the West Bank and between the West Bank and Israel; restrictions on
freedom of movement for Palestinians; long-term administrative detention of Palestinians
without trial, including the detention of hundreds of Palestinian children and the routine torture
and ill-treatment of Palestinian prisoners; harsh repression of popular protest that has led to
dozens of deaths and injuries in recent years; the extrajudicial execution of Palestinian suspects;
continued illegal Jewish settlement construction inside the West Bank; the construction and
maintenance of separate roads for settlers that Palestinians are prohibited from using; the
rationing of Palestinian water use in the West Bank; the blockade of Gaza that restricts the
importation of many necessary products and materials; and the West Bank separation barrier,
whose construction began in 2002 during the Second Intifada, and the route of which has
confiscated Palestinian lands near Israeli settlements (“Background”; “Israel: 50 Years”; “Israel
and Occupied”; The Occupation in its 51st Year; Harms and Ferry 141-144; Makdisi; Thrall,
“BDS”).
The 2005 BDS Call’s focus on ending the occupation is another element of the Call and
its exigence and kairos that can be read differently over time as the rhetorical situation and
ecology shifts and evolves. The original text of the 2005 BDS Call said that “Ending its
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occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall” was the first required
aspect of Israel’s “obligation to recognize the Palestinian people's inalienable right to selfdetermination” and fully comply with “the precepts of international law” (“Palestinian Civil”).
But later statements of the three aspects of Palestinian rights in public statements and on the BDS
movement’s website include this revised wording: “Ending its occupation and colonization of all
Arab lands occupied in 1967 and dismantling the Wall” (italics added). It is not clear who
decided to revise this phrase or exactly why, but it is likely that this phrase was added to clarify
that the statement refers only to the West Bank and Gaza and not to the entirety of Palestine
including Israel inside the internationally recognized 1967 Green Line. Because the BDS
movement does not take a position on a one-state or two-state solution, the 2005 BDS Call and
the three rights corresponding to the three sectors of the Palestinian people (Palestinian citizens
of Israel, Palestinians under occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, and Palestinian refugees)
leave open the ultimate political solution. It is likely that prior to the revision, the original phrase
would have been read differently by different audiences. Supporters of the two-state solution
could have read the original wording as only referring to the lands occupied in 1967 while
supporters of a one-state solution could have read it as ending the occupation of all of Palestine.
While I was unable to find any credible discussion of how this clarifying phrase came to be
inserted into later versions of the BDS call, is seems fair to guess that it may have been added
after criticism by those who thought it was too suggestive of a one-state solution. The fact that
the original 2005 Call text and wording remains publicly available on the BDS movement
website and in other locations may still elicit different readings from different audiences, though.
Because the elements of a rhetorical ecology are often in flux, while it is important to carefully
consider the different contexts, exigencies, and audiences that make up the rhetorical situations
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for pro-BDS discourse, we also cannot expect to be able to pin them down completely, as
Edbauer suggests.
In regard to discrimination, the 2005 Call refers to “Israel's entrenched system of racial
discrimination against its own Arab-Palestinian citizens,” and “colonial and discriminatory
policies.” In addition to the oppressive and discriminatory policies carried out by Israel against
Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza, the third segment of the Palestinian people whose
rights the 2005 BDS Call demands are the Palestinian citizens of Israel. Referred to as “Israeli
Arabs” or “Arab Israelis” by most Jewish Israelis (even though “Palestinian” is the increasingly
preferred term they use to describe themselves), the Palestinian citizens of Israel represent
approximately 20% of the population of Israel and are mostly made up of the Palestinians and
their descendants who remained inside of the Green Line after the Nakba at the time of Israel’s
independence in 1948 (Berger). Until 1966, Palestinian citizens inside Israel lived under
oppressive policies of martial law very similar to the experience of Palestinians living under
military occupation in the West Bank after 1967 (“Discrimination Against”; Munayyer). To
rebut charges that Israel practices apartheid, Israel’s advocates often argue that Palestinian
citizens enjoy full equality under the law and even serve in the Knesset. While it is true that
Palestinian citizens have many rights equal to those of Israeli Jews, there are also many other
rights and restrictions, some de facto and some de jure, that infringe on Palestinian citizens’
ability to enjoy truly equal rights inside of Israel (“Discrimination Against”; Munayyer). Some
examples of the discrimination faced by Palestinian citizens include discrimination in access to
housing, jobs, land, marriage, and citizenship. Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority
Rights in Israel asserts that there are over fifty laws in Israel that discriminate against Palestinian
citizens or favor Jews, a claim repeatedly echoed in pro-BDS discourse (“Discrimination
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Against”). For example, Palestinian Arab citizens, unlike Israeli Jews and Druze, are not
required to serve in the Israeli Defense Forces and most choose not to, so they face job
discrimination because military service is a requirement for most jobs in Israel (Goldman, Paul).
While there are some alternative national service opportunities for Palestinian citizens and
religious Jews (since 2005), it is difficult for Palestinian citizens to get these positions, which are
limited and do not confer the same prestige for future jobs as military service does (Magnezi;
Green, David, “Arab Israelis”). Palestinian citizens also face housing discrimination, which takes
various forms, including the much smaller percentage of building permits granted to Palestinian
citizens when compared with Israeli Jews and the many small communities that are allowed to
deny housing to families or individuals who do not fit within the vaguely defined “social-cultural
fabric” of the community, thus blocking most Palestinian citizens from moving in (Zeveloff;
Bob). In matters of marriage and citizenship, the temporary Citizenship and Entry into Israel
Law prohibits Palestinian citizens who marry Palestinians from the West Bank or Gaza from
bringing their spouses to live in Israel; though ostensibly a temporary law enacted during the
Second Intifada to curb terrorism, the Israeli Knesset has renewed the law every year since 2003
(Munayyer; “The Citizenship and Entry”). These and dozens of other de facto and de jure forms
of discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel constitute another ongoing exigence for
pro-BDS discourse and the BDS Call, they are also used as evidence to support pro-BDS claims
that Israel practices a form of apartheid. Such examples of injustices against Palestinian citizens
of Israel also work to promote a discrimination frame for the situation.
References to Israel’s violations of international law also occur a few times in the 2005
BDS Call and set up another common frame. This frame begins with the opening reference to the
ICJ ruling Israel’s wall illegal, followed by “Israel's persistent violations of international law”
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and the assertion that “hundreds of UN resolutions have condemned Israel's colonial and
discriminatory policies as illegal.” Other references to Israel’s international law and human
rights violations include their denial of “humanitarian law,” “fundamental human rights,” the
“inalienable right to self-determination,” “the precepts of international law,” and, finally, the
“rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN
resolution 194.”
The frame of Israel’s violations of international law also relates to the frame of Israeli
impunity, which is referenced indirectly in the 2005 BDS Call but which is also very prevalent in
most official BDS discourse and BNC statements. The first reference to this frame occurs in the
opening paragraph, which lays out some of the exigencies for the BDS call: that despite the ICJ
ruling of the wall as illegal, “Israel continues its construction of the colonial Wall with total
disregard to the Court's decision.” The rest of the opening paragraph then presents some of
Israel’s past and current actions that are inferred to also be contrary to international law,
including ethnic cleansing, expanding colonies (settlements), and annexing parts of occupied
territory. After this introduction to some of Israel’s ongoing violations, the next section builds on
the Israeli impunity frame:
In light of Israel's persistent violations of international law; and

Given that, since 1948, hundreds of UN resolutions have condemned Israel's colonial and
discriminatory policies as illegal and called for immediate, adequate and effective
remedies; and
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Given that all forms of international intervention and peace-making have until now failed
to convince or force Israel to comply with humanitarian law, to respect fundamental
human rights and to end its occupation and oppression of the people of Palestine. . .
Thus, the Israeli impunity frame, along with the related failure of the international community
and international complicity frames, lies at the heart of the BDS Call and the BDS movement’s
central justification and framing strategy: that BDS is necessary because no other strategy,
country, or international body has been successful at making Israel stop violating international
law in its treatment of Palestinians, which it continues to do with impunity. Thus, the official
2005 BDS Call and official BDS discourse more generally argues that there is no other choice
left to achieve Palestinian rights than a nonviolent, grassroots boycott campaign like the one
against South Africa. The fact that BDS seems to be gaining new supporters and converts every
day, despite the harsh public criticism leveled against it, seems to suggest that this framing
strategy may have some resonance among its targeted audiences (Beinart, “What the AJC Poll”;
Borschel-Dan; Goldberg, Michelle; Maltz; Telhami, “Americans Are”; “Young Americans”;
Weisman; Ziri).
To develop the failure of the international community and Israeli impunity frames, the
2005 Call references UN resolutions and actions (or lack thereof). While there are some
examples in earlier decades of the US and UN Security Council holding Israel accountable for its
violations of international law, since the 1990s, Israel has faced few material consequences from
the international community for its continued oppression and discrimination against
Palestinians17. There also has not been any significant progress made toward a comprehensive
17

Israel’s advocates have painted the UN as being anti-Israel because of several critical resolutions passed by the
UN Human Rights Council or the General Assembly (GA), including the 1975 UN GA resolution equating Zionism
with racial discrimination, but GA and UN Human Rights Council resolutions are non-binding, and the 1975
resolution was repealed in 1991 under pressure from the US (Lewis). Where other countries have been censured or
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peace accord since the 1993 Oslo Accords, which were never fully implemented and which
never led to any significant improvement in the lives of Palestinians; in fact, material conditions
faced by Palestinians living under occupation in the West Bank and Gaza got worse in many
ways after Oslo rather than better (Khalidi, Brokers 58-65; Said, From Oslo 92-94, 165-167;
Thrall, The Only Language 143-148). The 2005 BDS Call explains that without any other
meaningful way to hold Israel accountable for its actions, Palestinian activists have turned to
grassroots transnational activists around the world to launch a BDS campaign similar to the one
targeting South African apartheid. As Thrall argues in The Only Language They Understand:
Forcing Compromise in Israel and Palestine, without any real, tangible international pressure,
Israel will likely continue to pursue the oppressive and discriminatory policies it prefers based on
Israeli leaders’ perception of its demographic and “security” needs—as long the Israeli
perception of costs outweigh potential benefits of making sacrifices for a comprehensive peace
accord, then Israel, the more powerful partner, has no real incentive to make peace. As long as
no other international mechanism or body (including the UN, the US, etc.) intervenes
even harshly sanctioned by the UN Security Council for human rights violations and military aggression, including
Iraq, Iran, Russia, Sudan, and others, the US has made a policy of vetoing any Security Council resolution critical of
Israel, especially since the 1990s (Campos). The US also provides Israel with more foreign and military aid annually
than any other recipient, despite Israel being a strong military power in its own right and possessing nuclear
weapons (Bender; United States). In earlier decades, the US, the UN, and the international community had imposed
more consequences on Israel for its behavior, including when the UN security council stepped in to end the fighting
and restrain Israel’s military actions in previous military engagements in the region, including during the 1956 Suez
Crisis, the 1967 War, and Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon (UN Security Council, “Resolutions”; Morris 431, 437,
440-441, 521). The most recent instance of a world leader holding Israel accountable to a significant degree is the
oft-cited example of US president George H.W. Bush making a loan guarantee package for Israel contingent on the
freezing of settlement construction in 1992 (Friedman).
Even though many people thought Obama might put more pressure on Israel than previous US presidents, and he did
offer somewhat more public criticism than some previous US governments, the closest his administration came to
holding Israel accountable was to abstain from vetoing a UN resolution condemning Israeli settlements, while still
providing Israel with the largest aid package in US history ($38 billion over ten years) (Sengupta and Gladstone;
Spetalnick). In early 2020, after years of repeated delays due to pressure from Israel and its supporters, the UN’s
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights finally released a list of international companies that conduct
business in or with illegal Israeli settlements; while the list has been criticized by Israel and its supporters, it could
represent a first step at holding Israel accountable for at least some of its violations (Abunimah, “UN Takes”;
Nebahay; Eichner; Hendrix).
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substantially to prevent the ongoing denial of Palestinian rights by Israel, then the BDS
movement will continue to have an overarching justification and exigence. And as long as this
Israeli impunity continues without significant international pressure for accountability, then it
will continue to serve as both a major exigence for pro-BDS discourse and activism and a
common frame found throughout BDS discourse.
The common frames of ethnic cleansing and refugee rights are also introduced in the
2005 BDS Call and later repeated in many BNC statements. Near the end of the introductory
paragraph of the call, this statement frames the history of injustice against Palestinians as one of
ethnic cleansing: “Fifty seven years after the state of Israel was built mainly on land ethnically
cleansed of its Palestinian owners, a majority of Palestinians are refugees, most of whom are
stateless.” Though the term “ethnic cleansing” is still a somewhat controversial way to describe
how most of the Palestinians living in pre-1967 Israel ended up leaving their homes and never
returning, especially for Israel’s advocates, most contemporary historians, including several
Israeli New Historians, agree that most of these Palestinians were either driven out by Jewish
forces between 1947 and 1949 or fled during the fighting and were prevented by Israel from
returning and never compensated for lost property, facts which are also supported by evidence in
documents found in Israeli government archives (Morris; Pappé, The Ethnic; Shezaf). The
difference of opinion is largely over whether this removal of the majority of the Palestinian
population was necessary and justified or not, with most Zionists and advocates for Israel
arguing that it was unfortunate but also necessary and thus justified (Morris; Shavit).
The 2005 BDS Call introduces this history of ethnic cleansing to diagnose the cause of
the persistent refugee problem in order to set up and justify refugee rights and the right of return
as one of the three central BDS demands: “Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of
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Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194.”
This historical exigency for this refugee rights frame traces back to the 1947-48 Nakba when
over 700,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled and later denied the right to return to their homes
or be compensated by the new state of Israel, and millions of Palestinians continue to live in
exile to this day, many of them living in refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan, and Gaza (Harms
and Ferry 94-102; Khalidi, Palestinian Identity 3-4, 178; Pappé, The Ethnic; “Israel’s Refusal”;
Morris). The right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties inside Israel and
be compensated for their losses is one of the most controversial parts of the 2005 BDS Call and
the BDS movement itself18. Supporters of Israel argue that the right of return would overwhelm
Israel with Palestinians, thus erasing the Jewish demographic majority and thereby “destroying”
Israel (Fishman; Rosenfeld; Reut Institute). The ongoing plight of Palestinian refugees provides
another one of the major exigencies for the BDS movement and the BDS Call, and the right of
return is stipulated by UN General Assembly Resolution 194, section 11, which states that the
General Assembly
18

The problem of the Palestinian refugees can be traced back to the 1947 UN Partition Plan, which allotted 55% of
the land to the Zionists (even though they made up only 35% of the population at that time), while the remaining
45% of Palestine was to become an Arab state for the indigenous Palestinians who comprised 65% of the inhabitants
in 1947 (United Nations Special Committee on Palestine; UN General Assembly, “Resolution 181”; Harms and
Ferry 88-92; Morris 180-186). Many Israel advocates argue that Palestinians are to blame for not having a state
because Arab leaders at that time chose to reject the UN Partition Plan as unjust, while most Palestinians and BDS
activists argue that such a plan would be seen as unjust by any indigenous people. At the time of the partition plan,
the land allotted by the UN to the Jewish state also had a high minority Arab Palestinian population of about 45% of
the Jewish state, which was recognized by the UN as a challenge but as necessary in order to give the new Jewish
state enough land to accommodate a large influx of Jewish refugees from Europe after WWII (United Nations
Special Committee on Palestine; UN General Assembly, “Resolution 181”).
After the dispossession of over 700,000 Palestinian Arabs during the war of 1947-1948, the percent of Palestinians
residing in the new Jewish state decreased from 45% at the time of the UN Partition Plan to about 15% at the end of
Israel’s War of Independence even as the Jewish state expanded its territory from 55% of Mandatory Palestine to
approximately 78% according to the 1949 Armistice Line (the “Green Line”) (Harms and Ferry 94-102; Morris 184,
222-259). These Palestinian refugees were never allowed to return to their homes inside of Israel, nor have they
been compensated, and most of them continue to live as stateless refugees in camps in the West Bank, Gaza, and
surrounding Arab countries (Kossaifi 31-34; “Israel’s Refusal”). In fact, Palestinian refugees make up about half of
the total Palestinian population, which includes the family of BDS co-founder Omar Barghouti (Barghouti, “For
Palestinians”; Kossaifi 42).
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Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their
neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that
compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss
of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should
be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible. (UN General Assembly
“Resolution 194”)
The Palestinian right of return frame is important to BDS activists not only because it is
seen by Palestinians as the initial and most comprehensive tragedy inflicted on them by the
Zionist project, but its impact also continues to be felt today by the millions of Palestinians living
in refugee camps in the West Bank, Gaza, and surrounding countries, not to mention the impact
on many other Palestinians living outside the region in the diaspora who are unable to return to
their homes and villages even just for a short visit. Thus, the plight of Palestinian refugees not
only reflects a past catastrophic tragedy that defines Palestinian identity, but it continues to
inhabit the lives of millions of stateless Palestinians to this day. Not only are Palestinians not
allowed to return to their ancestral homes inside of Israel, but also they have never been
compensated for their lost homes and properties by Israel, nor has the Israeli government ever
acknowledged that Zionist forces bore any responsibility for the Palestinians’ dispossession.
Even as Israel has regularly allowed Jewish Israelis to commandeer the homes of Palestinians in
East Jerusalem and the West Bank based on Jewish claims to properties going back to before
Israel’s founding or the “absentee” property laws, often with the blessing of Israeli courts, Israel
and its courts also continue to deny Palestinian property owners’ claims to any land or property
inside of the Green Line in Israel proper (Prusher).
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The right of return for Palestinian refugees has also been a major sticking point in past
peace negotiations between Israel and Palestinian representatives because it is a right valued
highly by most Palestinians (especially those who are still refugees). The importance of the right
of return to Palestinians was also recently emphasized by the large turnout of Palestinians from
Gaza, most of whom are refugees from the Nakba, for the Great Return Marches in 2018 and
2019, during which thousands of unarmed Palestinians were wounded and over a hundred were
killed by Israeli snipers as they approached the Gaza border fence to advocate for their right to
return and an end to the siege of Gaza (“Six Months On”).
While the ethnic cleansing and refugee rights frames will likely resonate with social and
racial justice activists who are already concerned with human rights and sympathetic to the
Palestinian cause and narrative, older and more mainstream liberal American audiences (both
Jewish and non-Jewish) who have been exposed to years of pro-Israel framing prevalent in the
mass media and among politicians, including the oft-repeated slogan “a land without a people for
a people without a land” and the claim that Palestinian left their homes willingly in 1948 at the
behest of Arab leaders, may be less receptive to these frames that contradict commonly-held
Zionist views about Israel’s origins (Dershowitz, The Case; Peters). Even though the right of
return generates a backlash from supporters of Israel who seek to maintain the Jewish
demographic character of the state, it continues to be a common frame and major exigence for
the 2005 BDS Call, the BDS movement, and the larger struggle for Palestinian rights.
Other common BDS frames introduced in the BDS Call are equality, self-determination,
and nonviolence. Though more often inferred as the other side of the coin of “discrimination”
and “oppression” rather than discussed directly, the term “equality” features in the second
demand in the BDS call: “Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of
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Israel to full equality.” Omar Barghouti argues elsewhere that the most important rhetorical
framing strategy for the BDS movement and pro-BDS discourse should be a focus on equality:
“the indisputable Palestinian claim to equal humanity should be the primary slogan raised,
because it lays the proper moral and political foundation for effectively addressing the myriad
injustices against all three segments of the Palestinian people. It is also based on universal values
that resonate with people the world over” (Barghouti, “Putting” 56). Self-determination, which
has strong, though conflicting, roots in international law, is framed as another major goal of
BDS, with Israel having an “obligation to recognize the Palestinian people's inalienable right to
self-determination.”
In addition to the inherently nonviolent nature of BDS tactics, the BDS call also
explicitly introduces nonviolence as the preferred form of resistance for the BDS movement:
“These non-violent punitive measures should be maintained until Israel meets its obligation to
recognize the Palestinian people's inalienable right to self-determination and fully complies with
the precepts of international law.” All three of these frames—equality, self-determination, and
nonviolence—would likely resonate with the BDS movement’s target audiences of social justiceoriented and liberal Americans and Westerners as these frames overlap with values shared by
these audiences. The self-determination frame is directly tied to international law (Article I of the
Charter of the United Nations) and also echoes a common argument made by pro-Israel
advocates: that the Jewish people deserve self-determination in the form of a Jewish state19.
Another frame found in the 2005 BDS Call and that also commonly appears throughout
official pro-BDS discourse is that of international solidarity, which is closely related to the
19

There is debate over the precise meaning and application of the UN-sanctioned “right of self-determination”
(variously and contradictorily argued as referring to regional, democratic, and/or national rights), and the right of
self-determination of one group can sometimes conflict with the rights of another, which has been the case in
Palestine/Israel, where the Jewish people have succeeded in winning national and democratic self-determination
while Palestinians’ right has been long denied (Kapitan).
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frame referred to elsewhere as joint struggle. This frame is introduced in the 2005 BDS Call as
an obligation of “international civil society organizations and people of conscience all over the
world,” who “in the spirit of international solidarity, moral consistency and resistance to injustice
and oppression,” are asked to support BDS and Palestinian rights. Throughout the corpora of
official BDS texts I analyze, the frames of international solidarity and joint struggle recur many
times. Sometimes others are asked to show international solidarity with Palestinians by engaging
in joint struggle with them, and at other times, official BDS texts express solidarity and engage
in joint struggle with other movements for justice around the world, including those for workers’
rights and racial justice (Palestinian BDS National Committee, “Occupy Wall Street,”
“Palestinians Salute,” “Palestinian Trade Union,” “Racism,” “Remembering Hedy,” “Stop U.S.
Repression”; Palestinian BDS National Committee and Gaza Student Organizations). These
related frames can also be linked to Crenshaw’s concept of “intersectionality” popular among
many contemporary social and racial justice activists who believe that joint struggle is a
necessary component of movements for justice so that different forms of oppression are
recognized and addressed at the same time, and for whom these frames would be particularly
resonant and effective (Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins” and “Why Intersectionality”). The
fact that Palestinian solidarity and pro-BDS activism is popular among many activists also
affiliated with other social justice causes suggests that not only are these joint struggle and
international solidarity frames resonant but that this solidarity already exists to a significant
extent (Bailey; Bailey and Petersen-Smith; Erakat and Hill).
The BDS as a grassroots movement frame is introduced when the 2005 BDS Call
presents itself as originating from Palestinian civil society and asking for international solidarity:
“We, representatives of Palestinian civil society, call upon international civil society
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organizations and people of conscience all over the world.” The Call also invites “conscientious
Israelis to support this Call, for the sake of justice and genuine peace.” In addition to these
references to Palestinian and international civil society, the call also includes over a hundred
Palestinian signatory organizations at the bottom in a list preceded by this description that
emphasizes that the signatories represent the three segments of the Palestinian people: “The
Palestinian political parties, unions, associations, coalitions and organizations below represent
the three integral parts of the people of Palestine: Palestinian refugees, Palestinians under
occupation and Palestinian citizens of Israel.” This grassroots frame also relates to another frame
for BDS that appears frequently in later BNC statements: that grassroots, transnational pro-BDS
activism is more than just a few isolated groups working on a common cause but rather that BDS
acts as a transnational movement that individuals and organizations can join in their own local
contexts in order to exert a form of agency to help achieve justice in Palestine/Israel.
Sometimes the absence of frames can be as revealing as those that are promoted, which is
also the case for the 2005 BDS Call and other official pro-BDS texts from the BNC and
Barghouti. One example of a frame that is used less frequently in official pro-BDS discourse
than might be expected is the peace frame. For example, the 2005 BDS Call only mentions the
word “peace” twice in the text, as part of the phrases “peace-making” and “for the sake of justice
and genuine peace.” As with the rest of the official BNC statements, while “peace” is mentioned
occasionally, it is never alone, rather always with a modifier in phrases such as “genuine peace,”
“sustainable peace,” “just peace,” “peace with justice,” etc., a pattern also found in other BNC
statements and Barghouti texts. On the other hand, the more general peace framing is more
commonly found in pro-Israel texts that reinforce the “conflict paradigm,” which suggests a
“conflict” between two equal sides and presents Israel as seeking “peace” even as many of its
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actions and policies may seem to suggest otherwise (Taraki). In a similar way, official pro-BDS
discourse, including the 2005 BDS Call, rarely, if ever, employs the conflict frame to describe
the situation in Palestine/Israel. As discussed in Chapter 2, BDS movement activist-rhetors prefer
the settler-colonialism frame and paradigm to the conflict one because they argue that settlercolonialism more accurately describes the policies and actions of Israel and the Zionist
movement against the much less powerful indigenous Palestinian people rather than a conflict
framing that would more often connote a conflict of two roughly equal sides.
All of these primary issue frames introduced in the 2005 BDS Call can also be found
throughout official pro-BDS discourse and can be categorized under the more general and
widely-used master frames of injustice and human rights, both of which also encourage
identification with the Palestinians against Israel, identified as a perpetrator of injustice. Injustice
and human rights frames have been used successfully and unsuccessfully by many social
movements for justice around the world, including the US civil rights movement, the South
African anti-apartheid movement, and countless other anti-colonial, civil rights, and racial justice
movements (Brysk; Gamson, Encounters, Talking Politics; Keck and Sikkink). These master
frames also encompass the oppressor/oppressed frame with Israel being positioned as the
oppressor acting with impunity and the Palestinians being the oppressed victims who lack
human rights. The BDS Call frames Israel’s oppressive actions and violations of international
law as an injustice while achieving a “genuine peace” requires that Israel be held accountable
and justice achieved.
These master frames not only connect the BDS movement with other social movements
seeking justice and human rights, but they also encourage audiences to identify with the
Palestinians as the victims and against Israel as the oppressor, colonizer, occupier, and
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perpetrator of injustice (Burke). This oppressor/oppressed binary of identification and division
has been criticized by pro-Israel scholars as a biased oversimplification of a more “complex”
situation, but this framing is nevertheless likely to be resonant with audiences who recognize the
significant power imbalance between the state of Israel and Palestinians, as well as Palestinians’
current lack of human rights (Shimoni; Fishman). Thus, the 2005 BDS Call, along with official
pro-BDS texts generally, encourages identification with the Palestinians rather than with “both
sides” as the typical conflict framing does.
2017 BNC Statement Against Racism
Among the many BNC statements released after the 2005 Call, one that is representative
of much the framing, identification, and counter-framing strategies used by the official
Palestinian BDS National Committee is the March 7, 2017 statement, “Racism and Racial
Discrimination are the Antithesis of Freedom, Justice & Equality.” This statement was released
the day after Israel’s Knesset passed a new law to ban entry to foreigners who publicly express
support for BDS, which Israeli lawmakers deem to be antisemitic for singling out the Jewish
state and promoting the right of return (Goodstein). The statement was also released right before
the start of the 2017 Israeli Apartheid Week events held in universities around the world, and it
follows many public attacks on BDS, charges of antisemitism, and attempts to implement antiBDS legislation in several US states and at the federal level (“Anti-BDS Legislation”). This
statement also comes at a time when antiracist activism has been increasing in the US, largely
thanks to the Black Lives Matter movement, along with a growing focus on “intersectionality” in
Western leftist and social justice movements, and the left/liberal and anti-fascist responses to
growing “alt-right” and white nationalist organizing during and after the election of Donald
Trump (white nationalist discourse not only espouses racism and other forms of bigotry but also

142
often promotes antisemitic rhetoric) (“Alt Right”). In addition to these political events in the US,
far-right movements have also been gaining support in Europe and other countries, a fact which
the statement acknowledges (“Is Europe Seeing”).
After some more general condemnations of racism and racial discrimination, the
statement then goes on to list more specific forms of racism and bigotry that the BDS movement
opposes:
Adhering to the UN definition of racial discrimination, the BDS movement does not
tolerate any act or discourse which adopts or promotes, among others, anti-Black racism,
anti-Arab racism, Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, sexism, xenophobia, or homophobia.

We strongly condemn apartheid, genocide, slavery, colonial exploitation and ethnic
cleansing, which are crimes against humanity that are founded on racism and racial
supremacy, and we call for the right of their victims, including descendants, to full
reparation. We equally condemn and stand in solidarity with the victims of other human
rights violations including human trafficking, workers’ exploitation, and sexual
exploitation.
There seem to be multiple purposes of this statement: to situate the BDS movement as aligned
with intersectional antiracist and anti-colonial social justice movements and to offer
counterframing for charges of antisemitism from advocates of Israel. This statement clearly
locates the BDS movement within a larger global struggle for human rights, joint struggle and
against injustice, discrimination, racism, and antisemitism—all values that likely resonate with
left-leaning intersectional social and racial justice activist audiences.
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In Burkean fashion, the frames emphasized in this statement also serve to identify the
BDS movement with positive pro-justice and anti-oppression positions while negatively
associating Israel and Zionism with injustice and oppression. Like the 2005 BDS Call, the frames
used here include the master frames of injustice and human rights and issue frames that depict
and identify the BDS movement as supporting and engaging in joint struggle for antiracism,
anti-colonialism, freedom, and equality, while Israel and its policies are identified with the
negative acts of oppression, discrimination, settler colonialism, and apartheid. As discussed
previously in relation to the 2005 BDS Call, as opposed to the common “conflict” framing
suggesting both sides are at fault, which is used by Israel’s advocates and most mainstream
media outlets in the US, the BNC consistently uses an oppressor vs. oppressed injustice framing
that encourages identification with the Palestinians.
Another one of the most salient frames in this statement is that of joint struggle with
other oppressed groups of people around the world—a frame also closely aligned with the
intersectionality frame commonly found in US social justice movements and that also links to
the international solidarity frame found in the 2005 BDS Call. The statement builds this frame
by referencing how the BDS movement’s values require the movement to support other
oppressed people:
[T]he principles of the BDS movement include the values of cultural diversity,
solidarity and mutual support among victims of racism and racial discrimination.
Based on these values, we stand in solidarity with people of African descent,
indigenous peoples, landless people, refugees and migrants, people exploited and
oppressed for the economic advancement of a few, and those discriminated against and
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persecuted for their beliefs or identity, including caste. We stand with their respective
struggles for racial, economic, gender, environmental and social justice.
We extend our support to all marginalized communities, inter alia Arab, Black,
indigenous, Muslim, Jewish, Asian, Latino, Roma and Dalit, who are targets of
xenophobic and far-right racist movements that have risen or are rising to power,
particularly in the US, Europe, South America, India and elsewhere.
We also stand in solidarity with the struggles of all minorities in the Arab world
against racism and racial discrimination and for full equality and justice.
The principles of the BDS movement call for proactive solidarity with oppressed
communities worldwide and with all the victims of racist acts and rhetoric, as ours is a
common cause. We support their resistance, in harmony with international law, against
bigotry, racist ideologies and practices.
Racism and racial discrimination are the antithesis of freedom, justice and
equality.
This statement against racial discrimination and for joint struggle against oppression is consistent
with other BNC statements overall, and the frames and values it emphasizes would likely be
resonant with most left-leaning social and racial justice activist audiences in the US and the West
that focus on antiracism and intersectionality. Other BNC statements have also expressed
solidarity and joint struggle with the Black Lives Matter movement in the US, as well as with
Occupy Wall Street, international labor movements, and the indigenous Standing Rock water
protector movement in the US (Palestinian BDS National Committee “Occupy Wall Street,”
“Palestinians Salute,” “Palestinian Trade Union,” “Racism,” “Remembering Hedy,” “Stop U.S.
Repression”; Palestinian BDS National Committee and Gaza Student Organizations). A growing
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focus on and belief in joint struggle and intersectionality has led progressive anti-racist social
justice activists and movements to link with other oppressed and marginalized groups and create
coalitions that organize against injustice and across racial, ethnic, religious, national, gender, and
other group identities. At the same time, however, many pro-Israel advocates have grown
increasingly wary of intersectionality and have tried to find ways to undermine this popular
concept that threatens the acceptance of pro-Israel and Zionist beliefs among the social justice
left. For example, in 2019, the Reut Group published advice for pro-Israel professionals on
“Navigating Intersectional Landscapes,” offering further proof that many of Israel’s supporters
perceive intersectionality as threatening (Jaffe-Hoffman; “Navigating”).
By explicitly rejecting antisemitism along with other forms of racism and bigotry, this
statement seeks to offer counterframing to the antisemitism charges commonly promoted by
Israel’s advocates. Whether charging BDS with real antisemitism in the form of a “war by other
means” that seeks to “destroy Israel” (Block; Hallward, Transnational; NGO Monitor;
Goldenberg), a form of “new anti-Semitism,” “anti-Semitism by effect” rather than intent that
delegitimizes and unfairly singles out the only Jewish state (Rosenfeld; ADL; Brackman;
Fishman; Jewish Telegraphic Agency; Reut Institute; Steinberg; Tommer and Fleischer; Zieve),
or inadvertent antisemitism (Hirsh), the antisemitism charge against the BDS movement is so
widespread that it has become accepted by many supporters of Israel as doxa (Reut Institute;
ADL; Jewish Telegraphic Agency; Zieve). The counterframing against the antisemitism charge
offered here may resonate with some audiences who were on the fence or already sympathetic to
the Palestinian cause, but supporters of Israel who take it as a given that the BDS movement is
antisemitic are unlikely to be persuaded.
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While most of the other frames, values, and beliefs emphasized in this statement are very
consistent with previous BNC statements, this text also goes further to explicitly condemn
Zionism as a racist ideology: “We reject Zionism, as it constitutes the racist and discriminatory
ideological pillar of Israel’s regime of occupation, settler colonialism and apartheid that has
deprived the Palestinian people of its fundamental human rights since 1948.” In addition to
overtly associating Zionism with racism, the statement later references the 2001 UN World
Conference against Racism held in Durban, South Africa, in which Israel’s and the US’s
delegations withdrew from the conference after a draft declaration equated Zionism with racism
(though the final version removed this disputed section) (Feld 137; Kiewe 70). While this
identification of Zionism with racism is not surprising given the Palestinian experience with
ongoing Zionist-driven violence, dispossession, and discriminatory policies, this statement stands
out from most others for the way it explicitly names and condemns Zionism. The vast majority
of BNC statements do not mention “Zionism” and instead focus attention on Israel’s actions,
policies, and violations of international law.
Because of conflicting interpretations and attitudes toward Zionism among Western and
American audiences, the explicit condemnation of Zionism in this statement may serve to further
bolster the ethos and credibility of the BNC for anti-Zionist audiences, while at the same time
having the opposite effect on some older, more mainstream liberal audiences (including both
Jews and non-Jews) for whom Zionism is more likely viewed as a positive and legitimate
movement for Jewish liberation and self-determination. Younger liberal and leftist audiences
(again, both Jewish and non-Jewish) who may have less exposure to the positive associations
with Zionism and more experience with the negative connotations of Zionism as a form of
discriminatory settler-colonialism frequently found on the activist left, many of whom may be
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anti-Zionists themselves, may find an open condemnation of Zionism both fitting and resonant in
light of Zionism’s decreasing support among younger generations who value social justice
(Jewish Voice for Peace, “Our Approach”; Omer, Days of Awe; Omer-Man; Sunshine). By
linking criticism of Zionism with the intersectional joint struggle against antisemitism and other
forms of racism and bigotry, this statement may resonate with these antiracist audiences by
separating Jewishness from Zionism and suggesting that antiracists can stand against
antisemitism and Zionism at the same time, thus undermining the pro-Israel argument that antiZionism is inherently antisemitic. In early 2019, after years of ambivalence toward Zionism
among some of its leaders and members, the pro-BDS organization, Jewish Voice for Peace
(JVP), took the step of officially declaring themselves opposed to Zionism, thus providing
evidence of the growing acceptance of anti-Zionism on the left and among social-justice oriented
American Jews (Jewish Voice for Peace, “Our Approach”; Omer, Days of Awe; Omer-Man;
Sunshine).
This increasing embrace of anti-Zionism on the left and among younger Jews, however,
has also led to backlash among some liberal and conservative Zionist Jews and non-Jews who
continue to view anti-Zionism as inherently antisemitic for denying the Jewish people their
“right to self-determination” (Block; Hallward, Transnational; NGO Monitor; Goldenberg;
Rosenfeld). As Palestinian rights and BDS have become more and more accepted as part of
transnational intersectional antiracist movements for justice, tensions have also arisen between
liberal Zionists and other progressive antiracist activists, which has led to charges of
antisemitism and a growing split in the US and European Jewish communities between Jewish
anti-Zionists and those more critical of Israel and liberal Zionists who choose to support Israel
over other antiracist movements when criticism of Israel or the embrace of Palestinian rights and
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BDS becomes more overt (Dolsten; Omer, Days of Awe; Maltz; Sunshine; Zieve; Ziri). Thus,
denouncing Zionism in the same statement that explicitly denounces antisemitism may bolster
the BNC’s credibility with anti-Zionists while simultaneously validating the perception of BDS
as an antisemitic movement to “destroy Israel” among some Zionist audiences because of their
association of anti-Zionism with antisemitism, which could thus undermine the attempt at
counterframing against antisemitism charges for some audiences.
Use of Emotional Appeals for Gaza
One surprising pattern I found in the data is that very few official BNC statements rely on
the strong use of pathos or emotional appeals. The few that do include emotional appeals and
personal testimonies, however, are mostly BNC posts written by activists from Gaza either
during an Israeli assault or on an anniversary of such events. Israeli actions and policies toward
Gaza also serve as an ongoing exigence that periodically comes to the forefront of pro-BDS
discourse, especially whenever Israel engages in a military assault on Gaza and Hamas. While
Israel ended its official occupation of Gaza in 2005 and removed thousands of Jewish settlers at
that time, since Hamas’ takeover of Gaza from its political rival, Fatah, in 2007 (after Israel’s
refusal to recognize the democratically elected Hamas government after the 2006 elections),
Israel, with assistance from Egypt, has imposed a harsh blockade on Gaza that has stifled the
Gazan economy and left most Gazans in poverty and dependent on aid for basic survival
(“Background”; “Israel and Occupied”; The Occupation in its 51st). A 2015 UN report
determined that because of the Israeli blockade, Gaza would likely become “uninhabitable” by
2020; in 2019, a worsening water crisis in Gaza suggested that this prediction is on track to
become reality (Linshi; de Sam Lazaro). In late 2008 and early 2009, and then again in 2014,
Israel launched military assaults on Gaza ostensibly to curb Hamas’ ability to fire rockets on
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Israeli towns and cities. In the process, in both cases, Israeli shelling and missiles not only killed
over a thousand Palestinians (with a majority of civilian casualties) but also destroyed billions of
dollars of necessary infrastructure, most of which has yet to be rebuilt because the ongoing strict
blockade limits the importation of building materials into Gaza (Linshi; de Sam Lazaro;
“Whitewash Protocol”).
While strong pathos appeals are not typical of most official pro-BDS texts I encountered
in my research, when heavy pathos was used, it was often in the context of the suffering in Gaza.
Scholars of human rights movement discourse have shown that it is common for human rights
movements to rely on personal testimonies of suffering in order to gain attention and attract
sympathy and support for victims of human rights abuses (Brysk; Kennedy; Keck and Sikkink).
According to Brysk, “Life narratives of human rights abuses have become a powerful vehicle for
human rights campaigns, tribunals, truth commissions, and cause celebre literary texts. They
provide witness, put a human face on massive abuse, and model the protagonist’s emerging
awareness of causality and responsibility for their suffering” (109). Contrary to this common
pattern, however, most BNC statements are comprised of mostly relatively dry, logos-centric
discussions of Israeli policies and international law. On the other hand, BNC statements from
Gazans during Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009) and Operation Protective Edge (2014) take on a
more emotional quality that seems intended to elicit sympathy, empathy, outrage, and a sense of
urgency to act. For example the July 13, 2014 BNC statement, “Urgent Call from Gaza Civil
Society: Act Now!” reposted by the BNC but authored and signed by representatives of twentytwo Gazan civil society organizations, expresses uncharacteristic emotional language, presents
the situation in Gaza during Israel’s Operation Protective Edge assault as dire, and calls for
intensifying BDS:
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We Palestinians trapped inside the bloodied and besieged Gaza Strip call on
conscientious people all over the world to act, protest and intensify the boycotts,
divestments and sanctions against Israel until it ends this murderous attack on our people
and is held to account. With the world turning their backs on us once again, for the last
four days we in Gaza have been left to face massacre after massacre. As you read these
words, over 120 Palestinians are dead now, including 25 children. Over 1,000 have been
injured including countless horrifying injuries that will limit lives forever—more than
two thirds of the injured are women and children. We know for a fact that many more
will not make it through the next day. Which of us will be next, as we lie awake from the
sound of the carnage in our beds tonight? Will we be the next photo left in an
unrecognizable state from Israel’s state-of-the-art flesh-tearing, limb-stripping machinery
of destruction? We call for a final end to the crimes and oppression against us.
The focus on the killing of women and children and the emotional language choices, including
“bloodied,” “massacre,” “murderous,” and phrases like “Israel’s state-of-the-art flesh-tearing,
limb-stripping machinery of destruction,” demonstrate an impassioned, affecting rhetoric that is
atypical of the emotional restraint shown in the vast majority of BNC statements. Such emotional
rhetoric also reflects the increased international media coverage devoted to Israel’s wars on Gaza
that directs attention and sympathy to the Palestinians and highlights their suffering under
intensive Israeli military assaults, and which has also led to spikes in support for BDS during
these events. A similar emotional tone can be found in the January 10, 2009 BNC statement
during Operation Cast Lead, “Stop the Massacre in Gaza – Boycott Israel Now!”:
Today, the Israeli occupation army committed a new massacre in Gaza, causing the death
and injury of hundreds of Palestinian civilians, including a yet unknown number of
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school children who were headed home from school when the first Israeli military strikes
started. This latest bloodbath, although far more ruthless than all its predecessors, is not
Israel 's first. It culminates months of an Israeli siege of Gaza that should be widely
condemned and prosecuted as an act of genocide against the 1.5 million Palestinians in
the occupied coastal strip.
In addition to other emotional word choices here, the term “genocide” is rarely, though
occasionally, found in official BNC statements. When “genocide” is used by the BNC, it usually
only appears in quotes from Israelis or Jews critical of Israeli policy. For example, one
repeatedly quoted figure in several BNC statements is the Jewish professor emeritus of
international law at Princeton University and former UN Rapporteur for Human Rights in the
Occupied Territories, Richard Falk, who is quoted as having accused some Israeli lawmakers of
“incitement to genocide” and referring to Israeli policy in Gaza as “a holocaust-in-the-making”
in order to make a “desperate appeal to the governments of the world. . . to prevent these current
genocidal tendencies from culminating in a collective tragedy” (Palestinian BDS National
Committee, “Stop the Massacre”; Falk, “Is Israel,” “Slouching”). Some BNC statements have
also cited Israeli historian Ilan Pappé’s description of Israel’s policies toward Gaza as
“incremental genocide” (Palestinian BDS National Committee, “One Year Since”; Pappé,
“Israel’s Incremental”). In a few cases, the BNC has referenced “genocide” when citing Israeli
lawmakers who have made statements interpreted as calling for genocide against Palestinians,
including the former Israeli Justice Minister from the far-right Jewish Home Party, Ayelet
Shaked20 (Palestinian BDS National Committee, “Urgent Call”; Abunimah, “Israeli
20

Former Israeli Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked said in a Facebook post during Israel’s Operation Protective Edge
assault on Gaza in 2014 that the entire Palestinian people are Israel’s enemies, “including its elderly and its women,
its cities and its villages, its property and its infrastructure” and that Palestinian mothers and their homes were also
worthy of destruction so they couldn’t raise more “little snakes,” thereby justifying the mass destruction of
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Lawmaker’s”; Tharoor, “Israel’s New”; Hillel). This pattern reveals that the few times the BNC
uses explicitly emotional language to describe Israel’s actions toward Palestinians, including the
term “genocide,” it is usually in the context of Israeli military assaults on or policy toward Gaza.
While pathos and emotional language that focuses on human suffering can help elicit
empathy and sympathy from audiences and sometimes compel them to act against injustice and
for human rights, in the context of discussions of Palestine/Israel and pro-BDS discourse, the
efficacy of emotional language is more complicated than is typically the case in many other
situations where people suffer from human rights abuses (Brysk; Keck and Sikkink). Because the
discursive demonization of Jews has led to antisemitic violence in many instances throughout
history, culminating in the Nazi Holocaust, the use of emotionally-loaded language and rhetoric
in regard to Israel and its treatment of Palestinians, including and especially references to
“genocide” or Nazi atrocities, is often perceived by both Jews and sympathetic non-Jews as
another form of antisemitic “demonization” even if similar language used in the context of other
human rights abuses would be more acceptable. This may explain why the emotional language
found in this particular BNC statement is not used often. If we were able to set aside the history
of Jewish trauma and antisemitic violence, however, then language like this may seem more
appropriate for describing the traumas inflicted on the residents of Gaza and to emphasize the
urgency of international action, which is an attitude shared by some Jewish critics of Israel who
employ references to Nazi persecution of Jews in the lead-up to the Holocaust when discussing
Palestine/Israel (Omer, Days of Awe 3; Barghouti, Boycott 12-14). This tendency to import
Jewish history in discussions of Palestine/Israel, which often triggers affective transference and
“uptake memory,” as discussed by Abraham and Bawarshi, serves as a significant constraint on
Palestinian civilians; the post received thousands of likes and shares before being deleted (Abunimah, “Israeli
Lawmaker’s”; Tharoor, “Israel’s New”).
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pro-Palestinian and pro-BDS discourse, routinely leading to accusations of antisemitism that
prevent Palestinians from telling their own stories about their trauma and suffering in a way that
would typically be accepted for other oppressed people.
This in-depth microanalysis of representative BNC texts reveals some of the common
rhetorical framing patterns found throughout pro-BDS discourse. In the next part of this chapter,
I will also discuss the results of my analysis and coding of statements from Omar Barghouti. At
the end of the chapter, I will briefly discuss some of the similarities and differences between
these two types of official pro-BDS discourse I analyzed.
Statements From BDS Movement Co-Founder Omar Barghouti
In addition to analyzing the rhetorical framing strategies of official BNC statements from
the BDS movement website, I have also investigated the public discourse of BDS movement
spokesperson and co-founder, Omar Barghouti. I analyzed Barghouti’s several op-eds in US
newspapers and online publications as well as his 2011 book, Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions:
The Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights. After coding these texts using my heuristic questions
for rhetorical frame analysis, I then selected a few of these statements and chapters for which to
analyze his framing strategies and use of rhetorical moves more in depth. I discuss two of these
texts in this chapter: the “Introduction” to his book, and his op-ed, “The BDS Movement
Explained,” published in the New York Daily News on February 25, 2013.
While there is strong consistency between how the BNC and Barghouti frame the issues,
some subtle differences in Barghouti’s framing emphases, along with the inclusion of his own
personal views at times, may affect the potential resonance of some of his framing strategies for
different US audiences. Because the publications for most of his texts target US audiences,
Barghouti tends to focus more on analogies to the US civil rights movement and uses the
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nonviolence and equality frames more often than the BNC. These frames are likely to be
particularly resonant with the values of liberal and left-leaning American audiences, who tend to
highly value nonviolence and equality—both of which were also primary frames used by the US
civil rights movement. He also devotes more time to offering counterframing to antisemitism
charges than the BNC does, likely because liberal US audiences of both Jews and non-Jews tend
to be especially sensitive to charges of antisemitism and have been repeatedly exposed to the
pro-Israel frame and doxa that the BDS movement is antisemitic. Though Barghouti’s framing
strategies seem likely to be highly resonant with social and racial justice activist audiences, some
of his discourse and framing may be less resonant for more mainstream liberal US audiences as a
result of the success of pro-Israel frames in US media and public discourse and the tendency of
many Americans to affectively import the history of Jewish trauma into discussions of
Palestine/Israel.
While the BNC regularly references the frames of justice, freedom, and equality as
unattained goals sought by Palestinians and their supporters, Omar Barghouti more frequently
emphasizes these frames as important values and goals of the BDS movement. In “Putting
Palestine Back on the Map: Boycott as Civil Resistance” in the 2006 Journal of Palestine
Studies, Barghouti emphasizes the equality frame as the most important rhetorical strategy for
the movement and pro-BDS discourse:
[T]he indisputable Palestinian claim to equal humanity should be the primary slogan
raised, because it lays the proper moral and political foundation for effectively addressing
the myriad injustices against all three segments of the Palestinian people. It is also based
on universal values that resonate with people the world over. (Barghouti, “Putting” 56).
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In addition to focusing on justice, freedom, and equality, like the BNC, Barghouti also
emphasizes nonviolence, Israeli-settler colonialism, apartheid, and refugee rights frames.
Moreover, he also devotes more time to discussions of BDS strategy, tactics, and best practices
than the BNC does.
Rhetorical Situation and Ecology for Barghouti Texts
Barghouti’s op-eds are mostly published in US newspapers with a wide liberal-leaning
readership, including the New York Times, New York Daily News, Salon, Newsweek, and The
Nation, etc. Compared with the official BNC statements that target an international audience of
pro-Palestinian activists, Barghouti’s choice of publications indicate that his primary intended
audience may be a more mainstream, liberal, US audience, which makes sense considering that
the US provides Israel with more aid than any other nation and is Israel’s primary supporter in
the international arena (Kahl; Mearsheimer and Walt; Spetalnick). Some of his publications,
however, including his book, his article in the Journal of Palestine Studies, and other op-eds and
interviews from the online sources The Intercept, +972 Magazine, Mondoweiss, and Electronic
Intifada target a more left-leaning activist audience who already support Palestinian rights.
Despite the differences in these publications’ audiences, Barghouti’s framing strategies are very
consistent across these various publication venues and audiences.
As a co-founder of the BNC, the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural
Boycott of Israel (PACBI), and the BDS movement itself, Barghouti also acts as an official
Palestinian spokesperson for the BDS movement. While each of his op-eds and interviews has its
own specific historical, political, and social context, there is a pattern of his op-eds being
published during and immediately after Israeli actions that bring attention to Palestine/Israel,
including the 2008-2009 and 2014 Israeli assaults on Gaza (Operation Cast Lead and Protective
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Edge), John Kerry’s 2014 attempts at reviving the peace process, Israel’s 2015 re-election of
Netanyahu’s Likud party and other right-wing parties, the 2017 passage of Israel’s anti-boycott
law, and other events in the region. Relevant anniversaries also serve as exigencies for
Barghouti’s publications in the US press, including the 100th anniversary of the Balfour
Declaration and the 50th anniversary of the June 1967 War and the subsequent Israeli Occupation
of the West Bank and Gaza. Barghouti’s op-eds usually include brief justifications for the BDS
movement even as they address specific exigencies and contexts present at the time they were
written. His book, however, provides a more wide-ranging and in-depth justification for the BDS
movement and its tactics and strategies, and it is the most likely Barghouti text to be re-read at
different times and in shifting rhetorical ecologies.
Barghouti is a well respected advocate for Palestinian rights in the eyes of many antiracist
social justice activists, but to some of Israel’s vocal supporters and critics of BDS, he is seen as a
promoter of anti-Israel hatred and even antisemitism (StandWithUs; Seid and Rothstein;
Younis). Born to a Palestinian refugee family, Barghouti spent most of his childhood in Qatar
and Egypt and later attended Columbia University in New York, where his activism on behalf of
Palestinian rights began while he was also involved in the South African anti-apartheid
movement that serves as an inspiration for the BDS movement (Barghouti, “For Palestinians”;
“Jim Crow”; Beinart and Barghouti). He later married a Palestinian citizen of Israel and is now a
permanent resident of Israel working on his PhD in philosophy at Tel Aviv University while
continuing to engage in activism and travel internationally to speak about BDS and Palestinians
human rights (“Jim Crow”; Beinart and Barghouti). He was awarded the Gandhi Peace Award in
2017 at Yale University, and has received accolades from well-known social justice and human
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rights activists, including South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Naomi Klein, Judith Butler,
leaders of Jewish Voice for Peace, CODEPINK, etc. (“Press Release”).
Supporters of Israel, however, have frequently expressed not only their disagreement
with Barghouti’s speeches and writings, but some have even charged Barghouti with promoting
hatred and antisemitism (StandWithUs; Seid and Rothstein; Younis). For example, according to
Seid and Rothstein of the pro-Israel advocacy organization, StandWithUs, Barghouti “is an
extremist who opposes peaceful coexistence between Israel and Palestinians and who will violate
facts and reason to spread hatred for Israel,” and “if you ever wondered how groups like the
Nazis, Hutus, or America’s southern racists incited hatred and prejudice, you have a case study
every time Omar Barghouti speaks on a college campus.” Because of his outspoken activism on
behalf of Palestinian rights, he has also faced Israeli government repression, including
restrictions on his freedom to travel abroad and Israeli governmental “review” of his residency
status (Khoury).
Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions: The Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights
Published in 2011, Omar Barghouti’s book, Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions: The Global
Struggle for Palestinian Rights, has served as a handbook for BDS activists everywhere and has
reinforced Barghouti’s role as an official spokesperson for the BDS movement. The book was
published six years after the initial 2005 BDS Call during which time the BDS movement
continued to grow and gain supporters, two years after Israel’s 2008-2009 Operation Cast Lead
assault on Gaza, and one year after the violent Israeli raid on the Mavi Marmara Gaza Freedom
Flotilla, among other notable events (Barghouti, Boycott 25). The book’s publisher, Haymarket
Books of Chicago, is also well known as a publisher of many progressive, leftist, socialist, and
social-justice oriented books, including titles by Noam Chomsky, Naomi Klein, Howard Zinn,
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Arundhati Roy, Angela Davis, Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, and fellow Palestinian BDS activist
and founder and editor of the Electronic Intifada, Ali Abunimah, along with many others
(“Featured Authors”). Omar Barghouti’s inclusion with these other authors also helps to solidify
his position, along with that of the larger BDS movement, within the larger social, racial, and
economic justice-oriented left and its associated leftist and activist audiences.
In the “Introduction” to his book, Barghouti connects the 2005 BDS Call and movement
to historical Palestinian resistance to Zionist settler-colonialism and other global movements for
justice, freedom, and human rights; frames Israeli policies as apartheid and oppression enabled
by international complicity and Israeli impunity; presents BDS as a growing and successful
grassroots movement; offers counter-framing for common criticisms of BDS; and discusses
obstacles to the greater acceptance of BDS, including the influence of “the Israel lobby.”
Barghouti begins the “Introduction” with quotes from Palestinian poet Mahmoud
Darwish, Brazilian radical educator Paulo Freire, and Mahatma Gandhi, which serve to situate
pro-BDS discourse within the traditions of Palestinian resistance to Zionist settler colonialism
(Darwish), leftist radical socialism (Freire), and nonviolent anti-colonialism (Gandhi). After
providing an anti-colonial rendering of the traditional “Rabbi and the Goat” story21, Barghouti
offers his summary of the situation in Palestine/Israel:
For more than six decades Israel has enjoyed the best of both worlds, a free hand to
implement its extremist colonial agenda of ethnically cleansing as many indigenous

21

In the traditional Yiddish story of the rabbi and the goat, which has been told in many different versions and
variations, a man seeks help from a rabbi because he lives in a very small house with his wife and family, and they
are miserable and poor. The rabbi tells him to bring a goat into the house, after which point things get much worse.
After the rabbi tells the man to remove the goat, the whole family is much happier, which is where most versions of
the story end (“Get Rid”; Hass). Barghouti’s variation of this story removes the rabbi and instead a cruel man
chooses to put a goat into his small house with his abused and enslaved wife, thus making her situation even worse.
When he then removes the goat, the woman is happier at first but then eventually remembers the other reasons that
she was unhappy and decides to fight to gain her freedom (Barghouti, Boycott 1-2).
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Palestinians from their homeland and grabbing as much of their land as possible and,
simultaneously, a deceptive, mythical reputation for democracy and enlightenment. It has
effectively succeeded in cynically exploiting the Nazi genocide of European Jewish
communities, transforming the pain and guilt felt across the West into an almost
invincible shield from censure and accountability. (2)
He presents the 2005 BDS Call and movement as arising from international criticism of Israel
after its harsh response to the Palestinian Second Intifada of 2000-2005 and the US and
international community’s failure to hold Israel accountable for violating Palestinian rights (4-7).
He also argues that Israel’s aggressive actions in recent years, including the War on Lebanon
(2006), the 2008-2009 War on Gaza, along with Israel’s perceived turn toward “fascism” and the
ongoing siege of Gaza have all led to increased support for BDS (8-9, 12-13). Barghouti also
argues that the “Israel lobby” in the US has tried unsuccessfully to stem the growth of support
for BDS by using “McCarthyesque” techniques, which has alienated many younger Americans,
including many American Jews (10-11).
Barghouti goes on to summarize what he sees as one of the biggest achievements of the
BDS movement in its early years: successful counterframing against the Israeli narrative.
The most consequential achievement of the first five years of the BDS movement was
indeed to expose the ‘essential nature’ of Israel’s regime over the Palestinian people as
one that combines military occupation, colonization, ethnic cleansing, and apartheid.
Israel’s mythical and carefully cultivated, decades-old image as a ‘democratic’ state
seeking ‘peace’ may, as a result, have suffered irreparable damage. (11)
Barghouti’s assertion that the BDS movement’s greatest success is reframing the situation in
Palestine/Israel highlights the importance of framing to BDS activists. In addition to introducing

160
the apartheid frame, he compares BDS to both the South African anti-apartheid movement and
the US civil rights movement, saying BDS “appeals to international civil society by evoking the
same universal principles of freedom, justice, and equal rights that animated the anti-apartheid
movement in South Africa and the civil rights movement in the United States” (17-18).
Barghouti also argues the BDS movement continues to grow in popularity and support, largely
thanks to Israel’s own aggressive actions in recent years, and he offers several examples of
attempted and successful BDS initiatives around the world (19-31).
Barghouti also uses the “Introduction” to refute several common counter-arguments
against BDS, including that it is antisemitic, only symbolic, impractical and cannot work, etc.,
and he points out that many of these same arguments were used against the South African antiapartheid movement (24-25). He discusses how BDS gives transnational activists agency to hold
Israel accountable, saying that BDS has already started to “empower activists worldwide,
illuminating to them a path with great potential for raising the price of Israel’s intransigence and
disregard of international law” (25). Toward the end of the chapter, Barghouti highlights Israeli
Jewish support for BDS (31-32). He also emphasizes the BDS movement’s antiracist position:
BDS is categorically opposed to all forms of racism and racist ideologies, including antiSemitism. Individuals who believe that some are more human or deserve more rights than
others based on differences in ethnic, religious, gender, sexual, or any other human
identity attributes cannot belong to this consistently antiracist struggle for universal
rights. (33)
In his conclusion to the “Introduction,” Barghouti echoes Mearsheimer and Walt by asserting
that the “Israel lobby” in the West still serves as an obstacle to more people speaking out against
Israeli violations of Palestinian rights (33-34). He ends his conclusion by stating the book’s
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purpose: “This book is an attempt to speak truth to power, to encourage others to speak truth to
power, and to make a humble analytical, conceptual, and informative contribution to the most
effective effort to date aimed at ending Israel’s impunity and realizing Palestinian rights: the
global BDS movement” (34).
In the “Introduction,” Barghouti defines the problems, diagnoses their causes, makes
moral judgments, and offers BDS as the solution. He presents the main problems as Palestinian
oppression (in the form of apartheid, occupation, discrimination, etc.), and the corresponding
Palestinian lack of freedom, equality, human rights, and self-determination. Like the BNC,
Barghouti presents the primary causes of these problems as Israeli settler-colonialism, Israeli
impunity or lack of accountability, international complicity with Israel’s violations of
international law through the failure of the international community to hold Israel accountable,
and particularly US government complicity and support for Israel. Barghouti judges Israeli
actions and international complicity in Palestinian oppression as morally wrong and includes
ethos, pathos, and logos-based justifications for why BDS is a necessary and morally consistent
solution that can aid in holding Israel accountable and restoring Palestinian rights. All three
rhetorical appeals can be found in passages like this one from the “Introduction” in which
Barghouti draws on credible sources to present evidence for his argument while adding
occasional emotionally loaded terms to emphasize the severity of the situation:
Coming on the heels of Israel’s devastating war of aggression on Lebanon (2006), its
latest bloodbath in the Gaza Strip (2008-9), and its multiyear illegal and immoral siege of
the Strip have stimulated a real transformation in world public opinion against Israeli
policies. The United Nations and leading human rights organizations have amply
documented the devastating consequences of the siege on the health of the Palestinian
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population, especially children, among whom stunted growth and anemia have become
widespread. A May 2010 report by the BBC in fact reveals how Israel, through its siege,
has allowed only the “minimum calorie intake needed by Gaza’s million and a half
inhabitants, according to their age and sex,” as a form of severe collective punishment. It
has prevented not only candles, various types of medicines, books, crayons, clothing,
shoes, blankets, pasta, tea, coffee and chocolate, but also musical instruments from
reaching the 1.5 million Palestinians incarcerated in what has been called the world’s
largest open-air prison and even a “prison camp,” in the words of British prime minister
David Cameron. (9)
In this passage, Barghouti uses the ethos appeal when he cites the UN, human rights
organizations, the BBC, and the British prime minister using endnote citations; uses logos by
including specific examples of types of goods prohibited by Israel from entering Gaza; and adds
emotional terms to emphasize Palestinian suffering and appeal to pathos, including “bloodbath,”
“devastating war of aggression,” and “especially children,” etc. This same pattern of rhetorical
moves can be found throughout Barghouti’s book and his other writings, which are full of logosbased arguments and evidence—such as, analogies to other settler-colonial situations or nonviolent rights-based movements, syllogistic arguments, and credibly sourced facts and statistics
that demonstrate the nature of discriminatory policies or BDS successes, etc.—while adding
occasional emotional language to emphasize the urgency of BDS.
Barghouti uses issue and master frames that overlap with those presented by the BNC
leadership committee of the BDS movement, of which Barghouti is a member. Some of the issue
frames Barghouti focuses on in his “Introduction” include Israeli settler-colonialism; ethnic
cleansing; Israeli impunity; BDS as nonviolent movement; BDS as grassroots; Palestinians as
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seeking self-determination, freedom, antiracism, and equality; Israeli fascism; refugee rights;
failure of the international community and international complicity. He also highlights Jewish
support for BDS, and his use of issue frames fall under the umbrella of the master frames of
oppression, injustice, and human rights. While Barghouti’s framing strategies in his book
overlap strongly with the frames used in official BNC statements, he also spends more time
addressing American audiences by rebutting antisemitism charges and critiquing the influence of
pro-Israel advocates (which he refers to as “the Israel lobby”), whom he accuses of employing
“McCarthyesque” tactics against the BDS movement and supporters of Palestinian rights.
“The BDS Movement Explained”
In addition to his book, Barghouti’s op-eds in several mainstream US news sources serve
to emphasize common BDS movement framing strategies, provide justification for BDS, and
offer rebuttals and counterframing for charges of antisemitism. Barghouti’s New York Daily
News op-ed “The BDS Movement Explained” appeared on February 25, 2013 in the wake of
controversy over a February 7th panel on BDS at Brooklyn College that included Barghouti and
BDS-supporter Judith Butler as speakers (Yee; Butler, “Judith Butler’s Remarks”). A rhetorical
frame analysis of this op-ed elucidates the particular rhetorical situation and kairos for this text
and reveals how Barghouti frames the issues, establishes ethos, offers counter-framing, and
encourages his audience to identify with Palestinians and BDS; likewise, he wants his audience
to position themselves against Israel and its supporters.
The rhetorical situation for this op-ed is similar to that for most of his others that have
been published in US mainstream outlets, though the immediate exigence and kairos are distinct.
The New York Daily News has a more centrist audience than that of the more liberal New York
Times, and The Daily News also focuses more exclusively on local New York City issues when
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compared with other national publications Barghouti’s op-eds have appeared in, such as The New
York Times, Salon, and The Nation (Feuer). The kairos of this op-ed is tailored specifically to
rebutting criticisms of BDS stemming from the recent controversy around the Brooklyn College
panel, so the choice of a New York City focused paper is fitting. The Daily News also published
an op-ed a few weeks earlier by Alan Dershowitz who attacked the Brooklyn College BDS panel
as a “propaganda hate orgy” (Dershowitz, “Brooklyn”). Several national and New York-based
news outlets covered the BDS panel controversy, and several local political figures spoke out
against it, including New York City Council Assemblyman Alan Maisel, who raised the specter
of a “second Holocaust” in reference to the panel (qtd. in Schiller). As Barghouti mentions in the
text, another recent newsworthy event relating to Israel was, as Barghouti describes, the “Israelcentered bullying of secretary of defense nominee Chuck Hagel,” which Barghouti relates to the
controversy around the BDS panel. Because it focuses on New York City, The Daily News’s
audience is also likely to have a higher percentage of Jewish readers when compared with other
national news outlets, a fact which seems relevant because Barghouti spends a significant
amount of the space in this op-ed discussing and rebutting charges of antisemitism, an issue
especially relevant to Jewish readers.
Barghouti opens this text by referring to the controversy and pressure to cancel the panel
by pro-Israel advocates, which included Alan Dershowitz and the Anti-Defamation League, as
part of a “ruthless campaign to demonize and shut down all criticism of Israel” and “further
evidence of the rise of a new McCarthyism — one that uses unconditional allegiance to Israel as
the litmus test of loyalty” (Barghouti, “BDS Movement”; Yee). After denouncing the BDS
panel’s critics, Barghouti reiterates that the BDS movement is a “nonviolent, rights-based
struggle” inspired by the movements against South African apartheid and for civil rights in the
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US. He also links pro-BDS discourse with academic freedom and freedom of speech, questions
Israel’s democratic image, and asserts that Israel practices “occupation, colonization and
apartheid.”
Barghouti again emphasizes several common pro-BDS frames in this op-ed, including
that the situation in Palestine/Israel is one of oppression, human rights violations, occupation,
colonization, and apartheid. He further emphasizes the Israeli impunity and failure of the
international community frames when he asserts not only that “American taxpayers are
effectively subsidizing Israel's human rights violations,” but also that “Without increasing
international pressure and accountability, Israel will carry on with total impunity” in its ongoing
human rights violations. Overall, Barghouti’s framing strategies are consistent with official BDS
discourse, and his issue frames fall under the master frames of injustice and human rights.
A major rhetorical challenge and obstacle faced by the BDS movement that Barghouti
addresses directly in this text is the emerging doxa that the BDS movement is antisemitic. After
criticizing the “McCarthyist” tactics of BDS critics and laying out common pro-BDS frames for
the situation in Palestine/Israel, Barghouti uses two paragraphs to directly rebut antisemitism
charges against BDS:
Our opponents call us “Jew haters.” That is a lie and a slander. BDS advocates equal
rights for all and consistently opposes all forms of racism, including anti-Semitism. In
fact, many progressive Jewish activists, intellectuals, students, feminists and others
participate in and sometimes lead BDS campaigns in Western countries. The increasing
impact of Israeli supporters of BDS has led the Knesset to pass a draconian anti-boycott
law banning advocacy of any boycott against Israel or its complicit institutions.
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Calling the boycott of Israel anti-Semitic is itself an anti-Semitic statement, as it reduces
all Jews to a monolith that is absolutely equivalent to the state of Israel, is entirely
represented by Israel and holds collective responsibility for Israel's policies.
Here Barghouti offers counterframing for the charge of antisemitism against BDS in the same
way he also does in his book and some other op-eds: by highlighting Jewish support for BDS and
trying to detach the association of Israel with world Jewry. In doing so, his arguments echo those
made by both Zionist and anti-Zionist Jews that Jews should not automatically be associated with
or held responsible for the actions of Israel, for doing so would itself be antisemitic (Butler,
“Forward” ix; “What Is”). This counterframing strategy used by Barghouti (and also by the BNC
at times) also employs the settler colonialism frame to distinguish Judaism and Jews from
Zionism, the latter of which is depicted as a settler-colonial movement rather than an ideology
linked exclusively to Jewish people (Palestinian BDS National Committee, “Racism”).
Barghouti also uses Burkean language choices and framing to encourage audiences to
identify with the BDS movement and Palestinians against Israel and its advocates. On one side,
Barghouti promotes identification with Palestinians and BDS by painting the BDS movement as
a “nonviolent, rights-based struggle for our rights” that is “deeply inspired by the South African
anti-apartheid and the U.S. civil rights movements.” On the other side, Barghouti associates
Israel and its advocates with “bullying,” “new McCarthyism,” and an “intimidation campaign”
on behalf of Israel that engages in “discrimination,” “racist laws,” and a “system of oppression
against the Palestinian people, which takes the form of occupation, colonization and apartheid.”
Barghouti emphasizes that the BDS movement “advocates equal rights,” “opposes all forms of
racism, including anti-Semitism,” and is supported by “principled defenders of freedom and
human rights,” including “many progressive Jewish activists, intellectuals, students, feminists.”
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With these choices in wording and framing, Barghouti makes the divisions between the sides
clear: stand with Palestinians on the side of justice or stand with Israel and its supporters on the
side of injustice.
Barghouti also uses framing and Burkean identification and division to bolster his ethos
and the credibility of the BDS movement as a whole, which, at the time of this op-ed, had been,
once again, tarnished by accusations of antisemitism. By tying the attacks on the BDS panel to
the criticisms of Chuck Hagel during his 2012 confirmation hearing, in which Hagel was accused
of antisemitism by some supporters of Israel and members of the GOP for his previous criticisms
of AIPAC and his assertion that, “I am a United States senator, not an Israeli senator”—
criticisms which were seen as off-base or over the top by many supporters of Hagel and Obama
and that didn’t prevent Hagel from eventually being confirmed as Obama’s Secretary of
Defense—Barghouti tries to paint Israel’s advocates and BDS critics as part of a larger campaign
to silence criticism of Israel (Bloomfield). This rhetorical move may help persuade some
American audiences that the BDS movement is merely another victim of politically motivated
but otherwise unfounded allegations by pro-Israel advocates rather than a movement with
antisemitic intentions.
Early in this text, Barghouti also appeals to ethos through his claim to be an authentically
Palestinian voice when most Palestinians have been ignored in mainstream coverage of the
controversy. His repeated associations in this text and elsewhere between the BDS movement
and the South African anti-apartheid movement and the US civil rights movement also attempt to
link the BDS movement to prior widely supported movements for justice. Toward the end of the
text, he also quotes Martin Luther King Jr. in justifying the tactic of boycott as “withdrawing . . .
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cooperation from an evil system” and part of a “profound moral obligation” of “peace-loving
U.S. citizens” who wish to end their complicity with Israel’s oppression of Palestinians.
Barghouti introduces the new McCarthyism frame to describe the attempts by “Israel and
its lobby groups” to silence discussion of BDS and criticism of Israel’s policies. While Barghouti
also uses the new McCarthyism frame in his book, it is rarely used in official BNC statements,
perhaps partly because Barghouti’s writings are targeted more toward audiences in the US (in
contrast to the international audiences targeted by most BNC statements) where not only is
staunch pro-Israel advocacy more common and influential but also where audiences are more
likely to be familiar with the history of anti-communist McCarthyism in the US. Because his opeds target American audiences, it makes sense for Barghouti to focus more on the influence of
pro-Israel advocacy in the US in stifling public support for BDS and Palestinian rights. If he can
inform American audiences about the pressure tactics used against pro-BDS activism, then he
can better prepare BDS activists and supporters to confront and overcome them more effectively,
and this can also serve as counterframing for the common antisemitism charges against the BDS
movement by explaining to mainstream liberal audiences why they may have only previously
heard a one-sided anti-BDS perspective.
This focus on pro-Israel lobbying and Barghouti’s descriptions of it as “McCarthyist”
may also rub some audiences the wrong way, however, and be perceived by some readers
(especially some Jews and pro-Israel advocates) as crossing into a discursive grey area that could
appear to suggest antisemitic conspiracy theory (Hirsh, “Anti-Zionsim” 83-84). On the other
hand, many political analysts have argued that it is accurate to describe pro-Israel advocacy
organizations as powerful and affective at stifling legitimate criticisms of Israel (Aridan; Grim;
Mearsheimer and Walt; Rossinow; Walt). The tactics and success of pro-Israel advocacy
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organizations at pressuring media outlets, university administrators, and other organizations to
promote pro-Israel framing and to suppress speech, policies, and activism critical of Israel,
especially pro-BDS activism, are demonstrated in two recent documentaries: the Media
Education Foundation’s The Occupation of the American Mind: Israel’s Public Relations War in
the United States (2016) and Al Jazeera’s The Lobby (2018) (Grim; Occupation of the American
Mind; “Watch the Film”). Not surprisingly, in both cases, pro-Israel “lobby” groups and
advocates worked hard to suppress these documentaries that show the strategies and tactics used
to counter pro-Palestinian and pro-BDS activism and to promote pro-Israel framing in the US; in
fact, the Al Jazeera documentary was never aired due to successful pro-Israel pressure on Al
Jazeera and the government of Qatar (Grim; Occupation of the American Mind; “Watch the
Film”).
Though it is unlikely that staunch Israel supporters would be swayed by Barghouti’s
rhetorical framing strategies in this op-ed, his rhetorical moves are more likely to be resonant
with audience members who are less attached to Israel or who were already skeptical of US
support for Israeli policies. Aside from the use of the new McCarthyism frame and more frequent
discussion of the tactics of the Israel lobby, Barghouti’s framing choices in this text are very
consistent with those in his other works and with most BNC statements and are likely to be
resonant and fitting for audiences of intersectional racial and social justice activists in the US and
elsewhere.
Conclusion
This rhetorical frame analysis of official BDS movement discourse reveals that the
framing choices and rhetorical moves made by both the Palestinian BDS National Committee
(BNC) and BDS movement spokesperson and co-founder Omar Barghouti use consistent
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rhetorical and framing strategies to portray the situation in Palestine/Israel as one of oppression
and injustice perpetrated with impunity by Israel against Palestinians and enabled by the failure
of the international community. Other primary and issue frames that are common throughout
both BNC statements and Barghouti’s writings include settler-colonialism, occupation,
discrimination, ethnic cleansing, violations of international law, Israeli impunity, refugee rights,
international solidarity, joint struggle, nonviolence, equality, self-determination, and BDS as a
grassroots movement. Both the BNC and Barghouti also rebut antisemitism charges against
BDS. In both cases, neither the BNC nor Barghouti include frequent personal or emotional
testimony or narratives to bolster human rights claims, which is common for many other human
rights movements and campaigns (Brysk; Keck and Sikkink). Perhaps in an attempt to appeal to
Western audiences sensitive to antisemitism and to avoid charges of demonizing Israel and Jews,
official Palestinian BDS movement discourse only occasionally includes emotional language and
instead relies more heavily on logos-centric discussions of international law, Israeli policy,
justifications for BDS, and examples of BDS successes and campaigns.
Though the rhetorical framing strategies of both Barghouti and the BNC are very similar
overall, Barghouti spends more time rebutting and offering counterframing for claims of
antisemitism, making analogies to the US civil rights movement, and discussing the “Israel
lobby” and the “McCarthyist” tactics used to attack and silence many BDS activists and Israel
critics. These framing and rhetorical differences may owe to the fact that his writings are more
directly targeted toward Western and American audiences, whereas the BNC statements target a
more international audience.
Based on the framing strategies used by both the BNC and Barghouti, it is clear why
official BDS movement framing is resonant with the frames used by other intersectional
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movements for social and racial justice—a fact which is supported by the growing popularity of
BDS on many college campuses in the West and the open support for BDS by racial justice
movements, including the Black Lives Matter movement, which has officially endorsed BDS
(Bailey and Petersen-Smith; Movement for Black Lives). Even though he takes care to counter
antisemitism charges, separate Jewishness from Zionism and Israel, and highlight Jewish support
for BDS, by echoing Mearsheimer’s and Walt’s critiques of “the Israel lobby” and labeling antiBDS discourse and tactics as “McCarthyist,” Barghouti may undermine the potential resonance
of his texts with some mainstream US liberal and Jewish audiences who may perceive some of
his discussions of “the Israel lobby” as overlapping with antisemitic tropes about Jewish power
and behind-the-scenes control—a rhetorical challenge that may prove to be difficult to overcome
since pro-Israel advocates often do exert effective pressure to combat pro-BDS activism, making
this a topic one that is hard to avoid. Barghouti does effectively counter many common
arguments against BDS, however, and increases the potential resonance of his frames for liberal
and leftist US audiences by linking the BDS movement for Palestinian rights to other movements
for justice, including the anti-apartheid movement and the US civil rights movement. While this
chapter focused on analyzing selected texts that represent official BDS movement discourse, the
next chapter will investigate vernacular student-created pro-BDS texts.
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CHAPTER V
RHETORICAL FRAME ANALYSIS OF VERNACULAR STUDENT PROBDS TEXTS

In addition to examining official BDS movement discourse, I have also performed a
rhetorical frame analysis of corpora of vernacular pro-BDS student activist-created texts. As
suggested by Hauser and McClellan, analyzing the texts of rank-and-file members and
supporters of a social movement can help rhetoricians reveal a more holistic picture of
movement discourse: “National and international discourse communities, and—more
importantly for movement studies—counterpublic and subaltern spheres, all speak a distinct
language and perform a specific cultural inscription in their everyday interactions: this is what
we refer to as a community’s vernacular rhetoric” (29). Therefore, both official and vernacular
rhetoric must be examined to fully understand the framing strategies and rhetorical moves made
by social movement activist-rhetors.
Thus, after discussing the official pro-BDS discourse of the BNC and BDS spokesperson
Omar Barghouti in Chapter 4, I now turn my attention to the more vernacular student-activist
texts that I gathered during Israeli Apartheid Week (IAW) events at four Washington D.C.-area
universities in the spring of 2017. Though differing in some ways in regard to the framing
patterns and appeals used by official BDS movement discourse, including an enhanced focus on
the intersectionality and joint struggle frames, the use of a wider variety of rhetorical appeals and
formats, and the targeting of a narrower audience of fellow students, these student-created texts
also demonstrated a high level of consistency in the frames used and likely audience fitness or
resonance when compared with official movement texts. I will focus here on selected vernacular
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pro-BDS student texts that help explicate common patterns in pro-BDS framing and rhetorical
moves. In addition to other common issue and master frames used by official BDS discourse,
student activist texts also emphasize the apartheid frame and South Africa analogy, along with
the frames of joint struggle, intersectionality, ethnic cleansing, and refugee rights. Student
activist-rhetors also use more personal narratives and emotional appeals, and more often
explicitly promote anti-Zionism.
Rhetorical Situation and Ecology for Vernacular Texts
While US-based pro-BDS student activists also respond to local, regional, and global
events, the annual Israeli Apartheid Week (IAW) events are an example of an exigence created
by Palestinians BDS movement leaders and transnational solidarity activists themselves to raise
awareness about Israel’s violations of Palestinian human rights on an annual basis. IAW events
typically occur in the spring, but local student activists choose what week and what issues to
highlight in their events and actions. During this week of activities, student activists may produce
discourse responding to external local, regional, and global events in addition to their own
chosen exigencies and responses during IAW (which usually relate to raising awareness about
Israel’s oppressive policies against Palestinian).
While the rhetorical situation and ecology for vernacular student-activist pro-BDS
discourse is similar in many ways to that of official BDS movement discourse (see Chapter 4),
there are also some key differences. First, even though both official and vernacular pro-BDS
discourse tends to be directed primarily at audiences that value social and racial justice and
human rights, the student discourse I examined focuses more narrowly on the student bodies of
their respective universities, with secondary audiences being university faculty, administration,
and outside observers who student activists hope may be swayed to support Palestinian rights
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and BDS either by supporting a BDS resolution on campus or to engage in other forms of proBDS activism and discourse. Moreover, the pro-BDS discourse from these student groups also
reacts to and calls forth more immediate and local exigencies and kairos in addition to the
ongoing and longer-term exigencies of BDS movement discourse as a whole. For example,
several of the student groups’ IAW social media posts related to the anti-AIPAC demonstrations
happening in Washington D.C. during IAW events in 2017. A panel at Georgetown focused on
Birthright trips, for which some Jewish students would be signing up for around the same time as
IAW. And a pro-BDS student group at George Mason University included some direct responses
to a pro-Israel group’s Israel Awareness Week events that were concurrent with IAW on campus.
Other external exigencies during the spring of 2017 were the anti-AIPAC protests that year in
which IfNotNow-affiliated Jewish American protestors succeeded in briefly blocking the
entrance to the AIPAC conference building (“IfNotNow Protestors”). Because both of these
issues gained attention in the Palestinian solidarity community during that time, student activists
chose to respond to these external exigencies in addition to their own pre-determined exigencies
to raise awareness about Israeli oppression and discrimination against Palestinians. Studentcreated pro-BDS discourse also follows slightly different paths of circulation when compared
with official pro-BDS discourse. While official pro-BDS discourse typically circulates
transnationally online, the more vernacular student activist discourse circulates both online and
more locally via face-to-face and variety of print-based media on campus.
Regarding the student speakers and writers of pro-BDS vernacular discourse, in the case
of pro-BDS US college students, leaders and members of Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP)
and Students Against Israeli Apartheid (SAIA) come from a variety of racial, religious, and
ethnic backgrounds. Some student leaders and supporters have Palestinian or Jewish ancestry,
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and others were Muslim, Arab, black, white, etc. The student activists were a very diverse group
at all of the IAW events I attended, and Jewish ethnic ties were common—a phenomenon that
has been observed anecdotally by others and supported by recent polling that demonstrates the
increasing support for Palestinians among younger liberal Jewish Americans (Beinart, “How to
Stop,” The Crisis; Omer, Days of Awe; Borschel-Dan). While not all of the student activists
made their position on Zionism clear, many of the students, including members of GMU’s SAIA,
openly proclaimed themselves to be anti-Zionist. Some student supporters of these pro-BDS
organizations and attendees of IAW events are first-year undergraduates new to social justice
activism, while others are more seasoned activists and graduate students. A significant number of
the student activists were involved in multiple social justice organizations and causes, and almost
all of the student activists professed a commitment to “intersectionality” (a concept first
developed by critical race theorist and scholar, Kimberlé Crenshaw). For example, at GMU’s
SAIA, student activist leaders encouraged discussion attendees to introduce themselves using
their preferred pronouns—a nod to trans rights and identity and thus an implicit embrace of
intersectionality.
Some pro-BDS student discourse I analyzed was crafted by student leaders of proPalestinian organizations, but SJP and SAIA chapters are not typically led by a single individual
and instead usually had at least two or more co-leaders in a more non-hierarchical organizational
structure. Most student-facilitated meetings and events I attended and analyzed were discussionfocused and included question and answer sessions after the events in which a wide variety of
student members and attendees also participated; the discourse I analyzed thus includes a lot of
vernacular and unofficial exchanges. Moreover, student activist leaders cannot be considered
official leaders of the movement because they primarily work at a smaller scale in their local
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campus communities, and they usually create discourse as part of a team of other students rather
than as official leaders.
In addition to the students themselves, I analyze the discourse of other speakers invited to
participate in IAW events on campus, as well articles posted by these pro-BDS student groups on
social media during IAW. These speakers and writers include Palestinian scholars and activists,
Palestinian-American activists [from American Muslims for Palestine (AMP), US Campaign for
Palestinian Rights (USCPR), etc.], Jewish-American activists [from Jewish Voice for Peace
(JVP), USCPR, etc.], and some well-known social and racial justice activists, including Angela
Davis. While some of these chosen speakers may be considered official leaders in some contexts
(e.g., Angela Davis as a leader of black-Palestinian solidarity), none of them would be
considered a widely recognized official leader like Omar Barghouti or the BNC. Even though
these IAW authors and speakers may have held more official leadership roles in some cases,
because the students chose the speakers and texts, these choices also include a vernacular
element.
The audiences for pro-BDS students activists on US college campuses are more specific
than the audiences for official BDS discourse and include other college students, especially
progressive and left-leaning students who are likely to be concerned with human rights issues. In
some cases, for larger events, such as Angela Davis’s keynote speech for GWU’s Palestine
Awareness Week, sponsored by GWU’s Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) along with the
GW Feminist Student Union and GW Black Student Union as co-sponsors, the audience
extended beyond the university to include students and activists at neighboring DC-area colleges
who were invited by SJP GWU students. And in some cases, IAW events were live streamed
through SJP or other pro-BDS organizations’ Facebook pages and so reached wider audiences of
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people who may not currently be students but who follow the pro-BDS student organizations
through social media.
IAW events may primarily target liberal and progressive students to raise awareness
about Palestine/Israel and promote BDS, but these events also reach a wider student and faculty
community, some of whom may disagree with BDS and even perceive pro-BDS and proPalestinian messages as threatening and antisemitic because of exposure to pro-Israel and antiBDS messages and doxa. In some cases, students involved with pro-Israel organizations on
campus hold opposing events, such as “Israel Awareness Week,” held simultaneously with IAW
events on George Mason University’s campus. And pro-Israel students or faculty may also write
op-eds in the campus newspaper that are then shared online by other pro-Israel advocates across
the country. Thus, even local events intended for a particular audience sometimes end up with a
much wider national or international audience as texts circulate across the internet, often via
social media.
Aside from audiences and exigencies, pro-BDS student activist-rhetors also faced both
similar and unique constraints when compared with official BDS movement discourse. Like
movement leaders, student activists’ discourse is also constrained by audiences’ pre-existing
knowledge and exposure to framing on the topic of Palestine/Israel, Western and US sensitivity
to antisemitism, as well as anti-Palestinian and Islamophobic attitudes. Even as official BDS
discourse is constrained by the values and priorities of contemporary social and racial justice
discourse communities, pro-BDS student activists are even more sensitive to such values, with
intersectionality being a prominent part of US campus-based activism that is often incorporated
in the pro-BDS rhetoric of student groups like Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) and
Students Against Israeli Apartheid (SAIA) at George Mason University. Each university also
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seemed to have their own unique climate for pro-BDS activism, with some schools having a
more radical climate for activism that encourages pro-BDS student activists to take a strong antiZionist stance and openly advocate for a one-state solution, while other university climates more
supportive of Israel and more hostile to BDS may discourage such positions and rather promote
more limited and targeted BDS campaigns and discourse. Whether these differences are more the
result of past university administrative actions and values, the strength and influence of proIsrael groups on campus, or merely the result of student group leaders’ individual preferences is
not always clear.
The Apartheid Frame and South Africa Analogy
Among the frames most commonly used by pro-BDS student activist-rhetors during IAW
is, of course, the apartheid frame from which IAW draws its title. BDS movement leaders cite
the South African anti-apartheid movement as the inspiration for their own BDS call for
international solidarity—a struggle against injustice that also similarly relied on international
solidarity and a decades-long boycott, divestment, and sanctions campaign that is widely
believed to have been a decisive factor in eventually ending apartheid there. Though the
apartheid frame is still considered a controversial and inaccurate analogy by pro-Israel
advocates, Palestinian solidarity activists and critics of Israel have been making the analogy for
years now. Even former prime ministers of Israel, including Ehud Olmert and Ehud Barak, and
former US Secretary of State John Kerry have warned that Israel will become an apartheid state
in the near future if a two-state solution cannot be reached (Beaumont; Hasan). The apartheid
analogy and frame was previously popularized in the U.S. by the former president Jimmy
Carter’s 2006 book, Palestine: Peace not Apartheid, and he was heavily criticized by many
supporters of Israeli policy for making this comparison (Beaumont). Some critics of Israel,
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including Noam Chomsky and several South African anti-apartheid activists, have not only
compared Israel’s policies to apartheid but also have said the Israeli occupation of the
Palestinians is even worse than South African apartheid in many ways (Hasan; “Noam
Chomsky”; Tutu). Many Israel advocates, on the other hand, typically focus only on the
situation inside of Israel and exclude the occupied territories to argue that the situation is in no
way like apartheid and that to even compare the two situations is an antisemitic (Oren, “Israel
Isn’t”; “Response”). Many opponents of BDS and the apartheid analogy fear that it will lead to
calls for “one man, one vote” like in the case of South Africa, which would be a one-state
solution that would end Israel’s existence as a Jewish-majority state, and thus “destroy Israel” in
the eyes of many Israel supporters (Oren, “Israel Isn’t”; “Response”).
Pro-BDS activists tend to focus on the similarities between the situations in South Africa
and in Palestine/Israel and the official UN definition of “apartheid,”22 while Israel advocates
focus on the differences between the two situations and reject the apartheid analogy. While there
are many similarities between the two cases regarding the ways discriminatory settler-colonial
policies favor the dominant group over indigenous residents, no two cases of oppression are
exactly the same, including in regard to this comparison, which Omar Barghouti and other BDS
leaders and activists themselves admit (Barghouti, Boycott 17). In both cases, the Israeli and
22

The UN defines the “crime of apartheid” as “similar policies and practices of racial segregation and
discrimination as practised in southern Africa,” which “shall apply to the following inhuman acts committed for the
purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of
persons and systematically oppressing them”; the definition then lists several specific examples of policies that
constitute apartheid, many of which are the same or similar to Israeli policies, including “infringement of their
freedom or dignity,” “illegal imprisonment,” and in iii (c), “legislative measures . . . calculated to prevent a racial
group or groups from participation in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the country and the
deliberate creation of conditions preventing the full development of such a group or groups, in particular by denying
to members of a racial group or groups basic human rights and freedoms . . . the right to leave and to return to their
country, the right to a nationality, the right to freedom of movement and residence, the right to freedom of opinion
and expression, and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association,” etc., many of which would seem to
apply to Israel’s discriminatory policies against Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza (and some of them
can also arguably be applied to Palestinian citizens of Israel who face restrictions on who they can marry, where
they can live and build, etc. (“Discrimination”; “International Convention”).
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South African regimes enjoyed the support of US and European leaders even after their
populaces began turning against these discriminatory policies and regimes. Both BDS
movements were also led by oppressed people who sought and received the transnational support
and solidarity of grassroots activists, including college students in the West.
In addition to the similarities between the discriminatory experiences and policies of
apartheid in South Africa and those in Palestine/Israel, there are also parallels in the framing
strategies of anti-apartheid activists and their apartheid-apologist critics as well. For example,
anti-apartheid arguments in favor of equality, freedom, and justice echo the framing strategies of
Palestinian BDS activists and their international supporters. And, similarly to anti-BDS
criticisms on behalf of Israel, supporters of South Africa also made arguments about the
unfairness of singling out South Africa, the need for dialogue and engagement rather than
isolation, the focus on potential harm to black South Africans caused by BDS campaigns, and the
effectiveness of selective boycotts as opposed to wider boycotts, divestment, or sanctions (Dohi;
Khalek, “How Today’s”; Kriek; Williams).
Like IAW events organized by pro-BDS student activist-rhetors at other US and
European universities, IAW events at the Washington D.C.-area universities I studied include
speakers, information sessions, mock “apartheid walls,” “die-ins,” and other events intended to
emphasize the apartheid frame and raise awareness about Israel’s discriminatory settler-colonial
policies against the Palestinians. These annual events often face strong pushback and criticism
from pro-Israel advocates and student organizations that sometimes offer counterframing
activities during IAW (e.g., George Mason University’s Israel Awareness Week organized by the
campus Israel Student Association). In addition to the frequent appearance of the term
“apartheid” in many IAW materials, some IAW texts go more in depth to promote the apartheid
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frame. Some examples include the mock apartheid wall at Georgetown and the “Divest This
Time” campaign at George Washington University—both which will be explained in detail later
in this chapter. These examples develop the apartheid frame and analogy using both logos and
pathos-based rhetorical appeals.
Georgetown Students for Justice in Palestine’s (SJP) 2017 mock apartheid wall displayed
in the Intercultural Center (ICC) galleria during IAW includes both printed and visual materials,
some of which have been reproduced from outside organizations and others created by student
activists (“Mock Apartheid Wall”). A paper on the wall includes this hand-written description of
the purpose of GU’s SJP mock apartheid wall display:
Georgetown Students for Justice in Palestine presents: An exhibition of graffiti on the
separation barrier being constructed by Israel along and within its border with the
Palestinian West Bank. The barrier has been declared by the International Court of
Justice to be in violation of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949. Graffiti is used as a peaceful expression of protest. Questions/comments? Email
gusjpalestine@gmail.com
The wall also features several posters from the “Visualizing Palestine” series that
emphasize the apartheid frame (“Visualizing Palestine”). The “Visualizing Palestine” posters
were created in collaboration with the Visualizing Impact (VI) organization, whose mission is
stated as “Breaking new ground in socially aware data science, technology, and design” and
“Mainstreaming marginalized perspectives on critical social issues” (“Visualizing Impact”). VI
is also described as a “laboratory for innovation at the intersection of data science, technology,
and design” that “creates impactful tools highlighting critical social issues around the world”
(“Visualizing Impact”). The VI organization also includes visual fact sheets on a variety of other
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issues, including the persecution of Rohingya in Myanmar, censorship in media around the
world, income inequality, and other issues relevant to social justice for marginalized
communities (Visualizing Impact, “Offline/Online Rohingya”). The “Visualizing Palestine”
posters found on GU’s apartheid wall include texts on the following issues related to the
apartheid frame:
● Fact sheet about “Institutionalized Discrimination” (with these phrases highlighted:
“complete control,” “human hierarchy of inequality,” “discriminated against,” “separate
and unequal,” “segregation by citizenship,” “stolen land,” “system of structural
inequality,” and “full equality”).
●

“Segregated Road System” poster that color codes the different roads that can be used by
Palestinians and Israelis in the West Bank.

● Poster about discrimination on buses with a civil rights comparison: “Blacks banned in
the USA until 1960” and “Palestinians banned in the West Bank today,” with “Freedom
is for everyone no matter their color or ethnicity” at the bottom.
● “Across the Wall: Israeli Settlement Bus Routes” with a color-coded map of the Israelionly bus routes in the West Bank.
● “Identity Crisis: The Israeli ID System” that shows the different types of IDs that Israelis
and Palestinians have and what they signify, including “where Palestinians can live, their
access to services and their participation in the political system.”
● “Divesting for Justice: College divestment from South Africa and Israel” showing two
overlapping circles with the larger circle for SA divestments and the smaller one for
Israel.

183
● Another “Divesting for Justice: College divestments from South Africa and Israel” with
two side-by-side line graphs showing the number of colleges that divested and the years
with a description at top saying, “Boycotts and divestments have long been recognized as
a legitimate and effective means to protest against injustices.”
These “Visualizing Palestine” posters and leaflets are also commonly distributed and
displayed by other pro-BDS student groups at other universities and are a common feature of
IAW events and discourse. These posters offer evidence for the accuracy of the apartheid frame
and rely primarily on logos-based discussions of facts about Israeli policies, international law,
and impact on Palestinians. In at least one example, the apartheid framing is also linked to the
US civil rights movement. Even though these “Visualizing Palestine” posters were not created by
the students, I include them in my discussion of vernacular pro-BDS discourse because they have
been chosen for display by SJP students and thus represent one aspect of the vernacular pro-BDS
discourse of student activist-rhetors.
Other texts found on GU’s apartheid wall that highlight the apartheid frame include
hand-written definitions and painted graffiti-style words. The wall also includes a shortened
version of the UN definition of “apartheid” and the painted words “No Pride in Apartheid.”
Another flyer found on the wall is a student-created one that includes the words “This is what
apartheid looks like” over a background image of an aerial photo of the West Bank separation
barrier. Another apartheid text on the wall is an artistic visual image of a Palestinian with a
keffiyeh-covered face superimposed on a map of Palestine next to both a South African and
Palestinian flag with these words at the top: “Historically, Boycott has been used by Palestinians
as a resistance tactic during the 1936-1939 revolt against the British Mandate, and during the
First Intifada during the 1980s,” while the bottom states, “BDS as we know it today was inspired
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by the South African boycott and divestment movement, which eventually helped to topple the
apartheid regime in South Africa.” While GU’s SJP chapter’s mock apartheid wall repeatedly
emphasizes and develops the apartheid frame, the wall also includes several other frames and
issues that will be discussed later.
Another IAW event that highlights the apartheid frame is George Washington University
SJP’s “Divest This Time” campaign and video. The GWU SJP’s “Divest This Time” campaign
is introduced in a short video shown at the end of Angela Davis’ March 27, 2017 keynote speech
for GWU’s “Palestine Awareness Week,” the name given to GWU’s events rather than “Israeli
Apartheid Week.” Davis’ talk, titled “Freedom is a Constant Struggle: Why Movements for
Social Justice Should Support Palestine,” touches on many common primary, issue, and master
frames used in both official and vernacular pro-BDS discourse, including the apartheid frame23.
In her talk, Davis mentions the recent UN report that described Israeli practices as apartheid and
how it was publicly attacked. She also alludes to Richard Gere’s recent trip to Hebron after
which he compared it to the Old Jim Crow South. She elaborates on the apartheid frame and
connects it to Israeli policies toward Palestinians when she asserts that under the Rome Statute,
“apartheid” is defined as a “crime against humanity” that consists of an “institutionalized
regime” of racial domination. While Davis is a prominent figure in social and racial justice
struggles, and she published a recent book connecting the Black Lives Matter movement with
Palestinian rights, Freedom is a Constant Struggle: Ferguson, Palestine and the Foundations of
a Movement, Davis is not an official leader of the BDS movement.
At the end of Davis’ talk, GWU SJP students projected a short video they created
promoting their new BDS campaign at GWU: “Divest This Time.” The “#DivestThisTime”
23

The title of Davis’ talk, as well as much of the content, is similar to that of her recent 2016 book, Freedom Is a
Constant Struggle: Ferguson, Palestine, and the Foundations of a Movement published by Haymarket Books.

185
campaign video was also posted to GWU SJP’s Facebook page on March 29, 2017 (it had
received 51 likes/loves, 46 shares, 5.4K views at the time of analysis in July of 2017, which is
significantly more than most other GWU SJP FB posts at that time). This video’s release kicked
off a campaign at GWU to press the student association and university administration to divest
from a list of selected multinational corporations that profit from the Israeli occupation, which
represents “targeted BDS” rather than a full BDS of all Israeli institutions.
The “#DivestThisTime” (DTT) video and subsequent campaign use the apartheid frame
to argue that GWU’s administration should join the Palestinian call for BDS even though it
failed to join the call for BDS against apartheid South Africa in the 1980s. The DTT video
promotes nonviolent activism to target companies that profit from illegal occupation. The DTT
video opens with the following text: “In the 1980s, GW refused to divest from companies that
profited from South African apartheid despite student support and despite the GW mission
statement that the university ‘dedicates itself to furthering human well-being,’” The video then
includes images and audio of students saying their first names and later that they support
"#DivestThisTime" at GW. Several students wear Palestinian keffiyehs, the black and white
scarves that have come to symbolize Palestinian resistance. One image shows students putting a
Palestinian keffiyeh on the statue of George Washington on campus. Then GWU SJP co-leaders
explain the purpose of this BDS campaign to nonviolently pressure Israel to end the occupation.
One student says, “apartheid was unacceptable in South Africa, and it's still unacceptable in
Palestine.” Another student explains that G4S, Hewlett-Packard, and Caterpillar all support and
profit from the occupation. Another describes Israel as “an apartheid regime” that “violates
international law.” Another student argues that it is a “moral responsibility” for international
community to “put a stop to it” and “call it out for what it is.” DTT is also said to stand with
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other “freedom fighters” that “have identified Israel's mistreatment of the Palestinians,” who are
listed as Angela Davis, Judith Butler, bell hooks, Malcolm X. The video also includes a Nelson
Mandela quote in support of Palestine. The accompanying Facebook post description read,
“Don't fail Palestine, GW. Join Divest This Time GW as we urge our university through
nonviolent activism to divest from companies that profit from the continued illegal occupation.
#DivestThisTimeGW.”
The eventual outcome of this campaign also offers a microcosm of the way pro-BDS
campaigns and student-backed resolutions often play out at US universities. After a 2017 proBDS resolution associated with the DTT campaign initially failed to pass in the GWU Student
Association Senate by one vote, the end result of the DTT campaign was to successfully promote
the passage of SR-S18-21 in 2018: “The Protection of Palestinian Human Rights Act,” which
supports a boycott of several multinationals that are said to profit from Israel’s occupation,
including Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and others, was passed on April 23, 2018 by the
GWU SA Senate by a vote of 18-6, following an intense public debate, and it was later
denounced by the GWU administration who vowed to not abide by it (Bennett; Cohen, Haley;
Roach). The passage of this resolution a little over a year after the beginning of the DTT
campaign suggests that the rhetoric of the campaign was resonant with a majority of students
involved in the GWU Student Association, though the campaign was less resonant with
university administrators.
Intersectionality and Joint Struggle
In addition to focusing on the apartheid frame, vernacular pro-BDS student activistrhetors also frequently employ the intersectionality and joint struggle frames when advocating
for the BDS movement and Palestinian rights. During IAW activities and events, pro-BDS
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student activists in SJP and SAIA regularly invoke Crenshaw’s concept of intersectionality to
situate the BDS movement for Palestinian rights among other struggles against racism and
injustice, including #BlackLivesMatter, Standing Rock water protector #NoDAPL protests, and
other indigenous rights movements, feminism, LGBTQ+ rights, disability rights, critiques of
capitalism, etc. In a recent op-ed discussing the relevance of the concept of intersectionality that
she developed over two decades ago, Crenshaw explains how intersectional lens is meant to
work when applied to movements for social and racial justice:
Intersectionality is an analytic sensibility, a way of thinking about identity and its
relationship to power. Originally articulated on behalf of black women, the term brought
to light the invisibility of many constituents within groups that claim them as members,
but often fail to represent them. Intersectional erasures are not exclusive to black women.
People of color within LGBTQ movements; girls of color in the fight against the schoolto-prison pipeline; women within immigration movements; trans women within feminist
movements; and people with disabilities fighting police abuse — all face vulnerabilities
that reflect the intersections of racism, sexism, class oppression, transphobia, able-ism
and more. Intersectionality has given many advocates a way to frame their circumstances
and to fight for their visibility and inclusion. (Crenshaw, “Why”)
At the end of her original 1991 article, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence against Women of Color,” in which she coined the term “intersectionality,”
Crenshaw explains that “Through an awareness of intersectionality, we can better acknowledge
and ground the differences among us and negotiate the means by which these differences will
find expression in conducting group politics” (1299).
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From its initial use as an analytical tool to understand how different forms of oppression
can overlap and intersect, the concept of intersectionality has grown into an activist imperative
for individuals and organizations working for social and racial justice for marginalized peoples
to recognize linkages between identity-based movements for justice and engage in joint struggle
with other groups and movements against common sources of oppression. Intersectionality has
become fused with older ideas about the importance of joint struggle among international
struggles for justice that remind activists to not leave anyone behind in the quest for justice and
equality and which are echoed in Emma Lazarus’s “none of us is free until we are all free” and
Martin Luther King Jr.’s “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere” (Altmann; King,
“Letter”). Thus, just as the recent popularity of an intersectional lens means that contemporary
feminists are now less likely to exclude concerns from women of color in feminist activism
today, so too are Palestinians more likely to be included in other struggles for social and racial
justice than they were decades ago. The inclusion of BDS and Palestinian rights in movements
for social and racial justice, like the inclusion of LGBTQ+ rights, women’s rights, racial justice,
etc. in the movement for Palestinian rights, can also be seen in the vernacular discourse created
by pro-BDS student activist-rhetors.
The frames of intersectionality and joint struggle are found throughout vernacular
student-activist discourse promoting Palestinian rights and BDS during IAW. Several
intersecting struggles highlighted by SJP and SAIA events and texts and connected to the
struggle for Palestinian rights include Black Lives Matter and racial justice, LGBTQ+ rights,
feminism, and the Standing Rock #NoDAPL movement for indigenous rights. For example, in
the SAIA sponsored discussion on “Solidarity” on March 30, 2017 at George Mason University,
student co-leaders of SAIA posed several questions for the group that related to joint struggle
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and intersectionality, including “Can you think of a way your activism is tied to Palestinian
issues?” and “In what ways do you see other liberation movements (historically and today)
relating to Palestine?” (GMU SAIA). The SAIA gatherings I attended during IAW 2017 also
began with students introducing themselves and including their preferred pronouns—an
intersectional approach that seeks to promote inclusion for trans, queer, and other gender nonconforming individuals. Georgetown SJP’s mock apartheid wall also features various
expressions of joint struggle and solidarity with other movements for justice, including the
phrases “No War but Class War,” “#TransJusticeNow,” “Queer Solidarity w/ Queer
Palestinians,” “BLM,” and “#NoDAPL.” Among all of the dozens of pro-BDS vernacular
student activists’ texts I analyzed from IAW events, the joint struggle and intersectionality
frames were often prominent.
Two-way expressions of solidarity between Palestinian rights activists and black racial
justice activists are another common intersectional linkage presented within the joint struggle
frame. Black solidarity with Palestinians can be traced all the way back to the anticolonial
movements of the 1960s and 70s, and black-Palestinian solidarity has also increased again in
recent years, as manifest in the #Ferguson2Palestine social media campaign and culminating in
the endorsement of BDS by over 1,000 black activists and the Movement for Black Lives (Bailey
and Petersen-Smith; Feld; Feldman; Lubin; Movement for Black Lives; Erakat and Hill). One
example of the joint struggle frame in the context of black-Palestinian solidarity is a Facebook
post from American University SJP on March 27, 2017, which includes a link to article by
Jaquial Durham, titled “Revisiting Black Substantive Solidarity with the People of Palestine.”
Though the article doesn’t explicitly promote BDS, the author does offer strong support for
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Palestinian rights and connects the Palestinian struggle with the black American struggle for civil
rights and equality:
Black people as all people do, have a responsibility to fight for justice and struggle
against injustice, wherever it is. At this particular moment, it is more important than ever
that African descendants in the U.S. stand in solidarity with those fighting a similar
oppressive system. Not only stand in solidarity, but open their eyes and recognize that the
kind of historical struggle that black people often liken themselves to dislocation,
marginalization, state violence, is the struggle of Palestinians. . . In the words of Dr. Marc
Lamont Hill, “Now is the time. Justice cannot wait.”
In addition to promoting the Durham article, other pro-BDS student activists also use
IAW events and texts to emphasize black-Palestinian solidarity and draw links between the
Palestinian struggle for rights and the black American struggle for civil rights and equality. For
example, Georgetown SJP’s mock apartheid wall includes a “Visualizing Palestine” poster
comparing discrimination on buses in Palestine/Israel with bus segregation during the Jim Crow
era, including the phrases “Blacks banned in the USA until 1960,” “Palestinians banned in the
West Bank today,” and “Freedom is for everyone no matter their color or ethnicity” at the
bottom. Graffiti-style statements on the wall also include the phrases “BLM,” “This Lie Cannot
Live—MLK,” and a quote from black activist and feminist poet Audre Lorde: “The master’s
tools will never demolish the master’s house.” Angela Davis’s keynote speech at GWU, which
included several references to black-Palestinian solidarity (also the subject of her most recent
book), combined with her advocacy for Palestinian rights and BDS, links the Palestinian struggle
to the antiracist struggle of black Americans via her own identity and past role as a well known
leader and spokesperson for the Black Panthers and the black power movement. Her talk was
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also co-sponsored by the GW Feminist Student Union and GW Black Student Union. As these
examples show, the joint struggle frame and expressions of solidarity between black activists and
pro-BDS activists for Palestinian rights are commonly found in the vernacular student activist
discourse I examined.
The intersections of BDS and Palestinian rights with women’s rights and feminism is also
a common vernacular use of the joint struggle frame. For example, most of the pro-BDS student
groups posted Facebook messages during IAW including links to articles rebutting a recent
March 7, 2017 New York Times op-ed by Emily Shire, titled “Does Feminism Have Room for
Zionists?” In this text, Emily Shire focuses on the Women’s March and argues that Palestinian
rights and BDS should not be part of feminist movements because these issues are too political
and alienate Zionist feminists. In response to Shire’s argument, several women supporters of
Palestinian rights and BDS penned rebuttals, which were then posted on the SJP chapters’ and
SAIA’s Facebook pages (Davis et al.; Elia; Meyerson; Nevel). For example, on March 24, 2017,
GMU’s SAIA includes a link on their Facebook page to a Mondoweiss op-ed by Angela Davis et
al. that rebuts Shire’s op-ed and includes this final statement:
Zionist feminism is an oxymoron. It may have had a shared legacy with white-womenonly feminism but it does not reflect the conviction of today’s activists who refuse to
stand by the notion of justice for some of us while denying justice to others. We reject
Zionism and Zionist feminism. A growing number of women are recognizing that the
feminism that does not confront capitalism, racism, and colonialism will not lead to
liberation, just as there is no liberation possible without confronting sexism. Any way
forward must overcome the voices of selective feminism that defend systems of
oppression and try to silence our voices.
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A Facebook post from Georgetown SJP on March 20 includes a link to another article
responding to Shire in Mondoweiss by Nada Elia, who argues against welcoming Zionists into
intersectional feminist movements or other movements against oppression: “Zionists need to stop
their mental gymnastics, that would somehow allow them to support apartheid in Israel, while
fighting oppression in the rest of the world.” And on April 6, 2017, GWU SJP’s Facebook post
for the “Women in Liberation Struggles” event includes discussion of the “role of women in
liberation struggles around the world and especially as it relates to Palestine.” This event page
also includes a link to a 2015 Dana Olwan essay, “Why BDS is a Feminist Issue,” from the Al
Jazeera website that SJP encourages event attendees to read prior to the event. Olwan’s text
argues that support for BDS belongs in feminist movements, and she situates her argument in the
context of the immanent November 2015 vote by the National Women's Studies Association
(NWSA) to support BDS (which it did) (Redden, “National Women’s”). On March 13, SJP at
GWU also shared a post from the US Campaign for Palestinian Rights with a link to an interview
in The Nation in which Linda Sarsour also rebuts Emily Shire’s op-ed and argues for the
necessity of including Palestinian rights in the struggle for women’s rights and against
oppression (Meyerson). Based on all of these examples and others, pro-BDS student activists’
vernacular rhetoric and framing reveals their belief in the necessity of including support for
Palestinian rights in intersectional movements for justice, which can be discerned through not
only their own student-created texts but also through the content of the articles they choose to
link to and the quotes and descriptions they select.
In regard to joint struggle and intersectionality with other indigenous rights movements,
pro-BDS student activists also responded to the kairos of recent events during the spring of 2017
to express solidarity with the #NoDAPL Standing Rock water protector movement that sought to
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block the Dakota Access Pipeline from crossing indigenous tribal lands. Angela Davis highlights
the importance of intersectionality in regard to indigenous rights several times in her keynote
speech at GWU, including when she opens by emphasizing that the event was taking place on
colonized lands and that the US is also a settler-colonial nation. She goes on to connect Flint,
Michigan and water issues in Palestine to Dakota Access resistance, and she uses the
intersectional lens to connect her point back to women’s rights when she asserts, “Water is a
feminist issue.” Georgetown SJP’s mock apartheid wall also expresses solidarity with the
Standing Rock protestors in the form of graffiti stating, “No Colonialism. No Genocide. No
Settler Terror. #NoDAPL.” In addition to referencing indigenous rights as part of a focus on
intersectionality, these pro-BDS student groups also used #NoDAPL, Native American
indigenous rights, and US settler-colonial history as an analogy to Israel’s settler-colonial
policies against the indigenous Palestinians and to highlight the frames of settler colonialism,
ethnic cleansing, and refugee rights.
Settler Colonialism, Ethnic Cleansing, and Refugee Rights
Pro-BDS student activist-rhetors also frequently emphasize the settler colonialism frame
as the most accurate way to understand the situation in Palestine/Israel and regularly compare
Israeli settler colonialism with other settler colonial societies, including the US, Canada,
Australia, and South Africa. For example, at Georgetown SJP’s “So You Want to Go on a
Birthright Trip?” panel on March 15, 2017, an activist with the US Campaign for Palestinian
Rights emphasized the importance of placing the Birthright program within the larger settlercolonial context of Palestine/Israel. She explains that the US is also a settler-colonial society and
that we in the US are living on indigenous land. Another one of the panel speakers, a young
Jewish activist with Jewish Voice for Peace, also passed around copies of a zine, titled “Whose
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Birthright: A Zine Exposing Birthright Israel,” in which an anonymous Jewish student critically
recounts her experience on a 2015 Birthright trip in second-person narrative form, describing
what is shown by the official tour and what is left out, with facts and sources to provide
background and context for the issues discussed. At the end of the zine, the author includes
“Colonialism” in a glossary to describe the situation in Palestine/Israel. Since the time of this
2017 panel, both Jewish Voice for Peace and the anti-Occupation direct action group IfNotNow
have started campaigns targeting the Birthright organization (Pink; Sommer). Other examples of
the use of the settler colonialism frame include the “Visualizing Palestine” poster on
Georgetown SJP’s mock apartheid wall, “Palestine Shrinking/Expanding Israel,” which shows
the maps of land controlled by Zionists versus Palestinians in 1918, 1947, 1960, and 2017 and
includes other basic facts about Israeli settler colonialism and the ethnic cleansing of Palestine.
During SAIA’s Gaza in Context documentary showing and discussion on March 29th, a student
co-leader of SAIA frames the situation in Palestine/Israel as one of settler colonialism that seeks
displacement, dispossession, and concentration of the indigenous population, and the SAIA
students also repeatedly compare Israeli settler colonialism to the US. The SAIA leaders go on to
facilitate a discussion of settler colonialism and distinguish it from colonialism, arguing that one
just extracts resources (colonialism), but the other implants settlers (settler colonialism). Later in
the discussion, another SAIA leader emphasizes that Israel is not unique in its goals but is similar
to other examples of settler colonialism, including the US, and he goes on to argue that the US
and Israel share this common history and values as settler-colonial societies.
The settler colonialism frame also relates to the ethnic cleansing and refugee rights issue
frames, which are frequently emphasized in several events and texts from IAW. For example,
ethnic cleansing was the primary frame in the talk by Dr. Osama Abu-Irshaid on March 13, 2017
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at Georgetown, “The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine,” sponsored by Georgetown SJP. Dr. AbuIrshaid, the national policy director for the American Muslims for Palestine (AMP) and scholar
with the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, discusses Zionist and Israeli policies of
“transfer” and ethnic cleansing during and after the Nakba. Though he acknowledges that both
Jews and Palestinians have a right to live there and that Jews also have a historical tie to the
region, he emphasizes that their right to be there is as equals, not as occupiers or colonizers.
Georgetown SJP’s mock apartheid wall also includes a handwritten statement about the Nakba
that emphasizes the ethnic cleansing frame: “Al-Nakba = The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine: The
creation of Israel meant the expulsion of over 750,000 indigenous Palestinians from their homes
and the destruction of over 500 villages by Zionist militias to pave way for an exclusively Jewish
state.”
Related to discussions of the Nakba and the ethnic cleansing frame is the issue frame of
refugee rights, usually discussed in the context of the “right of return,” which is the third and
most controversial part of the 2005 BDS Call. For example, the refugee rights frame was
prominent during Georgetown SJP’s “So You Want to Go on a Birthright Trip?” panel
discussion on March 15, 2017. During the panel discussion, speakers repeatedly explain that one
reason the Birthright program promotes injustice is because Palestinian refugees are prohibited
from returning to Israel—even for a visit. One Palestinian speaker and activist with American
Muslims for Palestine (AMP) uses a more personal and emotional appeal when he describes his
own family’s history of becoming refugees and finding themselves stateless. In “Whose
Birthright?: A Zine Exposing Birthright Israel,” the narrative describes the end of the 10-day
Birthright trip this way: “Reminiscing on the incredible experience Birthright has afforded you,
you do not think twice about calling this land millions of Palestinian refugees only dream of
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returning to, your homeland” (16). Another emotional appeal regarding the refugee rights frame
is presented in the last section of the “Whose Birthright” zine, in which a 2014 Tufts Daily article
written by six unnamed Palestinian students is reprinted. One paragraph emphasizes the refugee
rights frame in the context of Birthright this way:
To make Birthright “fun” and “safe” means eradicating an

Arab populace. . . It means

exiling our brothers and our sisters to refugee camps, prisons or worse. It is important
that students at this university understand the implications of their so-called right. Kind
reader, understand that our hearts ache when we see photographs of friends and
acquaintances swimming in the sea our grandparents once swam in. Our hearts ache
when we see photographs of classmates posing in front of the mosques and churches our
grandparents once prayed in, but now pray to one day see. Our hearts ache when we see
pictures of peers eating the fruits of the land we have grown up hearing of, but never
tasted. (“Those without a Birthright”)
Sometimes the refugee rights frame is discussed in relation to the 2005 BDS Call, and
sometimes it is discussed as an issue important to Palestinians without reference to BDS. As
polls of Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, and the diaspora have shown, the issue of refugee
rights and the “right of return” are ranked very highly by most Palestinians, even those who still
favor a two-state solution (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, “PalestinianIsraeli”; Shiblak). The importance of the right of return to Palestinians was also clearly displayed
during the 2018 Great March of Return in Gaza (where the majority of Palestinians residents are
refugees from inside the Green Line), during which time thousands of Palestinians were willing
to risk death to express their desire for return and an acknowledgement of their rights as
refugees.
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Jewish Solidarity, Anti-Zionism, and Antisemitism
Similarly to official BDS movement discourse, vernacular pro-BDS student activistrhetors regularly denounce antisemitism and take care to distinguish between anti-Zionism and
antisemitism and between Israel and the Jewish people. Like Palestinian BDS movement leaders,
pro-BDS student activists face the rhetorical challenge and familiar doxa that the BDS
movement is antisemitic for targeting the Jewish state. In the case of IAW events I attended,
several included pro-Israel attendees who posed hostile or challenging questions to speakers and
student group co-leaders—a regular feature of pro-BDS and pro-Palestinian activism that may
not be as common at events promoting other social or racial justice causes on campus. While a
majority of American Jews still consider themselves supporters of Israel, polls show that more
and more young Jews view Israel more negatively, with only slightly more than half (57%) of
US Jewish college students favoring Israel in the conflict with the Palestinians, with many
“believing Israel falls short with values such as human rights, tolerance and diversity” (BorschelDan; Maltz; Ziri). These changing attitudes toward Israel are also reflected in the growth of antiOccupation and, in some cases, even explicitly anti-Zionist Jewish activism for Palestinian
rights, as found in groups like the anti-Occupation group IfNotNow (INN), the BDS-endorsing
and anti-Zionist Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP), Jews for Racial and Economic Justice (JFREJ),
and others, as well as the disproportionate number of Jewish students involved in pro-BDS
groups like SJP (Maltz, “Pro-Palestinian”; Omer, Days of Awe; Sunshine).
In addition to regularly denouncing antisemitism and differentiating between the Jewish
people and Israel, both official and vernacular pro-BDS activist-rhetors also seek to offer
counter-framing for antisemitism charges and boost the ethos of pro-BDS activism by
highlighting Jewish support for BDS and Palestinian rights. Some of the explicit and implicit
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ways Jewish activism for Palestinian rights is highlighted during the IAW events I studied
included the participation of Jewish activists in IAW events, including Jewish members of
Jewish Voice for Peace, the US Campaign for Palestinian rights, SJP and SAIA. In addition to
the involvement of Jewish activists, pro-BDS student groups also highlighted Jewish criticism of
Israel and activism for BDS and against the Occupation. One kairotic aspect of IAW discourse in
2017 were the vocal IfNotNow-led protests during the 2017 American Israel Public Affairs
Committee (AIPAC) conference in DC, dubbed the #JewishResistance24, which were publicized
by all of the DC-area pro-BDS student groups on their Facebook pages during IAW 2017
(Guttman, “Watch”). For example, Georgetown SJP posted a link to their Facebook page on
March 26 about IfNotNow’s (INN) anti-AIPAC protests with this description: “Powerful Jewish
resistance from IfNotNow at the AIPAC Conference today! Thank you for your bravery.” The
description for this post also includes the quote from rabbinic sage Hillel the Elder, from which
INN took their name: “If I am not for myself, who will be for me? If I am only for myself, what
am I? If not now, when?” (Rosenberg). GMU’s SAIA also shared another INN post on March
27th accompanied by a reference to the history of Jewish critique of Zionism: “What a great way
to kick off Israeli Apartheid Week at GMU. Jewish solidarity with Palestinians is nothing new
and #JewishResistance is as old as Zionism itself.” INN’s own description for the original post
emphasizes the importance of their Jewish identity to their activism: “IfNotNow brought the
#JewishResistance to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in DC. Together,
hundreds of Jews and allies came together to #ResistAIPAC, 50 years of occupation, and the
Trump administration. This is what our community looks like.”

24

INN’s use of the term “resistance” may also borrow from the contemporary popular use of “resistance” in the
context of the #Resistance to Donald Trump’s presidency.
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INN was formed during the 2014 Gaza War (Operation Protective Edge) and uses direct
action “to transform the American Jewish Community's support for Occupation into a call for
freedom and dignity for all” (IfNotNow, “About Us,” “IfNotNow”). INN does not take a position
on BDS, however, because it seeks to be an inclusive organization for all American Jews critical
of the Israeli Occupation regardless of their stance on BDS, which is still controversial and often
criticized by many American Jews (IfNotNow, “Our Principles”). Despite its agnosticism on
BDS, INN reflects the shift among many young Jews away from the reflexive support for Israel
more commonly found in older generations and mainstream Jewish organizations. On their
website, INN asserts, “While the out-of-touch establishment claims to speak for our community,
we know that American Jewry is eager for change” (IfNotNow, “About Us”). In addition to their
anti-AIPAC protests, INN has launched direct action campaigns to promote discussion of the
Occupation in Jewish summer camps, and it recently gained media attention for its “Not Just a
Free Trip” campaign that encourages Birthright participants to walk out of their tours to visit the
West Bank, speak to Palestinians, and learn about the Occupation (IfNotNow “Not Just”;
Riesman). Even though INN has not officially endorsed BDS and therefore cannot be considered
an official part of the BDS movement, their refusal to denounce BDS and their welcoming
attitude toward Jews who do support BDS results in some significant overlap between their goals
and tactics and those of the BDS movement. The fact that all of the pro-BDS student
organizations shared video clips and links to articles about INN’s 2017 anti-AIPAC protests
demonstrates both that pro-BDS students support and agree with INN’s anti-AIPAC actions and
also that these pro-BDS student groups actively promote examples of Jewish criticism of Israel.
Other examples of pro-BDS student groups highlighting Jewish support for BDS include
the Georgetown SJP’s “So You Want to Go on a Birthright Trip?” panel on March 15, 2017. Not
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only did the panel include multiple Jewish BDS activists, but also three of them explicitly
endorse BDS during their talk. During her GWU SJP-sponsored keynote speech, Angela Davis
makes a point to not only distinguish Israel and Zionism from the Jewish people, but she also
mentions examples of prominent Jewish BDS supporters in her talk, including Judith Butler. In
another case, Georgetown SJP shares Donna Nevel’s rebuttal to Emily Shire on their Facebook
page, in which Nevel, a Jewish American anti-Zionist activist who also co-founded Jews Say
No! and JFREJ, argues that rather than supporting Israel and Zionism, feminists should “stand
with the Palestinian-led grassroots movement for justice and with the growing number of women
around the globe who are committed to equal rights for all peoples living in Palestine and Israel”
(Nevel; “Donna Nevel”).
Because the antisemitism charge against the BDS movement is so ubiquitous, it is
common to hear pro-BDS speakers—both leaders and rank-and-file activists—take steps to
denounce antisemitism even as they harshly critique Israel and Zionism. For example, in her
keynote speech at GWU, Angela Davis explains the importance of distinguishing between Jews
and Israel by emphasizing that when challenging Israel’s ethnic cleansing, etc., it is important to
not assign these crimes to every Israeli or every Jew. She goes on to argue that people fear
accusations of antisemitism because there has been a conflation between antisemitism and
critique of Israel, and she stresses that critiquing Israel also requires “saying ‘no’ to
antisemitism.” One of the only examples of antisemitic discourse I witnessed during my study of
pro-BDS IAW events was an instance in which an attendee at a GMU SAIA discussion event
explained the pro-Israel bias of US media and politicians as being because “Israel controls the
US,” a statement that suggests the antisemitic trope of nefarious behind-the-scenes Jewish
control, which traces back to the early twentieth-century antisemitic hoax text promoted by the
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Russian aristocracy, Hitler, and other antisemites, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion25
(Bronner; Rothstein). Immediately after this student’s antisemitic statement, however, a
Palestinian-American SAIA co-leader intervened by reminding everyone that “there are no
Jewish conspiracies” and rebutted the idea of Israel controlling the US by reminding discussion
participants that Israel is a settler-colonial state just like other settler-colonial states, including
the US. Soon after this exchange, other attendees offered critiques of other oppressive regimes to
emphasize that Israel is not unique, including critiques of the US’s relationship with Saudi
Arabia, the latter of which one Arab-American student described as being “worse than Israel”
because of what Saudi Arabia is doing in Yemen.
This example shows that the SAIA group does not tolerate expressions of antisemitism at
their events, even though SAIA is an explicitly anti-Zionist organization, and my analysis of
their texts during IAW show them to be perhaps the most harshly critical of Israel of any of the
pro-BDS student groups I studied. The student attendee who made this antisemitic statement did
not make any other such statements during the rest of the event, and subsequent statements and
discussion between him and other SAIA attendees suggest that his assertion about Israel
controlling the US may have been an example of what contemporary antisemitism scholar David
Hirsh argues is a kind of inadvertent antisemitism tied to both the prevalence of antisemitic
tropes and ignorance about them, which can lead some leftists to repeat antisemitic discourse out
of ignorance rather than true Jew-hatred (Hirsh, “Anti-Zionism” 70-71; Hirsh, “Chip Berlet”). A
pro-BDS Georgetown student, whose editorial in The Hoya is linked to by Georgetown SJP’s
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The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which is the source of much of contemporary antisemitic conspiracy theory
about nefarious Jewish control of the media, international banking, world leaders, etc. was also tacitly endorsed in
Hamas’ original 1988 charter that invoked several conspiracy theories originating in The Protocols (Bronner). In
2017, Hamas updated their charter to remove references to Protocols-based conspiracies among other revisions that
softened several of their positions and reflected changing attitudes expressed by various Hamas leaders over the
years (Mitnick and Abu Alouf; Mughrabi).
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Facebook page on March 20th, explains why the antisemitism charge against the BDS movement
is unfair:
It is important to remember that, as is the case with all influential political movements,
BDS will undoubtedly appeal to individuals who hold extremist views. There will always
be truly anti-Semitic individuals who misunderstand the real goals of the movement and
use it as an excuse to spread hateful rhetoric. However, it is intellectually dishonest to
take the actions of few extremists and use them to reflect an entire movement. (ElHusseini).
Even though pro-BDS students’ attempts to rebut and offer counterframing for antisemitism
charges may not convince many BDS critics and Israel supporters who insist that Israel is being
unfairly targeted, El-Husseini’s point highlights the double-standard of associating the BDS
movement with the most extreme antisemitic fringe supporters while not making the same
generalizations in regard to the most right-wing overtly racist, anti-Palestinian, and Islamophobic
supporters of Israel (Aked, “Is Anti-Zionism”).
When studying pro-BDS activism and discourse, it is also not uncommon to encounter
Jewish pro-BDS activists who also express anti-Zionist attitudes. Prior to the Nazi Holocaust,
Zionism was not supported by a majority of world Jewry, more of whom initially supported the
socialist and anti-Zionist Jewish Bund; while Nazi antisemitism and the establishment of Israel
in 1948 led most diaspora Jews to support Zionism and Israel, a significant minority of leftist
Jewish anti-Zionists remained, and their numbers have grown in recent years as memories of the
Holocaust fade and violent and discriminatory Israeli policies toward the Palestinians have
intensified (American Jewish Committee, American Jewish 206-214; Maltz, “Vast Numbers”;
Omer, Days of Awe; “Protest to Wilson”; Rabkin, A Threat; Rose 3-4, 8; Sunshine; Waxman,
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“American Jews,” “As Israel Turns,” “Young American”). Both of the Jewish members of
Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP) at the “So You Want to Go on a Birthright Trip?” panel at
Georgetown on March 15th expressed anti-Zionist attitudes (“So You”). One speaker recounts
how he began to question his previously held ideas about Israel in 2014 during Operation
Protective Edge and asserts that he is no longer a Zionist. Then, in the Q&A, he equates the idea
of Zionism to the discriminatory things Europeans were doing to Jews in Europe for many years
prior to the Holocaust. The other JVP speaker also declares her anti-Zionism when says she is
ashamed of Zionism and what it has done to Palestinians. In “Whose Birthright?: A Zine
Exposing Birthright Israel,” a copy of which was distributed at the Georgetown panel, even
though the Jewish authors do not take an explicitly anti-Zionist position, their definition of
“Zionism” includes this critical statement about Zionist beliefs: “They believed their need of a
refuge from racist persecution in Europe overrode Palestinian counterclaims and resulted, to this
day, in the forced eviction, displacement, and destruction of Palestinian populations” (17).
Georgetown’s mock apartheid wall includes this hand-written definition of “Zionism”: “Zionism:
the project to maintain an exclusionary state with an enforced demographic Jewish majority on
stolen Palestinian land.”
While most attendees of the Georgetown panel seemed to tacitly agree with the antiZionist views of the Jewish and non-Jewish speakers, a couple of more hostile audience
members sought to challenge the speakers and accused them of not being representative of most
American Jews because of their anti-Zionist beliefs. One JVP speaker responds to this criticism
by comparing her position as an anti-Zionist in the minority among Jews to fact that, as a whitepresenting Ashkenazi Jew, she is also among the minority of white people in the US who are
activists against white supremacy. She further argues that in the early years of any social justice
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movement, only a minority typically supports the movement until eventually more and more
people join the side of justice. Her statements, along with the framing found in the other example
texts from the Georgetown panel, offer evidence for what recent polls have also found: that an
increasing number of younger, more left-leaning social justice-oriented American Jews are
gravitating toward both pro-BDS activism and anti-Zionism (Borschel-Dan; Nathan-Kazis,
“Report”; Maltz, “The Pro-Palestinian,” “Vast Numbers”; Sunshine).
Along with the increasing popularity of the apartheid frame for the situation in
Palestine/Israel, the rightward shift of Israeli politics, the GOP and Trumpian embrace of Israel,
and the eroding bipartisan support for Israel in the US, Zionism has also come to be more and
more associated with racism and white supremacy, a trend also reflected in many of the pro-BDS
texts I analyzed. Black activists’ endorsements of BDS in recent years have also accelerated the
prevalence of the “Zionism is racism” attitude among students at US colleges (Bailey and
Petersen-Smith; Movement for Black Lives). Along with the association of Zionism and racism,
many social and racial justice activists also associate Jewishness with white privilege, especially
for white Ashkenazi Jews of European heritage (Goldberg, Emma). At the Georgetown “So You
Want To Go on a Birthright Trip?” panel, a Palestinian and Jewish-American speaker from the
US Campaign for Palestinian Rights references Israel’s discriminatory treatment of nonAshkenazi Jews and says that “Zionism includes white supremacy” because it not only
discriminates against Palestinians, but also often against Jews of color. Georgetown SJP’s mock
apartheid wall includes the statement, “Zionism is Racism,” an attitude which is echoed in
materials produced or included by other pro-BDS student groups during IAW. Because most
American Jews are also Ashkenazi with European heritage and are usually considered “white” in
the US by most Americans, at least in recent years (with the exception of overt white
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supremacists, white nationalists, and neo-Nazis, etc.), perhaps coupled with the apartheid frame,
the belief that Zionism is a form of racism that often overlaps with white supremacy seems to be
a common view among leftist social and racial justice activists in the US, including those
affiliated with the BDS movement.
Emotional Appeals in Pro-BDS Discourse
Another feature of vernacular pro-BDS student activist discourse I encountered during
my study was the occasional appearance of emotional appeals on behalf of Palestinians. Like
with official BDS movement discourse, most vernacular pro-BDS texts tended to avoid personal
narratives and emotional appeals and instead focused on international laws and general facts and
statistics about discriminatory Israeli policies. There were a few events and texts, however,
which did include personal and emotional narratives and appeals. For example, a March 16th
Facebook post from Georgetown SJP includes a link to an article in remembrance of Rachel
Corrie who was killed 14 year earlier by an Israeli bulldozer while protecting a Palestinian home
from demolition in Gaza (“Honoring Rachel”). The SJP description of the post says, “14 years
ago, Rachel Corrie was murdered by the Israeli Occupation Forces when a Caterpillar D9
bulldozer ran over her as she was protesting the demolition of Palestinian homes.” The
accompanying link is to the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) website
(www.palsolidarity.org), where readers can find an emotional post on ISM’s page with reprints
of emails and poems Corrie had written soon before her death. A March 20th Facebook post links
to an article in Georgetown’s The Hoya student paper, in which a student BDS supporter pens an
emotional appeal for other students to support BDS:
Put yourself in the place of an elderly Palestinian farmer, who just had his house
bulldozed, his livestock confiscated and his land stolen. Put yourself in the place of a
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Palestinian mother who has just been informed her 6-year-old son was blown to bits by
an Israeli missile while playing outside. Put yourself in the place of a Palestinian man
who just lost his job and ability to feed his family because numerous Israeli checkpoints
caused him to be late for the third time this week. (El-Husseini)
Another example of emotional appeals in IAW discourse includes the “Those Without a
Birthright” op-ed, which is originally from The Tufts Daily and also reprinted at the end of
“Whose Birthright?: A Zine Exposing Birthright Israel,” which is the zine distributed at
Georgetown SJP’s “So You Want To Go on a Birthright Trip” panel. In this emotional editorial,
six Palestinian pro-BDS Tufts students implore their fellow students to understand their
perspective on Birthright trips using very emotional language to elicit empathy:
Our hearts ache when we see photographs of classmates posing in front of the mosques
and churches our grandparents once prayed in, but now pray to one day see. Our hearts
ache when we see pictures of peers eating the fruits of the land we have grown up hearing
of, but never tasted. Our hearts ache when we see our classmates posing next to exotic
camels and mysterious Bedouins in a grotesque charade of our culture. Our hearts ache
each time we are reminded that we do not share this birthright.
In addition to emphasizing the refugee rights frame as discussed earlier, the repetition of the
phrase, “Our hearts ache,” bolsters an emotional personal testimony that calls for Jewish students
to have empathy with the emotional pain Palestinians feel because they are denied the right to
return—and often denied the right to even visit Israel as a tourist. One of the speakers at
Georgetown SJP’s “So You Want to Go on a Birthright Trip?” panel also includes a personal and
emotional narrative, along with some strong language, when he describes his own family’s
history as Palestinians. He describes how his grandfather was born in Be’er Sheva in the 1930s
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and built his own home like most Palestinians did then. Then, he recounts how, after 1948, most
of his family was expelled to Gaza where his father was born just before the Israeli occupation in
1967, after which point, he became stateless and later came to the US. Later, when explaining his
response to the idea of American Jews having a birthright connection to Israel even if they lack
any familial or ancestral ties, he bluntly exclaims, “Fuck You.” While a few examples of
emotional appeals and personal narratives appeared in the vernacular discourse of pro-BDS
students during IAW 2017, these examples were less common than more logos-based appeals
using facts, statistics, discussions of international law and Israeli policies, and other logical
arguments involving syllogisms, enthymemes, etc.26
Another example of emotional appeals used by pro-BDS student activist-rhetors during
IAW includes the “die-in” action at GWU27 (SJP at GWU, “Die-In”). During this event, over a
dozen SJP-affiliated students lay down on the ground in Kogan Plaza for an unknown period of
time pretending to be dead with typed sheets of paper on top of each of them that include
descriptions of how they died or what oppression they suffered because of a specific company
that profits from the Israeli Occupation. In addition to reinforcing some common pro-BDS
frames for the situation in Palestine/Israel, including the injustice and human rights master
frames and the frames of occupation, oppression, discrimination, apartheid, international
complicity, violations of international law, etc., the event also serves to promote SJP GWU’s
“Divest This Time” campaign. The paper statements include the following example texts with
complicit company names in bold type: “My home was destroyed by Caterpillar Corporation
26

For example, the common association of Zionism as racism stems from a syllogism that because Zionism is a
settler-colonial movement to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, and settler-colonialism is racist because it always
discriminates against and oppresses the indigenous people in favor of a settler population, therefore, “Zionism is
racism.”
27

The exact date of the event is unclear because activists didn’t publicize it ahead of time, perhaps to intentionally
take students by surprise and pre-emptively avoid counter protests by pro-Israel students.
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machinery, to create illegal settlements”; “I am one of the two children killed at a UN School in
Gaza during Israeli White Phosphorous Attacks, with phosphorous manufactured by Elbit
Systems Ltd”; “I was killed by an unmanned aerial vehicle used to target and maim Palestinians,
provided by Elbit Systems Ltd”; “HP Enterprise biometric technology is the reason why me and
my cousin have two different ID cards in one land”; “I have no privacy in Palestine because
Motorola provides technology for a surveillance system in the West Bank that gives Israel my
personal information without my permission”; “Aircraft made by Lockheed Martin have dropped
bombs on my family, killing everyone I love”; and “I could not visit my family in Jerusalem
because of the Apartheid wall created with cement produced by Cemex.” This event uses
stronger emotional appeals than most vernacular pro-BDS texts I analyzed in order to reinforce
many common pro-BDS frames and emphasize Palestinian suffering and oppression. GWU’s
SJP posted images from this event on its Facebook page, but the images were later removed at
some point after the event, likely due to heavy criticism and charges by pro-Israel advocates that
the event was antisemitic (“Incident Details”).
As discussed more in depth in Chapter 4, while emotional narratives of suffering are
commonly used by human rights and injustice-focused movements, the use of such emotional
appeals in pro-BDS discourse can generate a greater backlash because American and Western
audiences tend to be especially sensitive to antisemitism both due to historical reasons, but also
because of the common doxa that the BDS movement is antisemitic, thus undermining the
potential resonance of emotional appeals on behalf of Palestinians because they are more likely
to trigger affective belatedness and “uptake” memories in some audiences (Abraham,
“Reluctant”; Bawarshi).
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BDS and Agency
While the main focus of the majority of the vernacular pro-BDS discourse I studied was
raising awareness about Israel’s oppressive policies toward the Palestinians, another feature I
noticed was the often implicit, but sometimes explicit, focus on the agency afforded to
individuals by their participation in the BDS movement. In general, SAIA and the SJP groups I
studied each engaged in discussions of how individuals could enact BDS and support the BDS
movement in their own lives. Whether by joining SJP or SAIA or by individually boycotting
products targeted for BDS, pro-BDS student activists encouraged other students to take concrete
action in support of Palestinians. The #DivestThisTime campaign at GWU was the most
organized BDS campaign by a D.C.-area college launched during IAW 2017. The campaign
encouraged students to join in pressuring the Student Association to pass a BDS resolution.
Though the subsequent 2017 Student Association BDS resolution failed, GWU SJP and
#DivestThisTime did succeed the following year when a BDS resolution similar to the 2017 one
was passed overwhelmingly by the Student Association in 2018, though the university
administration refused to implement it (Cohen, Haley; Bennett). A more explicit later example of
the agency frame in vernacular student pro-BDS discourse is when a Palestinian GWU student
said, in the wake of passage of the student government resolution supporting BDS and
Palestinian rights at GWU in April of 2018, “Divesting from Israel has been the only tactic for
resisting my occupation that I can grasp in my hands” (qtd. in Bennett). Prior to the 2005 BDS
Call, when student activists or others were concerned with Palestinian rights or wished to do
something to hold Israel accountable and pressure it to grant Palestinian human rights, there was
no clear option for individual agency in regard to this situation thousands of miles away if one
was unable to actually visit Palestine/Israel. With BDS, however, Americans and other people of
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conscience outside of Israel are offered a tangible way to contribute to the movement for
Palestinian rights, even if only in a small and symbolic way.
Quantitative Textual Analysis
In addition to my qualitative analysis of pro-BDS texts using my heuristic questions, as
discussed in Chapter 3, I also analyzed my entire corpora of texts using an online text analyzer to
check for word and phrase frequency (“Textalyser” at http://textalyser.net/). While I did not
perform an official quantitative analysis, using a text analysis program helped me to not only
eliminate bias in my own results but also ensure I did not overlook any important terms or
phrases that I may not have noticed in my qualitative coding. The results of this analysis
supported my own analysis of data and revealed strong consistency between the most frequently
used words and phrases in both official and vernacular discourse. For example, the terms “rights”
and “human rights” were used frequently in both official and vernacular discourse, along with
“justice,” “apartheid,” “occupation,” “discrimination,” etc. Other common terms include
“solidarity,” “settler colonialism,” “ethnic cleansing,” and “right of return.” When references to
the name of the BNC were removed, the two most common 8-word phrases from the BNC and
the pages analyzed on the BDS movement’s official website were “the Palestinian struggle for
freedom justice and equality” and [the right] “of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes.”
The top BNC 7-word phrase is “regime of occupation, settler colonialism and apartheid.” For
vernacular IAW texts, the most common single words found, when all articles, prepositions, and
forms of either “Israel”/“Israeli” and “Palestine”/“Palestinian” were removed, were “rights,”
“justice,” and “occupation.” The single word count for the BNC and BDS Movement website
texts also included “rights” as one of the most frequent terms, along with “international,” “law,”
“apartheid,” “movement,” and “occupation.” This descriptive quantitative analysis also revealed
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that terms like “peace,” “conflict,” and “dialogue” were not very common. It was somewhat
surprising that forms of “Zionist” or “Zionism” were not very common either, especially in
official BDS movement discourse, even though a handful of texts did express an openly antiZionist stance. While this quantitative word frequency analysis was a useful complement to my
qualitative rhetorical frame analysis, it was primarily through my qualitative examination and
coding of my corpora, along with my later micro-analysis of selected representative texts, that I
was able to discern the clearest patterns in rhetorical framing strategies intended to identify
problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, propose solutions, and promote identification
and division, etc. A more comprehensive and holistic qualitative rhetorical frame analysis was
necessary to discern themes and frames that did not necessarily overlap with specific single or
multi-word phrases, such as agency, joint struggle, and failure of the international community,
frames that were expressed using many different combinations of words and phrases.
Conclusion
My analysis of vernacular pro-BDS discourse reveals a strong consistency in framing
strategies among pro-BDS student activists, as well as between official and vernacular discourse,
though there were a few differences as well. Both official and vernacular pro-BDS discourse use
all three rhetorical appeals to present their arguments and emphasize the master frames of
injustice and human rights, along with common issue frames of apartheid, occupation, settler
colonialism, joint struggle, international complicity, Israeli impunity, ethnic cleansing, antiZionism, BDS as a grassroots movement, and others. Both official and vernacular texts also used
Burkean identification and division to entice audiences to pick a side and identify with the
oppressed Palestinians against the oppressor, Israel. Analogies to the South African antiapartheid movement and the US civil rights movement were also common. In both cases,
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expressions of antisemitic attitudes or statements were very rare among pro-BDS rhetors, and on
the infrequent occasions when statements did seem to cross a line into antisemitic or borderline
antisemitic conspiracy, pro-BDS student activists pushed back against such claims. Both official
BDS movement leaders and student activist-rhetors also regularly condemn antisemitism and
highlight Jewish participation and support for BDS as a way to offer counter-framing for charges
of antisemitism against BDS. Both types of discourse also frequently reference intersectionality
and related concepts popular on the social justice left in order to tie the cause for Palestinian
rights to other social and racial justice movements for human rights and equality around the
world.
My analysis of vernacular pro-BDS student activist discourse reveals that while there is a
high level of consistency between the framing and rhetorical strategies of official and vernacular
pro-BDS discourse, student activists in the US tailor their rhetoric to a more specific and local
audiences—that of US college students and their respective university communities—as well as
more localized rhetorical situations and ecologies. In addition to the long-term and ongoing
exigencies and rhetorical ecologies of Palestine/Israel, the pro-BDS student groups whose
discourse I studied during IAW events in 2017 responded to the kairos of immediate, local, and
national events and exigencies, such as the recent #NoDAPL Standing Rock protests, the INN
anti-AIPAC protests in Washington D.C., and the debate over the compatibility of feminism and
Zionism resulting from recent Zionist critiques of the Women’s March organization. The
presence of information and advertisements for free Taglit-Birthright trips to Israel during the
spring semester serves as another unique exigence for pro-BDS student activists to offer
alternative perspectives on the Birthright program. Aside from raising awareness about Israel’s
violations of international law and Palestinian human rights, pro-BDS student activists also use
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of a wider variety of rhetorical appeals and formats than official BDS movement discourse,
including more personal narratives and emotional appeals and an even stronger focus on the
intersectionality and joint struggle frames. Consistent with the contemporary left’s focus on
intersectionality, pro-BDS student activists expressed solidarity and joint struggle with other
antiracist and social justice movements, including Black Lives Matter, LGBTQ+ rights,
feminism, and indigenous rights movements like #NoDAPL. Student activist texts also highlight
the apartheid frame and South Africa analogy and emphasize the issues of ethnic cleansing and
refugee rights within a settler colonialism frame. And like official BDS movement leaders, proBDS student activist-rhetors rarely used terms and frames favored by Israel advocates, such as
“peace,” “coexistence,” “dialogue,” or the conflict frame that typically presents the situation in
Palestine/Israel as one of two equal sides in “conflict” with each other. Similarly to official proBDS discourse, vernacular student-activist discourse stressed the inequality and power
imbalance between the Israeli and Palestinian sides and favored the settler colonialism frame
over the conflict frame.
In addition to the few aspects of pro-BDS student’s rhetorical framing strategies that
were unique when compared with official BDS movement discourse, these student-created texts
also demonstrated a high level of consistency in the frames used and likely audience resonance
when compared with official movement texts. Similar to official BDS movement framing
strategies, the vernacular pro-BDS discourse I studied included examples of emphasizing
antiracism and rebutting antisemitism charges, including by highlighting Jewish supporters of
BDS and Palestinian rights, including activists from groups like JVP, SJP, INN, and JFREJ.
Even as they regularly denounce antisemitism, pro-BDS student activists also often promote
anti-Zionism and equate Zionism with racism and white supremacy, viewing white Ashkenazi
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Jews as contemporary beneficiaries of white privilege rather than an oppressed minority.
Zionism and Israeli settler colonialism is also frequently portrayed as the primary cause of
Palestinian human rights violations and suffering, to which the BDS movement is often
portrayed as a solution and source of individual agency.
Also similarly to official BDS movement discourse, pro-BDS student activist rhetoric
seems likely to be most resonant with social and racial justice activists who already prioritize
fighting injustice through intersectional joint struggle with other marginalized peoples, as
evidenced by the multi-racial coalitions of activists who attend, co-sponsor, and speak at SAIA
and SJP IAW events. The participation of many progressive Jewish activists in IAW events also
demonstrates not only the resonance of pro-BDS discourse with many young Jews, but also
reveals the shifting priorities and values that have caused more and more young Jews in recent
years to embrace Palestinian rights.
The #DivestThisTime campaign at GWU offers a clear example of which audiences
vernacular pro-BDS rhetorical framing strategies appear to resonate most with and which
audiences are less likely to be receptive. After a 2017 BDS resolution failed to pass, GWU’s
Student Association Senate voted in secret ballot—to avoid personal attacks after pro-Israel
students and outside supporters criticized the resolution for being antisemitic for unfairly
singling out Israel—to pass the nonbinding BDS resolution targeting multinational corporations
that profit from Israel’s occupation for divestment (Bennett; Cohen, Haley; “George Washington
U”). After the Student Association Senate passed the BDS resolution overwhelmingly, the next
day GW president Thomas LeBlanc said, “I want to be clear to our university community that
this does not represent the university’s views and the university will not implement such a
proposal” (“George Washington U”). Thus, while pro-BDS rhetorical strategies and framing
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seems to resonate with many social and racial justice activists, including many on US college
campuses, among older adults who continue to hold most positions of power in the US, support
for Israel and opposition to BDS remains resistant to pro-BDS framing, perhaps at least partly
due to the continued persistence of the doxa that the BDS movement is antisemitic.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

Overview of Rhetorical Frame Analysis Results
My rhetorical frame analysis of pro-BDS discourse has sought to investigate the
following questions: 1) How do both official and vernacular BDS activist-rhetors frame the BDS
movement and their goals?; 2) How do they frame their responses to the evolving rhetorical
situations and challenges (including Western sensitivity to antisemitism)?; and 3) How do they
tailor these frames for different audiences? Through my analysis of a corpora of both official and
vernacular BDS movement texts, I have found that, despite some minor differences between the
audiences and rhetorical moves of official BDS movement leaders versus rank-and-file student
activist-rhetors, there is a remarkable consistency in the rhetorical framing strategies used in both
discourses. Both official and vernacular BDS activist-rhetors use a variety of rhetorical appeals
(primarily logos but also ethos and pathos) to raise awareness about discriminatory Israeli
policies and human rights violations against Palestinians and to encourage Burkean identification
with the oppressed Palestinians and against their Israeli oppressors. Pro-BDS activist-rhetors
typically frame the BDS movement as a nonviolent movement to achieve Palestinian rights and
hold Israel accountable for its ongoing system of oppression, discrimination, occupation,
apartheid, and violence against Palestinians. Other common frames emphasize the values of
justice, freedom, equality, joint struggle, and individual and collective agency—values that
strongly overlap with current social and racial justice activist discourses around intersectionality
and justice for marginalized and oppressed peoples. In regard to the most commonly used
frames, both official and vernacular pro-BDS discourse emphasizes the issue and collective
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action frames of apartheid, discrimination, occupation, settler colonialism, ethnic cleansing,
refugee rights, freedom, equality, and joint struggle, all of which also fall under the umbrella
master frames of injustice, oppression, and human rights. This contrasts with the common
frames used by pro-Israel advocates that are rarely found in pro-BDS discourse, including
security, Palestinian terrorism, coexistence, dialogue, peace (without modification), and conflict.
In response to the evolving rhetorical situations and challenges they face, including
charges of antisemitism against the BDS movement in the context of post-9/11 Islamophobia and
Western sensitivity to antisemitism, BDS activists offer rebuttals and counter-framing for the
doxa that the BDS movement is antisemitic for targeting the Jewish state by clearly
distinguishing between the Jewish people and Israel to discourage collectively assigning Jewish
people the blame for Israel’s actions, carefully separating anti-Zionism and criticism of Israel
from antisemitism, emphasizing Jewish support for the BDS movement, and drawing
comparisons to other familiar struggles for justice and liberation. By emphasizing Jewish support
for BDS and Palestinians rights, both official and vernacular pro-BDS discourse not only offers
counterframing for antisemitism charges but also bolsters the ethos of pro-BDS discourse
because US audiences often tend to prefer Jewish opinions over Palestinian ones (Hallward,
Transnational 183). Even though neither official nor vernacular BDS movement discourse relies
heavily on pathos-based appeals and rarely includes the personal testimonies commonly found in
other human rights campaigns (Brysk; Keck and Sikkink), both types of BDS activist-rhetors do
occasionally include emotional appeals and personal narratives from Palestinian victims of
Israeli oppression and violence.
While the framing strategies of both official and vernacular pro-BDS discourse are very
similar overall, the vernacular pro-BDS texts I studied also reveal a few differences. For
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example, while official BDS movement discourse focuses primarily on an international audience,
pro-BDS vernacular student-activist discourse attends more to national and local audiences of
US college students. This focus on a collegiate audience and the concurrent popularity of other
racial and social justice movements on US college campuses leads vernacular pro-BDS student
activist-rhetors to emphasize the intersectionality and joint struggle frames even more frequently
than in official BDS movement discourse, though these frames are also increasingly found in
official pro-BDS discourse as well. In addition, perhaps partly because US audiences may be less
familiar with the nature of Israeli policies toward Palestinians when compared with an
international audience as a result of a greater pro-Israel media bias in the US (McGreal;
Goldfarb), vernacular pro-BDS discourse more commonly includes personal narratives and
emotional appeals about Israeli oppression of Palestinians, even as the majority of pro-BDS
appeals are more logos-based. A different knowledge base about the situation in Palestine/Israel
when compared with international audiences may also explain why the failure of the
international community, international complicity, and Israeli impunity frames were less
commonly used in the vernacular discourse of US pro-BDS student activists, most of whom
focus more on raising awareness about the situation for US collegiate audiences.
My analysis also suggests that while the rhetorical framing strategies used in both official
and vernacular discourse resonate with certain audiences, adjusting some rhetorical framing
strategies could promote a greater resonance with wider audiences. Pro-BDS rhetorical framing
strategies are likely to resonate most strongly with audiences of social and racial justice activists
who focus on intersectionality and building coalitions among various marginalized groups
seeking justice and equality, especially activists of color in the US, and to a lesser but significant
degree with a broader audience of younger liberal and leftist Americans, including many young
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Jewish American racial justice activists who are increasingly joining the movement for BDS and
Palestinian rights (Maltz; Omer, Days of Awe; Sunshine; Waxman, Trouble). To increase the
resonance of pro-BDS discourse with other potentially-receptive audiences, however, BDS
activist-rhetors could more explicitly express empathy with Jewish fears of antisemitism and
clarify certain controversial BDS goals and demands (e.g., the “right of return”) to make proBDS discourse more resonant and persuasive for a wider liberal-leaning audience who are more
likely to have encountered the doxa that BDS is antisemitic. Such a strategy could help some
Jewish and non-Jewish audiences transcend the affective obstacles and predictable uptakes that
often hamper receptiveness to pro-BDS framing and promote more productive discussions about
BDS and Palestinian rights (Abraham, “Reluctant”; Bawarshi).
As I have done in this project, combining framing analysis with rhetorical analysis can
help rhetoric scholars gain insight into social movement rhetors’ rhetorical moves to a degree
that traditional rhetorical analysis or sociological framing analysis alone may not. Combining
these two approaches offers scholars a chance to better understand not only how social
movement rhetors use rhetorical appeals and other available means of persuasion but also how
rhetors use framing to focus audiences’ attention and cognitively direct their understanding and
interpretation of an issue or event. Kuypers argues that rhetorical framing analysis is also
“particularly well-suited for determining the worldviews of those producing the discourse being
studied” as well as rhetoric’s impact, which is especially useful when examining controversial
discourse like that of the BDS movement and investigating challenging rhetorical situations like
the issue of Palestine/Israel (198, 182).
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BDS Framing Resonance with Audiences
Though it is impossible to determine the actual effectiveness of any rhetorical artifact
with certainty, it is useful to theorize about the probable effectiveness of discourse given the
rhetorical situation and intended audiences (Andrews 8). Many rhetoricians refer to this likely
effectiveness as “fitness,” while frame analysts often refer to this as frame “resonance” (Andrews
54; Benford and Snow 619-622; Hauser, Introduction 57-60). Rather than trying to pin down
how rhetorically effective a text is, Andrews argues that rhetorical critics have traditionally
“sought to interpret a speech by assessing the ways in which the data show that the speaker has
identified his or her rhetorical problems and opportunities and has adapted the materials of the
speech to meet these circumstances” (55). According to Hauser, “Fitting responses are ones that
accommodate audience interests and ability to mediate change while addressing the controlling
exigence. . . Ultimately, for a fitting response to be a satisfying one, it must intersect with the
values, ethics, and personal commitments of both rhetor and audience” (Introduction 60). Social
movement theorists Benford and Snow argue that frame resonance can be determined by
“credibility of the proffered frame and its relative salience,” while “The credibility of any
framing is a function of three factors: frame consistency, empirical credibility, and credibility of
the frame articulators or claimsmakers” (619). Even though Benford and Snow’s model of frame
resonance overlooks some elements of the rhetorical situation or ecology that rhetorical scholars
would deem important for determining rhetorical fitness, their emphasis on the perceived
credibility or ethos of movement rhetors seems relevant to determining the resonance of BDS
movement rhetorical framing strategies. This criteria emphasizing rhetors’ credibility also
demonstrates the significance of the rhetorical obstacle posed by the doxa that the BDS
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movement is antisemitic, which may undermine the resonance of BDS movement framing for
certain audiences for whom this doxa remains entrenched and resistant to change.
Ascertaining the probable effectiveness or fitness of vernacular social movement rhetoric
can be especially difficult because, in some cases, vernacular social movement discourse is often
intended to be more indirect than official movement discourse. As Hauser and McClellan
explain, “Vernacular rhetoric aimed at resistance seldom is intended to persuade its apparent
target” because “those with power do not relinquish it willingly” (Hauser and McClellan 40).
Hauser and McClellan reference Habermas to further argue that vernacular resistance rhetoric
“requires gaining majority support in order to create a legitimation crisis,” but official social
movement rhetors also often use this same strategy, including Martin Luther King Jr. in his
“Letter From a Birmingham Jail,” which is referenced by Hauser and McClellan (40). Thus,
determining the probable effectiveness of rhetorical acts, otherwise referred to as “fitness” or
“resonance,” including for BDS movement discourse, requires examining elements of the
rhetorical situation, including audience beliefs and values, and using qualitative data to make an
argument for the likelihood of audiences responding to social movement discourse the way
official and vernacular activist-rhetors intend.
Even though the overall effectiveness of rhetoric and discourse is very difficult to
ascertain with any certainty, the results of my analysis suggest that the framing strategies of both
official and vernacular activist-rhetors seem to be most resonant with other social and racial
justice activists who value intersectionality, antiracism, anti-colonialism, and joint struggle—
values that most BDS activists share and that overlap with pro-BDS framing strategies. This
resonance is in line with Brysk’s study of human rights campaign discourse showing that other
oppressed or formerly oppressed groups are often the best audiences for human rights discourse:
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“Disparate groups can become an ongoing attentive constituency for the claims of others who
have experienced a similar genre of suffering or defend a common principle. . . Previously
persecuted groups become attentive and receptive to current victims through the projection of a
bridging narrative” (164). In the case of the BDS movement, the frequent emphasis on
intersectionality and joint struggle, and the common use of analogies to other antiracist and civil
rights movements that appear regularly in both official and vernacular pro-BDS texts (e.g., South
Africa, US civil rights movement, etc.) may help function as a bridging narrative that appeals to
members of other marginalized groups who may have experienced similar forms of oppression,
making them a receptive audience to pro-BDS discourse (Brysk 169). Both official and
vernacular pro-BDS rhetors also regularly use frames that invoke the struggle for black liberation
and civil rights, including through statements of solidarity with Black Lives Matter and against
police brutality, #Ferguson2Palestine, analogies to the US civil rights movement and the South
African anti-apartheid movement, statements emphasizing the importance of intersectionality,
etc. These framing strategies by pro-BDS rhetors also help increase the resonance of BDS
framing for black audiences and others who value intersectionality as a principle for activism
and organizing. The presence of many students of color in pro-BDS student groups like SJP and
SAIA and the support for BDS from black antiracist activists and the Movement for Black Lives
also attests to the resonance of these frames as well (Bailey and Petersen-Smith; Movement for
Black Lives; Erakat and Hill; “Freedom is the Future”).
Other audiences that pro-BDS framing strategies are likely to resonate with include
indigenous victims of settler colonialism and progressive audiences in the West who sympathize
with other struggles for justice and equality. As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, BDS movement
statements in support of other indigenous struggles, including the Standing Rock #NoDAPL
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protests against the Dakota Access Pipeline in 2017, along with the frequent emphasis by proBDS activists on the commonalities between Israeli policy and other settler-colonial societies
(e.g. many BNC statements, Barghouti texts, and IAW events like the SAIA discussion about
settler colonialism), would likely encourage people with similar concerns to identify with the
BDS movement. In addition to functioning as a rhetorical Burkean identification and division
process and a form of Brysk’s “bridging narrative,” such pro-BDS rhetorical framing strategies
focusing on common values and situations of oppression and colonialism also work as “frame
alignment” processes, including “frame bridging,” a framing strategy which seeks to connect and
mobilize groups and individuals with similar values and ideology with a particular social
movement; in this case, connecting other people concerned with social and racial justice and
anti-colonial struggle with the BDS movement for Palestinian rights (Benford and Snow 624;
Snow et al. 467-469). The growing support for Palestinian rights and BDS is also evidenced by
the many diverse signatories to the pro-BDS “Freedom is the Future” campaign launched in 2019
by the US Campaign for Palestinian Rights (USCPR) and the Adalah Justice Project, which
include several social and racial justice organizations, along with various other indigenous rights,
faith-based, and anti-war groups. Thus, in addition to resonating with other victims of
oppression, pro-BDS discourse can also resonate with audiences who share certain values and
have supported similar struggles for justice in the past, such as the South African anti-apartheid
struggle, the US civil rights movement, Black Lives Matter, #NoDAPL/Standing Rock,
immigrant rights struggles, etc.
Moreover, Arab, Muslims, and liberal and leftist Jews who value social justice above
Zionism may also be receptive audiences for pro-BDS discourse. For other Arabs and Muslims,
sympathizing with the Palestinians likely requires less rhetorical effort on the part of pro-BDS
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activists because many Muslims and Arabs may identify with Palestinians at the level of shared
identity. The values of democracy, freedom, and justice promoted by pro-BDS framing also
likely resonate with Arab and Muslim audiences who were part of the Arab Spring or who were
inspired by it. Unlike some earlier pro-Palestinian discourse that often drew on Islamic texts and
history to argue for Palestinian rights, official and vernacular BDS movement texts present a
secular view of the situation in Palestine/Israel and lack Islamic religious appeals, even though
many Muslims support BDS (Rowland and Frank; Mishal and Aharoni). This secular focus of
pro-BDS discourse and framing may also help promote its acceptance among secular audiences
who may hold conscious or unconscious Islamophobic beliefs.
In regard to Israeli and diaspora Jews, the recent and rapid growth of Jewish social justice
organizations that support the struggle for Palestinians rights like Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP),
Jews for Racial and Economic Justice (JFREJ), the anti-Occupation groups IfNotNow (INN), the
Center for Jewish Nonviolence (CJNV), the All That’s Left collective, and non-Zionist
synagogues like Tzedek Chicago, along with recent polling data showing increasing criticism of
Israel and sympathy for the Palestinians among younger and non-Orthodox American Jews,
suggest that many American Jews, especially among younger generations, find resonance in the
values and frames promoted by the BDS movement, even in spite of the prevalent doxa held by
some Jews and others that BDS is antisemitic28 (Beinart, The Crisis, “How to Stop,” “What the
28

Among recent polls that show a loss of support for Israel among younger generations of American Jews, a 2016
Brand Israel Group (BIG) study, “Sounding the Alarm: The American-Israeli Relationship,” showed that between
2010 and 2016, on the question of whether they lean toward the Israeli side, Jewish college students dropped 27
percentage points, while at the same time, favorability toward the Palestinians increased by 18% (Borschel-Dan;
Ziri). Based on recent polls like these, in 2018, the leader of the Jewish Agency warned that younger American Jews
increasingly view Israel as being not aligned with liberal values (Maltz, “Young American”). Omer and Waxman
both cite a 2013 Pew study showing that fewer Jewish Americans reported a strong attachment to Israel than in
earlier surveys and that younger American Jews report lower levels of support for Israel and higher levels of support
for Palestinians to support their arguments that many younger and more liberal American Jews are moving away
from support for Israel and toward solidarity with Palestinians (Omer, Days of Awe 19-20; Waxman, “Young
American”; “A Portrait”). Weisman also notes the growing divide between American and Israeli Jews based on not
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AJC Poll”; Borschel-Dan; Goldberg, Michelle; Maltz; Omer, Days of Awe; “A Portrait”;
Sunshine; Waxman, Trouble; Telhami, “Americans Are”; “Young Americans”; Weisman; Ziri).
It is likely that pro-BDS rhetors’ many statements denouncing antisemitism and supporting
inclusion and intersectionality have helped to make pro-BDS rhetoric more appealing and
resonant with these audiences as well. In addition to BDS framing, however, it may be that
shifting elements of the rhetorical ecology for BDS discourse have also played a big role in
making BDS more attractive to Jewish audiences. For example, many recent events have eroded
the previously bipartisan support for Israel, including Trump’s election and his support for proIsrael Christian Zionist policies, the rise of far-right antisemitism and violence like the Tree of
Life synagogue shooting, the Israeli government’s increasing right-ward shift under Netanyahu,
and the growing visibility of pro-Palestinian voices through social media and now in the US
Congress with the election of Democrats Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar, etc. Moreover, it is
becoming more common for liberal and left-leaning Americans, including American Jews, to
criticize Israel’s policies even if they don’t support BDS (e.g. especially Bernie Sanders’
critiques of Israeli policy beginning during the 2016 primary and continuing in 2019 and 2020)
(Sanders). This increasing openness to criticize Israel in the US public sphere may, in turn,

only recent poll results but also attitudes toward President Trump and his policies toward Israel that are favored by
Israelis but criticized by American Jews to argue that Israeli and American Jews are “headed for a messy break up”
(Weisman). A 2018 Pew study, though it didn’t focus on Jewish attitudes, also showed a growing partisan split
between Republicans and Democrats in their support for Israel, with Democratic support for Israel dropping
significantly in recent years; other 2018 polls showed similar findings (“Republicans and Democrats”; Telhami,
“Americans Are”). There has been some debate about the accuracy of some of these polls, especially in light of a
recent Gallup Poll from 2019 that indicated a stronger level of support for Israel among Americans and American
Jews, but some critics point to the wording of questions, the order of questions, the higher percentage of
Republicans in the Gallup sample, and other factors as possibly accounting for the discrepancies (Adkins; Wittes
and Shapiro).
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encourage more open-mindedness among many liberal Americans, including Jews and non-Jews,
toward the BDS movement and its framing29.
Many American Jews who support BDS or otherwise support Palestinian rights and
harshly criticize Israel have expressed frustration that the relationship between criticism of Israel
and antisemitism is being distorted by recent public discourse and antisemitism charges against
supporters of Palestinian rights, including the BDS movement. Some specific issues that Jewish
supporters of Palestinian rights have called attention to include the confusion over the meaning
of antisemitism that arises when Israel claims to speak for all Jews, when unfounded charges of
antisemitism against the BDS movement and critics of Israel serve to weaken the popular
understanding of antisemitism in an era in which far-right white supremacist antisemitic violence
is on the rise, and when right-wing governments around the world (including the Trump
administration, Orban in Hungary, etc.) seek to distract from their connections to far-right
antisemitism by touting their support for Israel (Bennis; Omer, Days of Awe 19-22, 48, 55;
“Jewish Scholars”; Gessen). For example, over one hundred Jewish scholars wrote an open letter
to The Trump administration’s Education Secretary, Betsy DeVos, to protest the Education
Department’s threats to withhold federal funding for the joint Duke-UNC Consortium for Middle
East Studies program, which had been charged with antisemitism by the Education Department
(“Jewish Scholars”; Meckler and Strauss). In their letter, these scholars emphasized their

29

A recent 2019 poll by the American Jewish Committee (AJC) sheds light on American Jews’ attitudes toward
BDS and reveals that most American Jews do not actually believe that the BDS movement is antisemitic (Beinart,
“What the AJC Poll”; American Jewish Committee, “AJC Survey”). The AJC, a mainstream pro-Israel Jewish
organization, asked American Jews about BDS and found that 35% of American Jews reported believing that BDS
is “mostly anti-Semitic” and 47% reported that the BDS movement has at least “some anti-Semitic supporters,” a
claim which Beinart describes as an “essentially meaningless formulation since many American Jews would likely
say that the Republican and Democratic parties have ‘some anti-Semitic supporters’ too” (Beinart, “What the AJC
Poll”; American Jewish Committee, “AJC Survey”).
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frustration with what they perceive as the Trump administration’s attempts to take advantage of
Jewish fears of antisemitism to suppress free speech:
In particular, we take issue with how your letter to Duke and UNC justified its
investigation by exploiting Jewish fears of anti-Semitism. This move fits within a clear
pattern of the Trump administration using Jews and our concerns over anti-Semitism in
order to try and justify repressive policies. We take great offense at this cynical
weaponization of our historical trauma, particularly as anti-Semitic attacks on Jews have
skyrocketed since Trump came into office. (“Jewish Scholars”)
Many American Jews have been openly critical of Trump administration policies and
attempts to suppress free speech and activism for Palestinian rights, but some of them may not
necessarily support the BDS movement itself even as they support Americans’ right to boycott
and harshly criticize Israel without being accused of antisemitism (Dias et al.; Sanders). Polls
and anecdotal accounts suggest, however, that increasing numbers of American Jews are moving
beyond criticism of Israel and support for the right to boycott to outright BDS support and even
anti-Zionism. As Omer discusses in depth in Days of Awe, many Jewish anti-Zionists and
Palestinian solidarity activists are redefining their Jewish identity through solidarity with
Palestinians and other movements for justice—rather than through Zionism and support for Israel
(Days of Awe). This trend is also evidenced by JVP’s recent 2019 decision to take a public stand
against Zionism (Jewish Voice for Peace, “Our Approach”). Even though Jewish anti-Zionists
and supporters of BDS remain a minority among diaspora Jews, their numbers are growing
rapidly, especially among younger generations, which suggests that if this trend continues,
increasing numbers of American and diaspora Jews may eventually support BDS or at least
become more open-minded to pro-BDS framing.
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Despite both official and vernacular pro-BDS activist-rhetors regular statements that
denounce antisemitism, promote antiracism, and carefully distinguish between Israeli oppression
of Palestinians and the Jewish people, another audience for whom pro-BDS discourse may
sometimes unfortunately resonate includes people that hold antisemitic attitudes. Certain subjects
and frames related to Palestine/Israel may seem to overlap with antisemitic tropes about Jewish
power, including discussions of “the Israel lobby” and pro-Israel media bias, and thus could
resonate with people who hold antisemitic beliefs about Jewish power and control—despite proBDS rhetors’ repeated attempts to counter such attitudes, which I observed on multiple occasions
during the course of my study30 (e.g. SAIA leader’s rebuttal of a statement about Israel
controlling the US, multiple BNC and Barghouti statement denouncing antisemitism, etc.).
Antisemitic tropes reflecting hatred and stereotypes about Jews have been common for hundreds
of years, primarily in Europe but also spreading around the world as popular conspiracy theories
via the internet in recent years. These antisemitic tropes have developed over time to paint
Jews—and sometimes also “Zionists” or the state of Israel as stand-ins for Jews—as being
demonic or conspiring to control the world. These tropes also include “a host of related and
unrelated manifestations, piling charges including being cosmopolitan, usurer, capitalist,
socialist, communist, arrogant, coward, and parasite” (Kiewe 62).
30

The “Israel lobby” is one topic that often generates backlash and accusations of antisemitism because it can
appear to suggest a nefarious conspiracy similar to those found in The Protocols. The controversy surrounding Ilhan
Omar’s critiques of AIPAC in 2019 are one example of how this topic can trigger affective reactions to audiences
sensitive to antisemitism (Barkan). Abraham argues that rhetoricians can play a role in helping to come up with
“creative ways to conduct discussions about the Israel Lobby” that are “within good-faith frameworks free of
accusation, hyperbole, and name-calling” (“Conclusion” 187). While developing more precise and non-hyperbolic
explanations of what activists mean by “the lobby” could avoid triggering as strong of a backlash, activists and other
individuals who are targeted by pro-Israel public relations organizations, lobbying organizations and PACs (e.g.
AIPAC and NORPAC), blacklists (e.g. Canary Mission and the AMCHA Initiative), “lawfare,” pressure groups, and
bad-faith public criticism need a way to talk about their experiences and develop appropriate and effective strategies
to respond to such attacks (Occupation of the American Mind; Omer, Days of Awe 30-31; “Watch the Film”).
Finding the balance between legitimate good-faith critiques of the lobby and other sensitive topics that may appear
to echo antisemitic tropes is a challenge for both pro-BDS rhetors and BDS critics (see Chapter 4 for more
discussion of how the Israel lobby frame is used by Omar Barghouti).
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While antisemitic discourse is not part of official BDS movement rhetoric, nor was it a
significant feature of the vernacular pro-BDS discourse I studied, some people holding
antisemitic attitudes can be drawn to support BDS for the wrong reasons. In many cases, BDS
movement leaders and pro-BDS student activists have publicly denounced individuals who
espouse such views and who have participated in pro-BDS or Palestinian solidarity activism
(Abunimah, “A Final Word,” “Palestinian Writers”; Abunimah and Ibish; “Granting No
Quarter”; Goldstein; Pessah; Soske and Jacobs 11; Palestinian BDS National Committee,
“Palestinian BDS”). Unfortunately for the BDS movement, however, even a small minority of
antisemitic individuals and statements associated with BDS support are used by Israel’s
advocates as examples to undermine the ethos of the BDS movement as a whole and reinforce
the doxa that BDS is antisemitic because many BDS critics “take the actions of a few extremists
and use them to reflect an entire movement (El-Husseini; The New Anti-Semites). Despite the
presence of individuals who have espoused extremely anti-Palestinian and Islamophobic
statements and attitudes among supporters of Israel, including even some members of the Israeli
government, this same generalization is not as commonly applied to Israel’s supporters or
Zionists as a whole (Aked, The Undeniable; Barghouti, Boycott 42-44; Bazian; Salaita, AntiArab 142-144, Uncivil Rites 15-16, Condemnation; Tesler; Tharoor, “Israel’s New”).
This apparent double-standard regarding generalizations about bigotry’s role in the BDS
movement versus pro-Israel advocacy recalls Ibram X. Kendi’s discussion of the way racist ideas
manifest in discourse through “individualizing White negativity and generalizing Black
negativity” (42-43). He further argues that, “Negative behavior by any Black person became
proof of what was wrong with Black people, while negative behavior by any White person only
proved what was wrong with that person” (43). If we substitute “BDS supporter” for “Black” and
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“Israel supporter” for “White,” then his argument can also apply to the way BDS is tarred with
the brush of antisemitism while Israel and its supporters are not as readily associated with the
worst elements among them—a phenomenon that frequently happens whenever a significant
power imbalance leads to one group controlling the narrative.
Kendi’s thesis from his book Stamped from the Beginning may also be relevant to the
way Orientalist and Islamophobic anti-Palestinian discourse has adapted over time from the
earliest days of Zionist immigration to Palestine until now. Much like the way racist discourses
about black people were developed and transformed throughout the years to justify the
exploitation of black labor for profit rather than being the result of pre-existing hatred, antiPalestinian discourse can be traced to the Zionist need to expropriate land in Palestine in order to
establish a Jewish-majority state. Kendi argues that the production of racist ideas comes after the
initial discrimination and exploitation in order to justify the actions and policies that have been
deemed as necessary:
Their own racist ideas usually did not dictate the decisions of the most powerful
Americans when they instituted, defended, and tolerated discriminatory policies that
affected millions of Black lives over the course of American history. Racially
discriminatory policies have usually sprung from economic, political, and cultural selfinterests . . . (9)
Much like how the racist tropes about black people evolved over time to justify continued
exploitation and racially discriminatory policies, Orientalist and Islamophobic tropes about
Palestinians have similarly evolved from them being portrayed as “barbaric” and “backward” in
the late colonial and early Zionist era, to later stereotypes about Palestinians as “terrorists” who
“only understand violence,” to more recent assertions that even the nonviolent BDS movement
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for Palestinians rights is an antisemitic “war” to “destroy Israel.” This pattern of evolving racist
discourse as described by Kendi can also be seen in the relatively recent emergence of virulent
antisemitism in the Arab and Muslim world, which was uncommon prior to the advent of
Zionism and grew mostly after the founding of Israel in the heart of the Middle East (Kiewe 6668). For example, Muslims have long considered Jews to be protected “People of the Book” who
were allowed to practice their religion openly in Muslim countries (unlike in Christian Europe),
but the emergence of conflict between Arab Muslims and Jewish Zionists led some Muslims to
reinterpret minor verses in the Quran in an antisemitic way—verses that did not previously
inspire Jew-hatred; likewise, antisemitic tropes common in Christian antisemitism were also
imported into the region where Israel’s presence and wars with her neighbors had already
exacerbated tensions (Kiewe 68-69). This emergence of Muslim antisemitism may also lead
some Muslims to support BDS as a way to isolate Israel for the wrong reasons, but, again, just
because some antisemites support BDS does not indicate that BDS is inherently antisemitic
movement, nor does it suggest that most Muslim supporters of BDS are motivated by
antisemitism. In fact, some elements of BDS discourse may serve to tamp down on some
supporters’ pre-existing antisemitism via pro-BDS texts that openly denounce antisemitism,
refrain from demonizing Israel, and present Israel’s settler-colonial policies not as uniquely evil,
but instead portray Israel as one of several settler colonies that operates within a global system of
capitalist exploitation and US hegemony.
Limitations on Pro-BDS Frame Resonance
Even though pro-BDS framing strategies and rhetorical moves seem to resonate strongly
with the values and experiences of social and racial justice activists and people from other
marginalized and oppressed groups, some other audiences are not yet persuaded. More
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mainstream Western and US audiences continue to be particularly sensitive to antisemitism,
especially since the post-WWII era, and these audiences may have a harder time accepting proBDS framing of Palestine/Israel, including the right of return, opposition to Zionism, and
framing that depicts the Jewish state as an oppressor rather than the more familiar historical
victim. Orientalist, Islamophobic, and anti-Palestinian doxa and bigotry, which have been even
more common in the post-9/11 era, also play a part in audiences’ resistance to accept pro-BDS
framing. Moreover, these attitudes also contribute to the doxa of the BDS movement being an
antisemitic attempt to “destroy Israel,” which adds another significant rhetorical obstacle for the
BDS movement to overcome. Audiences for whom pro-BDS rhetorical framing is unlikely to
resonate with and to whom BDS activist-rhetors are thus also unlikely to target include rightwing Zionists, including the current majority of Jews in Israel and conservative Christian
Evangelical Zionists who usually support the Republican party (Goldman, Samuel). For many of
these right-wing Zionists (both Jews and Christians), the Bible dictates Jewish control of the
whole of Palestine, making it unlikely that these audiences would ever be open to pro-BDS
discourse (Illing).
While analogies to other movements for human rights and social justice can serve as
bridging narratives to help pro-BDS discourse resonate with audiences of formerly oppressed
people and those who value social justice and intersectionality, connecting the Palestinian
struggle and BDS to the former oppression of Jewish people in pro-BDS appeals may have more
mixed results. For example, while many Jewish people report that reflecting on the history of
Jewish oppression led them to supporting Palestinian rights (Omer, Days of Awe 20-21,
“Refiguring”), referencing Nazi persecution of Jews in the context of Israel’s treatment of
Palestinians is also considered offensive to many other Jews. In discussions of the “new anti-
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Semitism,” some BDS critics argue that comparing Israel to Nazis in any way is a sign of
antisemitism, even though such comparisons are not uncommon for Jewish critics of Israel
(“Antisemitism Then”; Barghouti, Boycott 12-14; Rosenfeld 8, 13; “Working Definition”; The
New Anti-Semites; Gessen). Though Nazi analogies were uncommon in the pro-BDS discourse I
studied, there were a handful of times that the BNC or Omar Barghouti raised Nazi analogies in
the context of Israeli human rights violations (Barghouti, Boycott 13). In each of these few
instances, however, the BNC and Barghouti make such comparisons only to pre-Holocaust Nazi
discrimination against Jews, and they also only do so by quoting Jews or Israelis, never
suggesting such comparisons themselves in the absence of a quote from a prominent Jewish
individual. This careful use of quotes from Jewish critics, however, may not resonate with some
Jewish (and non-Jewish) audiences who may instead respond to any mention of Nazis in the
context of Palestine/Israel with powerful affective uptakes that may reinforce the doxa that BDS
is antisemitic (Abraham, “Reluctant Rhetoricians” 37-38; Bawarshi 13).
The counterframing by BDS opponents and supporters of Israel that the BDS movement
is antisemitic poses a significant rhetorical obstacle to the acceptance of pro-BDS framing by
some audiences. According to Benford and Snow, successful “counterframing” by opponents
“can affect a movement's framings, on the one hand, by putting movement activists on the
defensive, at least temporarily, and, on the other hand, by frequently forcing it to develop and
elaborate prognoses more clearly than otherwise might have been the case” (617). Thus, because
BDS critics and Israel advocates have been successful at counterframing that perpetuates the
doxa of the BDS movement as antisemitic, pro-BDS rhetors and the BDS movement as a whole
are forced to respond to antisemitism charges and adjust their discourse to a degree that goes
beyond what is required of most other human rights and racial justice movements. Such a
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requirement may not only undermine the ethos of pro-BDS rhetors but also distracts from proBDS framing of the situation in Palestine/Israel, which seems to be the intention of some proIsrael “hasbara” organizations that seek to steer public discourse toward support for Israel and
away from discussions of Palestinian rights, groups which include The Israel Project,
StandWithUs, Campus Watch, Canary Mission, the Adelson-funded Maccabee Task Force,
StopAntiSemitism.org, and others. (“Watch the Film”; Occupation of the American Mind;
Cortellessa; The New Anti-Semites).
Mainstream Democrats and liberals in the US, along with their counterparts in Europe,
also seem unlikely to fully embrace pro-BDS framing in the near future, though there are some
signs that this could be changing. For example, 2016 US presidential candidate Hillary Clinton
expressed disdain for the BDS movement and vowed to fight against BDS at every opportunity
during the presidential election (Wofford). Despite some tepid criticism of Israel and hopes that
he would do more to hold Israel accountable early in his presidency, Barack Obama also
demonstrated his support for Israel above the Palestinians on many occasions, speaking before
AIPAC and negotiating the largest military aid package for Israel in US history (Kahl;
Spetalnick). Other prominent Democratic politicians have also criticized BDS, expressed support
for Israel, and even co-sponsored anti-BDS legislation like S.720, the US Senate’s Israel antiBoycott Act, including Ben Cardin, Chuck Schumer, and former Senator Claire McCaskill,
despite the ACLU’s position that the bill violates the First Amendment (Cardin; Hauss). Even
left-leaning liberals like Bernie Sanders, even though he has been increasingly critical of Israeli
policies and the Netanyahu government in recent years, have criticized BDS and the UN for
unfairly singling out Israel (Brown). Some Israel critics have argued that mainstream Democratic
support for Israel, especially in recent years, is often tied to the influence of AIPAC and a
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handful of top Democratic donors with strong pro-Israel views, including Haim Saban, who
contribute large sums to many Democratic politicians, including $15 million to Hillary Clinton’s
2016 presidential campaign (Bruck; “Haim Saban”; Emmons). Considering that the US political
campaign system is tied to the ability to fundraise and attract donations, small numbers of large
donors can have outsized influence over politicians’ positions, which in turn may promote
support for Israel among mainstream Democrats—support that is reinforced when well-known
politicians like Obama and Clinton repeat pro-Israel framing.
As Republican support for Israel has increased during the Trump era, however,
Democratic attitudes toward Israel are worsening, perhaps partly in response to Trump and partly
thanks to the success of pro-BDS framing. Recent polls indicate increasing support among
Democrats for Palestinians and decreasing support for Israel (Nathan-Kazis, “Report”;
“Republicans and Democrats”; Tibon; Telhami, “Americans Are”). For example, an October
2019 University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll by Shibly Telhami at the Brookings
Institution’s Center for Middle East Policy found that American audiences’ attitudes toward BDS
were heavily dependent on party affiliation, with the vast majority of Democratic respondents
reporting being neutral or supportive of BDS with only 15% of Democrats opposing it, with the
reverse findings for Republicans (76% opposed and only 20% supportive or neutral) (Telhami,
“American Attitudes”). This same poll also found that 77% of Democratic respondents who had
previous heard of BDS agreed with the following statement: “BDS is a legitimate, peaceful way
of opposing Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. Inspired by the South African antiapartheid movement, BDS urges action to pressure Israel to comply with international law.
Opposing Israeli policy does not equal anti-Semitism” (Telhami, “American Attitudes”). This
poll further found that state and federal efforts to implement anti-BDS legislation are not
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representative of American public opinion. Wide majorities among all respondents, including
62% of Republicans and 80% of Democrats (and 72% overall) were opposed to anti-BDS
legislation and instead agreed with this statement: “We should OPPOSE laws that penalize
people who boycott Israel because these laws infringe on the Constitutional right to free speech
and peaceful protest” (Telhami, “American Attitudes”). While it is impossible to attribute the
precise causes of these shifts in public opinion, as liberals and Democrats express more
sympathy with Palestinians and less with Israel, and as support for BDS—or at least the right to
boycott Israel—increases despite pro-Israel framing against BDS, then it becomes more likely
that liberal audiences will increasingly become more receptive to pro-BDS framing as well.
The Role of Transference, Belatedness, and Affect
While pro-BDS rhetorical moves and framing strategies often resonate with Jews and
non-Jews who highly value social and racial justice and who see Jewish history as evidence for
why oppression of anyone should never be tolerated, many liberal Zionists may be put off by the
doxa of BDS as antisemitic and therefore suspicious of any calls for Palestinian rights, and
especially those that do not definitively embrace the necessity of Jewish self-determination in the
form of a two-state solution. Abraham argues that even when rhetors advocating for Palestinian
rights take care to avoid and denounce antisemitic discourse, sometimes criticism of Israel can
lead some audiences to assume nefarious and antisemitic intent, even when there is none
(Abraham, “Reluctant Rhetoricians” 45). Abraham further argues that this conflation of criticism
of Israel with antisemitism at least partly results from the effects of transference, belatedness,
and affect, which Abraham argues are “applicable to understanding the hidden energies and
psychological forces at work in our argumentative dynamics about the Israel-Palestine conflict”
(Abraham, “Reluctant Rhetoricians” 37-38). Related to Abraham’s argument, Bawarshi argues
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that affective responses to discussions of Palestine/Israel can lead to what he calls “uptake
memory”: “Uptakes have memories in the sense that they are learned recognitions and
inclinations that, over time and through ideological reproduction, become habitual. Our uptake
memory is what we bring to a rhetorical encounter, and it is what helps us select from, define,
and make sense of that encounter” (13). Related to Bawarshi’s concept of the rhetorical obstacle
posed by “uptake” memories, Abraham further explains how transference, belatedness and affect
can influence how many people, including Jews and some non-Jews as well, to reflexively reach
back to distant history when discussing present realities: “When one speaks of Jewish History,
the Jewish People, or Jewish suffering, there is a tendency to lump a good bit of history
together,” which “enables a conflation of memory, whereby supposed threats to Jewish memory
in the present seemingly enable one to reach for events from the past, as part of an effort to
suture together. . . a rather fragmented history” (Abraham, “Reluctant Rhetoricians” 35). Frank
echoes Abraham and Bawarshi when he describes how discussions of Palestine/Israel often get
sidetracked “by traumas expressed in transhistoric terms. . . The difference between the past and
present is collapsed, and no critical space is allowed between the historic trauma and the present”
(Frank 133-134). Thus, pro-BDS discourse critical of Israeli policy may end up triggering uptake
memory even when pro-BDS rhetors take care to denounce antisemitism and avoid demonizing
Israel through their language choices.
Abraham explains how this rhetorical and psychological process can lead to flawed
perceptions of antisemitism: “If one suggests that Israel has engaged in immoral or illegal
conduct in its dealings with the Palestinians, due to this affective dimension whereby to criticize
Israel is to somehow criticize the Jewish people, one is likely to be constructed as issuing an
indictment of Jews, even if one goes to great lengths to insist that this is not what one is doing”
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(Abraham, “Reluctant Rhetoricians” 45). Abraham thus explains not only how the doxa of BDS
as antisemitic functions as a rhetorical obstacle for BDS activists to overcome, but he also
provides some insight into how this doxa came to be in the first place: because many supporters
of Israel (including but not only Jews) reflexively assume that any harsh criticism of Israel may
be motivated by antisemitism, and so therefore the BDS movement, which focuses its criticism
on Israel, must also be motivated by antisemitism.
The effects of transference, affect, and belatedness described by Abraham may also
demonstrate one possible reason why so many Israel supporters and liberal Zionists argue that
the “right of return” for Palestinian refugees would necessarily mean the “destruction” of Israel
and the end of Jewish self-determination (Reut Institute, “Building a Political” 13-14; Rosenfeld;
StandWithUs). Abraham explains how many BDS critics perceive calls for the “right of return”
as attacks on Israel’s existence that are therefore antisemitic:
Since the claims these Palestinian refugees make upon Israel involve providing redress
for dispossession and ultimately a return to Israel, which would disturb Israel’s
demography as a Jewish state, these claims are often characterized as threatening Israel’s
existence. In other words, any political action or statement that makes a gesture toward
disturbing Israel’s Jewish character seems to become configured—by definition—as antiSemitic. (Abraham, “Reluctant Rhetoricians” 41)
Another reason that discussions of refugee rights and the right of return generate so much
controversy and affective uptakes among audiences sympathetic to Israel is that many people
assume that the right of return would mean millions of Palestinian refugees all returning to Israel
at once. Surveys of Palestinian refugees, however, suggest that when given a choice of returning
to Israel, a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, or a third country, less than half a
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million choose Israel, which suggests that if the “right of return” were implemented, it would
still leave Israel with a larger Jewish majority than the Jewish state had at the time of the 1947
UN partition plan before 700,000 Palestinians were expelled31 (Harms and Ferry 94-102; Morris
184, 222-259; Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, “Results”).
In addition to fears of the right of return, another related belief that serves as an obstacle
to the potential resonance of pro-BDS discourse is the view that anti-Zionism is inherently
antisemitic for unfairly singling out the Jewish people as the only people not deserving of the
right of self-determination (Reut Institute; StandWithUs; The New Anti-Semites). While most
Israel supporters see Zionism as the abstract right of the Jewish people to self-determination
(with no mention of Palestinians), most Palestinians and BDS activists see Zionism as a settlercolonial movement that ethnically cleansed the indigenous Palestinians to create a state that
continues to privilege Jews and oppress Palestinians. Because these two opposing views of
Zionism are so different, with Israel’s supporters viewing Zionism as an abstract idea while
many Palestinians and BDS activists view Zionism in terms of its material consequences, it can
lead to many misunderstandings in discussions of Palestine/Israel—misunderstandings that can
also trigger affective reactions and “uptake memories” that import the history of antisemitism
and Jewish victimhood into the discussion of a nationalist political ideology (Zionism) and its
concurrent policies (Abraham, “Conclusion,” “Recognizing,” “Reluctant”; Bawarshi).
Ways BDS Discourse Could Become More Resonant With a Wider Audience
The BDS movement’s framing and rhetorical strategies seem to resonate with the values
and beliefs of many social justice-focused audiences, and the BDS movement has made notable
achievements in recent years, including several high profile endorsements of BDS from
31

The 1947 UN Partition Plan allotted the Jewish state approximately 55% of the land of Mandate Palestine, which
would have included a population that was 45% Palestinian Arab (Morris 184, 252).
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university student governments, cancellations by musical performers, and the loss of corporate
partnerships, etc. (Barghouti, Boycott 19-31; “Impact”). However, pro-BDS framing also
continues to face rhetorical obstacles and counterframing from supporters of Israel who regularly
accuse the BDS movement of being antisemitic for targeting Israel and for promoting the “right
of return.” The persistence of the doxa of BDS as antisemitic can undermine the resonance of
BDS framing for mainstream audiences who are not already committed to intersectional social
and racial justice movements, including those in the mass media. Therefore, pro-BDS rhetorical
framing strategies—both official and vernacular—may become more resonant with these
audiences if they can more effectively address the issue of antisemitism and avoid triggering
uptake memories based on affect, belatedness, and transference (Abraham, “Reluctant
Rhetoricians”; Bawarshi). Expecting pro-BDS activists to devote a large portion of their time and
effort to directly addressing and rebutting the charge of antisemitism, while there is no guarantee
that doing so would prevent future charges (as can be seen in the antisemitism debate around
Corbyn’s Labour party in the UK and the repeated accusations against Ilhan Omar and Rashida
Tlaib in the US), would be unrealistic. Pro-BDS activist-rhetors could, however, consider
adjusting their discourse and responses to engage more productively with potential supporters
and wider audiences who are still sensitive to antisemitism.
For example, contemporary antisemitism scholar David Hirsh admits that most of the
antisemitic or borderline antisemitic statements that come from leftist supporters of Palestinian
rights and BDS are probably inadvertent and born more of ignorance of the nature of antisemitic
discourse rather than any conscious underlying Jew-hatred (Hirsh, “Anti-Zionism” 15, 70-71).
Thus, one step that pro-BDS activists could take is to be sure they are informed and educated
enough about antisemitic discourse to recognize it when they encounter it, so they can more
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quickly and effectively push back against it. Many pro-BDS rhetors already do this on a regular
basis, as I have observed in my research, but there may be instances in which some rank-and-file
BDS activists or supporters miss opportunities to respond and thus may appear to tolerate
antisemitic discourse. Hirsh also argues that the common tendency for most claims of
antisemitism against pro-Palestinian or pro-BDS activists to be automatically attributed to
deliberate bad-faith attempts to smear activists and silence all criticism of Israel, a phenomenon
he refers to as the “Livingstone Formulation” (named after former London mayor Ken
Livingstone), also serves to block potentially important discussions about Palestine/Israel and the
lingering effects of antisemitism (Hirsh, “Anti-Zionism” 54-62, 141-142).
On the other hand, some claims of antisemitism against the BDS movement and other
Palestinian solidarity activists are most likely made in order to circumvent legitimate discussions
and criticisms of Israeli policy, especially when originating from organizations whose primary
purpose is public relations on behalf of Israel (also known as “hasbara”) (Aked, The Undeniable;
Bazian; The Occupation of the American Mind; “Watch the Film”). It is also likely, however,
that many other claims of antisemitism arise from real fears based on uptakes triggered through
transference, belatedness, and affect rooted in conflating the historical persecution of Jews with
contemporary political realities. Thus, some antisemitism charges, especially those coming from
Jewish individuals, may be misplaced or inaccurate but yet come from a place of genuine fear
rather than a bad faith attempt to stifle criticism of Israel.
It is also true that some charges of antisemitism against BDS supporters are legitimate,
which is also evidenced by the fact that BDS activists themselves have repeatedly denounced
expressions of antisemitism or antisemitic individuals who profess support for Palestinian rights
or BDS, including in one case I witnessed during my IAW research (discussed in Chapter 5) and

242
in many other cases in which BDS leaders and pro-BDS organizations have publicly denounced
antisemitism or instances of antisemitic discourse, including statements made by supporters of
BDS or Palestinian rights (@AliAbunimah; Abunimah, “A Final Word,” “Palestinian Writers”;
Abunimah and Ibish; Barghouti, Boycott 33; Dann; Dysch; “Granting No Quarter”; Horowitz;
“Letter”; Pessah; Salaita, “Condemnation”; Serhan; Palestinian BDS National Committee,
“Palestinian BDS”; Wolf).
Therefore, it may be more effective and avoid triggering further affective uptakes if proBDS activist-rhetors were to respond to charges of antisemitism with more empathetic
acknowledgments of Jewish fears of antisemitism along with careful counterframing, rather than
resorting automatically to defensive assertions of bad-faith intent. This strategy is also similar to
recommendations from pro-Israel advocates and public relations specialists, including Frank
Luntz’s The Israel Project’s 2009 Global Language Dictionary, suggesting that empathetic
expressions of sorrow for Palestinian deaths followed by counterframing is the most effective
way for Israel advocates to respond to charges of Israeli human rights violations and war crimes
rather than angry defensive reactions (Luntz 4; The Occupation of the American Mind). For
example, even if there were no antisemitic intent behind a pro-BDS activist-rhetor’s statement,
that does not necessarily prevent some audience members from experiencing real feelings of fear
based on uptake memory connected to historical traumas. By first recognizing and
acknowledging the impact of historical trauma, pro-BDS rhetors may be able to coax some
audiences to be more open-minded to subsequent rhetorical framing strategies, which may also
help with counterframing against the doxa that BDS is antisemitic.
Several other scholars of antisemitism and Palestine/Israel discourse have made similar
arguments that acknowledging Jewish trauma in the context of Palestine/Israel could go a long
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way toward promoting the acceptance of the Palestinian narrative of suffering and thus also
encouraging support for Palestinian rights (Klug, “The Question”; Omer, “It’s Nothing”; Yi and
Phillips). This strategy also echoes Krista Ratcliffe’s calls for “rhetorical listening,” which she
defines as “a stance of openness that a person may choose to assume in relation to any person,
text, or culture,” including in the context of cross-cultural conversations (1). For example, Atalia
Omer argues that when Palestinian solidarity activists use a human rights framework that ignores
Jewish history, it “enables a de-contextualised attitude that erases the pertinence of recognising
and negotiating the boundaries and memories of (all) identities involved in conflict zones”
(Omer, “It’s Nothing” 513-514). Similarly, antisemitism scholar Brian Klug also suggests that
changes in the tone, word choice, and symbol use in discussions of Palestine/Israel can help
avoid accusations of antisemitism against Palestinian solidarity activists (Klug, “The Question,”
“What Do We Mean” 12-13). Klug suggests that not only is it important to acknowledge Jewish
history and antisemitism as relevant to the birth of Zionism, but that criticisms of Israel are more
effective and less likely to trigger fears of antisemitism when speakers “avoid words and images
that conjure up the negative stereotype of ‘the Jew’ and project it onto Israel or onto Jews in
general”; he also suggests that is more productive for both sides to avoid including Nazi and
Holocaust analogies in discussions of Palestine/Israel (Klug, “The Question”).
And just as both Abraham and Bawarshi cite Ratcliffe’s concept of “rhetorical listening,”
so too could a form of “rhetorical listening” be useful for BDS activist-rhetors. Listening to the
other side in order to understand another perspective does not imply that Palestinians or BDS
activists should change their demands for justice or give up any of their rights. Rather, if proBDS activists use rhetorical listening and expressions of empathy in discussions with BDS
critics, then they may find that these critics and other audiences observing such exchanges may
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be more likely to accept pro-BDS frames as well—or it could at least help to undermine some of
the fierce resistance to BDS. If BDS activist-rhetors applied more rhetorical listening toward
good-faith BDS skeptics, they could better avoid triggering affective uptake memories in some
audiences by acknowledging Jewish trauma, correcting misunderstandings about BDS, and
addressing the discrepant definitions of Zionism used by BDS activists and Israel advocates. For
example, Israel’s supporters usually define Zionism innocuously as a movement for Jewish selfdetermination, while the definition held by most Palestinians and BDS activists is that Zionism is
a discriminatory settler-colonial project. Thus, each side selects only the parts of Zionist
ideology and history that support one side’s perspective while ignoring other possible meanings
and experiences. Instead, it may be more productive—for both BDS activists and Israel’s
supporters—to acknowledge Zreik’s point that Zionism and Israel can be viewed as both a
liberation movement for self-determination for Jews fleeing persecution and a discriminatory
settler-colonial movement at the same time (Zreik 358-359). In some contexts, it could also be
helpful to explain the long history of Jewish anti- and non-Zionism dating back to the beginning
of the Zionist movement, including among Jewish Bundist socialists in Europe and elsewhere
(Butler, Parting; Rabkin; “Protest”; Omer, Days of Awe 5; Rose).
BDS activists need not accept the Zionist narrative and framing wholesale in order to
acknowledge the role of antisemitism in the history of Zionism. For example, in several pro-BDS
texts I studied, both official and vernacular BDS movement activist-rhetors acknowledge the
history of Jewish persecution in Europe and the horrors of the Holocaust (Abunimah,
“Palestinian Writers”; Barghouti, Boycott 68, 82, 89; Palestinian BDS National Committee,
“Remembering”). However, the official BDS movement website’s “What is BDS?” section on
“Israeli Settler Colonialism and Apartheid,” does not mention antisemitic persecution in Europe
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as an impetus for the Zionist movement in Europe (“Israeli Settler”). Overlooking this primary
motivator for Zionism could be counterproductive to the resonance of pro-BDS discourse for
wider audiences. Pro-BDS activists can still argue, as many Palestinians and anti-Zionist Jews
and others have done for many years, that Palestinians do not deserve to suffer and be denied
human rights and self-determination because of European antisemitic persecution in which they
played no role (Barghouti, Boycott 68; Harms and Ferry 83; Said, “Zionism” 17-18, 23-29;
Makdisi 287). If BDS activist-rhetors were to more consistently acknowledge Jewish history, it
could also serve as counterframing for charges of antisemitism against the BDS movement and
encourage wider audiences, including more Israeli and American Jews and non-Jews, to
acknowledge the Palestinian narrative and framing and be persuaded to support BDS and
Palestinian solidarity.
Many pro-BDS activist-rhetors already often use these strategies, but it’s possible that a
stronger focus on some of these issues could improve the resonance of BDS movement framing
for wider audiences, especially considering the unique rhetorical challenges pro-BDS rhetors
face. For example, Omar Barghouti himself has argued repeatedly that BDS activists should be
careful with their language use and avoid antisemitic discourse in support of Palestinian rights
(Barghouti, Boycott 33, “Two Degrees” 144; “Granting No Quarter”). Barghouti’s discussion of
antisemitism in JVP’s book, On Antisemitism, explains his view on how to address antisemitism
in relation to the BDS movement for Palestinian rights:
Sometimes associating Israel with stereotypical attributes that are associated with Jews is
antisemitic. Sometimes it may not be. Regardless, and given the hurt that verging on
antisemitic language causes to Jewish communities, we who advocate for Palestinian
rights must be quite vigilant about using such language and must try our best to adhere to
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the most accurate, non-emotive description of the facts as possible. (Barghouti, “Two
Degrees” 144)
Barghouti later goes on to argue, as he does on many other occasions as well, that,
“Antisemitism has no place in the worldwide Palestine solidarity movement, including BDS.
This is a principled position and there can be no compromise over it” (“Two Degrees” 151). As
mentioned earlier, the first step in ensuring that antisemitism doesn’t appear in pro-BDS
discourse is for BDS activists to educate each other on what constitutes antisemitic discourse so
they can recognize it when they see it, as suggested by both Hirsh and Klug. Education is also
important because many Americans, especially non-Jews, are often unaware of the nature and
content of antisemitic discourse (Hirsh).
Once an activist is able to recognize when harsh criticism of Israel crosses the line into
antisemitism, it can become tricky, however, for BDS movement leaders and more rank-and-file
activists to determine when an antisemitic or borderline antisemitic statement is worth
addressing. It would be impossible to respond to every antisemitic statements from all fringe
supporters of Palestinian rights, especially when extremist views on many issues are easy to find
online (which is also the case among Israel’s supporters). Such an unrealistic expectation for
BDS leaders to respond to all instances of antisemitic speech would also not as readily be applied
to the leaders of other social or political movements. Demanding that BDS leaders or
Palestinians repeatedly denounce antisemitism also echoes the Islamophobic demand for
Muslims to denounce terrorism. Thus, BDS leaders and activists must continue to constantly and
carefully navigate this sticky rhetorical ecology to avoid antisemitic discourse while focusing
their rhetorical framing strategies and efforts on arguing for Palestinian rights and against
continuing Israeli oppression.
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Another way that BDS movement activists could potentially make their rhetorical
framing strategies more resonant with a wider liberal audience is by adding more personal
testimonies from Palestinians to elicit empathy and raise awareness about the discrimination and
hardships Palestinians face. Using personal narrative and testimony, including some emotional
appeal, is common practice in many other human rights campaigns (Brysk; Keck and Sikkink).
While I found a few examples of emotional personal testimonies in both official and vernacular
pro-BDS discourse, such examples were rare, and instead, much pro-BDS discourse seemed to
follow Barghouti’s reasoning that one way to avoid triggering fears of antisemitism in Jewish
audiences is to use mostly logos and less pathos to present the “most accurate, non-emotive
description of the facts as possible (Barghouti, “Two Degrees” 144). It would be possible,
however, to present real stories of Palestinian struggles and suffering without concurrently
demonizing Israelis in an antisemitic way. And if Jewish fears of antisemitism were
acknowledged more openly as well, such personal stories may help wider audiences connect and
empathize with Palestinians in a way dry “non-emotive” facts about international law may not.
Because the “right of return” is the most controversial aspect of the BDS call and the part
that leads many BDS critics and supporters of Israel to believe that BDS is antisemitic and seeks
to “destroy” Israel, it may also be helpful for pro-BDS activists to include more detailed
explanations about the basis for this right, historical precedent, and various possible practical
plans for carrying it out. My analysis demonstrated the prevalence of the right of return frame in
much pro-BDS discourse, including in the 2005 BDS Call itself, and this “right” was framed as
being based in international law and originating in response to Israel’s ethnic cleansing of
Palestinians during the Nakba. The official and vernacular pro-BDS texts I analyzed, however,
did not include significant discussion of how Palestinians or the BDS movement envision return
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in a practical sense. This lack of explanation allows critics of BDS to claim—without a clear and
consistent response from the BDS movement—that the right of return seeks to overwhelm and
“destroy” Israel through the return of seven million Palestinian refugees to Israel all at once.
In a few recent public speaking engagements, Barghouti has addressed the right of return
more clearly, explaining to an audience at the non-Zionist Tzedek Chicago synagogue that
international law gives all refugees everywhere the same right to return and reparations as
Palestinians also have (“BDS and Liberation”). During this talk32, he explains that the BDS
movement does not outline the parameters of a just return because it is “beyond our mandate,”
and he further explains that the UN developed parameters for return in former Yugoslavia that
would not cause harm to people, emphasizing that any enactment of the Palestinian right of
return should try to avoid harm to anyone, thus inferring that the right of return should not cause
undue harm to those Israeli Jews currently living in Israel (“BDS and Liberation”). Though
Barghouti addresses some aspects of how the BDS movement envisions the right of return, more
in-depth explanations may help skeptical audiences better understand the Palestinian perspective.
One example of research on the right of return that could be useful for pro-BDS activists but
which I did not encounter during my analysis of pro-BDS texts is the work of Palestinian
scholar, Salman Abu Sitta. In his careful research of Israeli maps, Abu Sitta identifies patterns of
population density and concludes that many sites of emptied or destroyed Palestinian villages
inside of Israel remain unoccupied and the majority of land unused, thus suggesting there is
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In April of 2019, Omar Barghouti was scheduled to go on a speaking tour of several universities and
organizations in the United States and also attend his daughter’s wedding, but the US government denied his entry
as he was about to board a plane at Ben Gurion airport. Even though he held a valid visa, US officials informed him
that his visa had been revoked for a vague immigration matter. Barghouti had previously traveled to the US on
multiple occasions, so it is unclear why his visa was revoked this time, and a US State Department spokesperson
denied that revoking his visa was based on his political views, but no further explanation was offered. Barghouti
participated in the speaking tour anyway via videoconferencing, but he missed his daughter’s wedding (“Denied
Entry”; Kilani; Specia).
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significant space within Israel to accommodate returning Palestinian refugees if there were
political will to do so. Ibish and Abunimah also published research on the basis in international
law for the right of return and various plans for return used in other conflicts that could be
applied to the case of Palestine/Israel and which could also serve as a useful resource for proBDS activists.
Examining pro-BDS framing regarding the right of return is also useful because the BDS
movement emphasis on this right, despite the controversy it generates among supporters of
Israel, reveals Palestinians’ own priorities. This is important because if future peace negotiations
and reconciliation are ever to succeed, Palestinians’ actual priorities and grievances must be
addressed realistically and in a way that is perceived as just and fair by most stakeholders. For
example, in 2000, the Second Intifada broke out not long after failed peace negotiations between
Ehud Barak and Yassar Arafat, and it has been widely reported that the right of return was a
major sticking point between the two and a right which Arafat was not willing to relinquish to
Israel’s satisfaction because a majority of Palestinians believe that the refugees have a right to
return as stipulated in UN Resolution 194 (Ibish and Abunimah; Malley; Thrall, The Only
Language 64-66, 182). Israel and its supporters may not be happy with the Palestinians’ focus on
the right of return because they fear that it will erode the Jewish demographic majority in Israel,
but any peace agreement will need to account for the attitudes of the majority of the Palestinian
people rather than just a handful of unelected leaders. The 2018 and 2019 Great Marches of
Return in Gaza also reveal the Palestinians’ strong belief in their right to return. Even if many
Palestinians would be willing to make some compromises on the right of return and how it is
implemented, Israelis and their US supporters must realize that Palestinians expect more than a
small token regarding the right of return. The fact that a large percentage of the Palestinian
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people still live in exile, many remaining in refugee camps in Gaza and elsewhere—and the fact
that they have never received compensation or even an admission of culpability from Israel—is a
significant factor that contributes to ongoing conflict and the lack of a comprehensive peace
accord. Thus, another way this rhetorical frame analysis of pro-BDS discourse is useful is by
revealing that pro-BDS framing that aligns with Palestinians’ values, beliefs, worldview, and
priorities regarding their rights, which have often been previously overlooked and denied. This
denial of Palestinian rights continues to be a major underlying cause of ongoing oppression and
conflict, and future peace negotiators must take the right of return seriously or a just and
sustainable peace will likely remain elusive.
What Next for BDS?
Despite the fact that rhetorical obstacles to pro-BDS discourse still sometimes function to
undermine the wider acceptance of pro-BDS framing strategies, especially the doxa that BDS is
antisemitic and persistent Islamophobic and anti-Palestinian attitudes, both anecdotal and
empirical evidence found in my research suggests that the BDS movement and pro-BDS framing
are gaining wider support even as pro-Israel advocates and the Israeli government are spending
increasing amounts of time, money, and effort at combatting BDS. It even seems that the more
pro-Israel advocates fight against BDS, the more their efforts only backfire and bring more
attention to BDS movement framing. The BDS movement and use of BDS tactics continue to
grow on college campuses and among transnational networks of social and racial justice activists
in the US and around the world despite anti-BDS blacklists like the websites of Canary Mission
and the AMCHA Initiative, pressure on college administrators to not hire or promote academic
advocates for BDS and Palestinian rights, and both successful and unsuccessful attempts to crack
down on BDS activism and push for anti-BDS legislation in the US. Because of the popularity of
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intersectionality and joint struggle on the left, the growth of other social and racial justice
movements may also continue to spur the growth of the BDS movement.
Just as several other recent social movements have sprung up suddenly and succeeded in
changing the discourse and sometimes gaining subsequent tangible victories or policy changes,
including Black Lives Matter, #MeToo, and others, the BDS movement could also experience an
unpredictable burst of growth and success in the near future. The Gaza Great Return Marches in
2018 seemed to signal a change in media coverage and discourse around Palestine/Israel as
thousands of unarmed Palestinian protestors were shot by Israeli snipers as they protested for
their right to return and an end to the inhumane siege of Gaza. During these events, Palestinian
grassroots activists also succeeded in raising awareness about the humanitarian crisis in Gaza,
which led dozens of liberal Democratic members of Congress to call on the Trump
administration and Israel to address this issue (Abunimah, “70 Members”). During the Great
Return March in 2018, Senator Bernie Sanders also released a video featuring Palestinians in
Gaza describing the everyday hardships they face, which can be seen as one of the most proPalestinian messages ever publicly espoused by a sitting US senator, which also garnered
hundreds of thousands of views on Twitter (Beinart, “Bernie Sanders”; @SenatorSanders;
Senator Bernie Sanders). Sanders’ first campaign video of the 2020 US presidential primary also
featured one of his surrogates, antiracist activist Shaun King, praising Sanders for denouncing
the “apartheid-like” conditions faced by Palestinians (“Bernie Sanders Posts”). Even though
Sanders does not support BDS and has defended Israel’s actions at times, these examples of
Israel criticism and calls to acknowledge Palestinian rights—combined with recent public
opinion polls in the US—demonstrate decreasing support for Israel and growing support for
Palestinians, especially among Democrats, liberals, and younger Americans (Telhami,
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“Americans Are,” “American Attitudes”; Nathan-Kazis, “Report”; “Republicans and
Democrats”; Tibon). The close alliance between the Trump administration and the right-wing
Netanyahu government in Israel may only exacerbate this divide and further erode the historical
“bipartisan consensus” that has previously dominated US foreign policy toward Israel.
And finally, the growth and ultimate future success of the BDS movement and its
framing strategies may end up happening less as a result of pro-BDS rhetorical moves and more
from the increasingly anti-democratic and repressive actions of Israel and its advocates. Many
recent policies and laws in both Israel and the US, some seeking to counter the influence of BDS,
seem to have backfired and done more to cause a backlash against Israel. For example, the recent
so-called Israeli “Nation-State Bill” passed by the Knesset in July of 2018 has led many
supporters of Israel, including both liberal and centrist Zionists, to decry the erosion of Israeli
democracy and the shift toward official apartheid (Green, Emma “Israel’s Nation-State Law”).
Even staunch Israel supporter and advocate Alan Dershowitz bemoaned this new bill and argued
that it would only make it harder to defend Israel’s actions and policies and hurt relations with
US Jews (“Exclusive”). In another surprising development, well-known liberal Zionist Israel
advocate and dual Israeli-US citizen, Natalie Portman, adopted a BDS tactic, despite her
criticisms of the BDS movement, and refused to come to Israel to accept the Genesis Prize in
protest over the Netanyahu government’s repression of Palestinian demonstrators during the
2018 Gaza Great Return March (“Genesis Prize”). The apartheid analogy and frame also started
appearing more prominently in the public sphere after the January 2020 release of the Trump
administration’s Peace to Prosperity plan that proposes the annexation and division of
significant parts of the West Bank, which has led to several prominent Israelis, Israeli human
rights organizations, and other critics condemning the plan and comparing it to South African
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apartheid and bantustans (“B’Tselem”; Levy; Sokatch; Thrall, “Trump’s Middle East”;
“Trump’s Peace Sham”; Peace to Prosperity).
While some minor adjustments to pro-BDS rhetorical framing strategies could perhaps
help overcome rhetorical obstacles that limit the resonance of pro-BDS framing for certain
audiences, such as affective uptake memories triggered by fears of antisemitism, pro-BDS
framing strategies may gain more widespread resonance even without changing anything. If
intersectional social and racial justice movements continue to gain adherents, if younger
Americans’ and Jews’ support for Israel and Zionism erodes further, and if Israel persists in
pursuing increasingly anti-democratic policies (including the possible official annexation of the
West Bank suggested by Trump’s 2020 Peace to Prosperity plan), then prior evidence suggests
that support for the BDS movement could grow as more people are turned off by Israel’s
increasingly anti-democratic behavior and harsh repression of Palestinians.
Applications for this Research
Hopefully, this research has shown not only how rhetorical frame analysis can be a
productive methodology for studying pro-BDS discourse in particular but also how it can be used
for examining the rhetorical moves and framing strategies of other social movements and their
rhetorical artifacts. Combining rhetorical analysis with elements of sociological frame analysis
can offer deeper insights into social movement rhetors’ worldviews and ideologies, revealing
how they frame problems and solutions, promote identification and division, respond to
rhetorical challenges and constraints, and how their framing strategies may or may not be
resonant for different audiences and within shifting rhetorical ecologies. Rhetorical frame
analysis can also be especially useful in the context of controversial issues and debates like
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Palestine/Israel in which strong emotions combine with affective reactions and uptake memories
to create unique rhetorical obstacles and challenges for social movement rhetors to overcome.
While rhetorical frame analysis is useful for studying pro-BDS discourse, it would also
be productive for analyzing a variety of texts and discourses. For example, rhetorical frame
analysis could also examine pro-Israel framing strategies and mass media frames about
Palestine/Israel and BDS. Gamson, Wolfsfeld, and other scholars have studied mass media
framing of the Palestine/Israel issue, and these studies have revealed not only common media
frames but also have shown, in the case of Gamson et al., how media framing of Palestine/Israel
has changed over time and to what degree average Americans have adopted these frames for
understanding the situation at a given time. While many scholars that use frame analysis focus on
textual analysis, some, including Gamson et al., use focus groups to gather data about the frames
used by average people. Focus group studies or carefully crafted surveys of Americans’ attitudes
and preferred frames regarding the BDS movement and Palestine/Israel at different times could
offer unique insights into how public opinion and pro-BDS frame resonance may be changing
over time.
Rhetorical frame analysis could also be useful for analyzing the discourse of other past or
present social movements. For example, the rhetorical frame analysis heuristic I developed here
could also be productively applied to the discourses of Black Lives Matter, #MeToo,
immigrants’ rights movements, and other social movements, especially those that generate
controversy, intense debates, and frequent misunderstandings and discursive backlash. Analyzing
how social movements respond to some of this backlash through counterframing would be
another application. For example, the frequent charges of antisemitism against BDS and the BDS
movement’s attempts to counter these may have some parallels to the way the women’s rights
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movement and feminism generally have often been construed as “anti-men” or how racial justice
movements, including Black Lives Matter have been seen as inherently “anti-white” or “antipolice.” And while it is useful to combine analysis of both official and vernacular social
movement discourse to get a more holistic picture of a social movement’s discourse, scholars
could study these separately as well. Other techniques for analysis could also be added to this
coding heuristic to highlight various aspects of the discourse, depending on the purpose of the
analysis, including critical discourse analysis, or other elements of linguistic discourse analysis
or rhetorical criticism.
In addition to some useful applications for my research, as with all limited studies, there
are also a few shortcomings, including the limits of my corpora and the rhetors I chose to study
and the lack of an in-depth comparison with mass media or pro-Israel framing. Even though this
study analyzed the rhetorical moves and framing strategies of large corpora of both official and
vernacular pro-BDS texts, any such study is inherently limited by the text selection. For
example, because I chose to only collect texts from pro-BDS student groups at Washington D.C.area universities during IAW events in 2017, I am unable to make broad generalizations about
the rhetorical framing strategies of other pro-BDS students groups in other countries or regions
of the US, which may be significantly different from those I studied. While I examined over 200
statements by the BNC and several of Barghouti’s texts, there remain many pro-BDS texts left
out of my analysis, which is a limitation of any rhetorical study. Were a rhetorical scholar to
compare framing strategies from early in the development of a social movement to that of later
years, it would be a valuable way to determine and evaluate how social movement framing
strategies change over time in response to shifting rhetorical ecologies. If larger corpora of BDS-
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related texts were sponsored or housed by an institutional archive, then it could offer researchers
a more accessible point of access for future research of BDS-related discourse.
Ultimately, pro-BDS activist rhetors—both movement leaders and more rank-and-file
activists—do not have control over Israel’s actions or international and US support for Israel.
The best that pro-BDS activists rhetors can hope for is to raise awareness of the Palestinian
plight to hopefully shift the discourse toward acknowledging Palestinian suffering and the need
to hold Israel accountable, especially among people in a position to enact changes in policy
toward Israel. Pro-BDS rhetorical framing strategies already seem to be moving the needle
toward support for Palestinians on many college campuses and among many social and racial
justice advocates, but Palestinian and pro-BDS activist-rhetors also continue to face a strong
backlash from Israel and its supporters, especially in the US. If the current trends of increasing
support for Palestinians and criticism of Israel continue, as revealed by recent opinion polls, then
younger and more liberal Americans who emphasize intersectionality could help push pro-BDS
framing and support for Palestinian rights more into the mainstream discourse. This trend could,
in turn, eventually lead to a tipping point that could have more practical effects in the realm of
US and international policy toward Israel, and significant changes in policy could finally lead to
a “South Africa moment” regarding Palestine/Israel. Whether and when this shift occurs will
depend not only on the success or failure of pro-Israel efforts to counter BDS movement
messaging and the effectiveness and resonance of the rhetorical framing strategies of pro-BDS
activist-rhetors, but the future resonance and potential effects of pro-BDS discourse will also
hinge on how events play out on the ground.
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APPENDIX
CORPORA FOR ANALYSIS

I have listed all of the sources I analyzed as part of my corpora of official and vernacular proBDS texts below. Mirroring the order I discuss my analysis of data in chapters 4 and 5, I list
citations for BNC statements first, followed by Omar Barghouti’s texts, and then citations for
vernacular student texts analyzed at the end.
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spring and summer of 2017.
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---. “Join the Second Global BDS Day of Action 30 March 2010.” BDS Movement, 15 March 2010,
www.bdsmovement.net/news/join-second-global-bds-day-action-30-march-2010.
---. “BNC Welcomes Landmark EU Court Ruling, Calls for Intensifying Grassroots BDS.” BDS Movement, 25
March 2010, www.bdsmovement.net/news/bnc-welcomes-landmark-eu-court-ruling-calls-intensifyinggrassroots-bds.
---. “BNC Statement in Support of Israeli Apartheid Week.” BDS Movement, 27 Feb. 2010,
www.bdsmovement.net/news/bnc-statement-support-israeli-apartheid-week.
---. “BNC Responds to French Prime Minister: BDS Promotes Justice and Universal Rights.” BDS Movement, 25
Feb. 2010, www.bdsmovement.net/news/bnc-responds-french-prime-minister-bds-promotes-justice-anduniversal-rights-0.
---. “A Call from Gaza.” BDS Movement, 20 Dec. 2009, www.bdsmovement.net/news/call-gaza-0.
---. “BNC Welcomes the Kairos Palestine Document of Leading Christian Palestinians.” BDS Movement, 14 Dec.
2009, www.bdsmovement.net/news/bnc-welcomes-kairos-palestine-document-leading-christianpalestinians.
---. “Palestinian Trade Union Movement Unanimously Confirms Support for BDS.” BDS Movement, 25 Nov. 2009,
www.bdsmovement.net/news/palestinian-trade-union-movement-unanimously-confirms-support-bds-0.
---. “Jerusalem Light Railway: Effects & Legal Implications.” BDS Movement, 19 Nov. 2009,
www.bdsmovement.net/news/jerusalem-light-railway-effects-legal-implications-0.
---. “Palestinian Civil Society Calls on Arab States to Boycott Veolia and Alstom.” BDS Movement, 14 Nov. 2009,
www.bdsmovement.net/news/palestinian-civil-society-calls-arab-states-boycott-veolia-and-alstom.
---. “Cancel the participation of Ariel University’s Center of Samaria in the Solar Decathlon Madrid 2010.” BDS
Movement, 14 Sept. 2009, www.bdsmovement.net/news/cancel-participation-arieluniversity%E2%80%99s-center-samaria-solar-decathlon-madrid-2010.
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---. “Appeal to Catalonian Civil Society and Institutions: Do not Invite Israeli Cultural Ambassadors to the
Catalonian Diada!” BDS Movement, 7 Sept. 2009, www.bdsmovement.net/news/appeal-catalonian-civilsociety-and-institutions-do-not-invite-israeli-cultural-ambassadors.
---. “The Palestinian National Committee for the BDS Campaign Sends an Open Letter to Rafael Correa, President
of Ecuador.” BDS Movement, 28 Aug. 2009, www.bdsmovement.net/news/palestinian-national-committeebds-campaign-sends-open-letter-rafael-correa-president-ecuador.
---. “Palestinian Civil Society Calls on Democratic South Africa to End Complicity with Israeli Apartheid.” BDS
Movement, 11 June 2009, www.bdsmovement.net/news/palestinian-civil-society-calls-democratic-southafrica-end-complicity-israeli-apartheid-0.
---. “Stop Rio de Janeiro from Promoting Israel's War Industry.” BDS Movement, 31 March 2009,
www.bdsmovement.net/news/stop-rio-de-janeiro-promoting-israels-war-industry.
---. “BNC Statement on Land Day – Boycott Israel! Make it Account for its Crimes in Gaza!” BDS Movement, 27
March 2009, www.bdsmovement.net/news/bnc-statement-land-day-%E2%80%93-boycott-israel-make-itaccount-its-crimes-gaza.
---. “BNC Launches "Israel Review Conference" Website.” BDS Movement, 17 March 2009,
www.bdsmovement.net/news/bnc-launches-israel-review-conference-website-0.
---. “The BNC Salutes South African Dock Workers Action!” BDS Movement, 3 Feb. 2009,
www.bdsmovement.net/news/bnc-salutes-south-african-dock-workers-action.
---. ‘“Stop the Massacre in Gaza – Boycott Israel Now!’” BDS Movement, 10 Jan. 2009,
www.bdsmovement.net/news/stop-massacre-gaza-%E2%80%93-boycott-israel-now-1.
---. “L’Oreal: Makeup for Israeli Apartheid!” BDS Movement, 23 Dec. 2008,
www.bdsmovement.net/news/l%E2%80%99oreal-makeup-israeli-apartheid-0.
---. “United Against Apartheid, Colonialism and Occupation: Dignity & Justice for the Palestinian People.” BDS
Movement, 28 Nov. 2008, www.bdsmovement.net/news/united-against-apartheid-colonialism-andoccupation-dignity-justice-palestinian-people-2.
---. “PACBI / Palestinian BDS National Campaign (BNC) Letter to Balliol College re: Peres Lecture.” BDS
Movement, 17 Nov. 2008, www.bdsmovement.net/news/pacbi-palestinian-bds-national-campaign-bncletter-balliol-college-re-peres-lecture-0.
---. “Don't give the stage to Israeli Apartheid! Boycott the Jerusalem Symphony Orchestra!” BDS Movement, 28
Oct. 2008, www.bdsmovement.net/news/dont-give-stage-israeli-apartheid-boycott-jerusalem-symphonyorchestra.
---. “Open Letter to the Norwegian Government and Civil Society: Stop the Norwegian-Israeli Business and
Research Seminar!” BDS Movement, 20 Oct. 2008, www.bdsmovement.net/news/open-letter-norwegiangovernment-and-civil-society-stop-norwegian-israeli-business-and-research.
---. “BNC to Telkom South Africa: ‘Don’t Enter into a Deal with AMDOCS.’” BDS Movement, 12 Sept. 2008,
www.bdsmovement.net/news/bnc-telkom-south-africa-don%C2%B4t-enter-deal-amdocs-0.
---. “Support Striking Namibian Workers at Lev Leviev Diamonds! Protest Firing Threats, Abusive Managers.” BDS
Movement, 14 July 2008, www.bdsmovement.net/news/support-striking-namibian-workers-lev-levievdiamonds-protest-firing-threats-abusive-managers-0.
---. “‘No New EU-Israel Action Plan in April 2009!’” BDS Movement, 9 July 2008,
www.bdsmovement.net/news/%E2%80%9Cno-new-eu-israel-action-plan-april-2009%E2%80%9D-1.
---. “BNC Letter of Support to Lord Dafydd Elis-Thomas for Boycotting Meeting with Israeli Ambassador.” BDS
Movement, 14 June 2008, www.bdsmovement.net/news/bnc-letter-support-lord-dafydd-elis-thomasboycotting-meeting-israeli-ambassador.
---. “Support L’Association pour une Solidarité Syndicale Étudiante (ASSÉ) Decision to Join the BDS Movement.”
BDS Movement, 3 June 2008, www.bdsmovement.net/news/support-l%E2%80%99association-pour-unesolidarit%C3%A9-syndicale-%C3%A9tudiante-ass%C3%A9-decision-join-bds-movement-0.
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---. “The Palestinian BDS National Committee Salutes the Canadian Union of Postal Workers on their Historic
Boycott Resolution.” BDS Movement, 2 May 2008, www.bdsmovement.net/news/palestinian-bds-nationalcommittee-salutes-canadian-union-postal-workers-their-historic-0.
---. “Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS.” BDS Movement, 9 July 2005, www.bdsmovement.net/call.

Omar Barghouti Texts:
I include all of the Omar Barghouti texts I analyzed as part of my corpora here. Any texts I
mention inside of my chapters are also cited in my regular Works Cited, including a couple of
more recent Barghouti texts that were not part of my corpora.
Barghouti, Omar. “A B.D.S. Founder, on Israel’s Anti-Boycott Law.” The New York Times, 16 Mar. 2017,
www.nytimes.com/2017/03/16/opinion/a-bds-founder-on-israels-anti-boycott-law.html.
---. “The BDS Movement Explained.” New York Daily News, 25 Feb. 2013, www.nydailynews.com/boycott-israelarticle-1.1271226.
---. Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions: The Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights. Haymarket, 2011.
---. “Israeli Extremism Will Encourage Global Boycott (Room for Debate).” The New York Times, 11 May 2015,
www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/05/08/can-the-us-make-peace-with-netanyahus-newgovernment/israeli-extremism-will-encourage-global-boycott.
---. “Israel’s Descent into Unmasked, Right Wing Extremism: A New Generation Rises to Fight Occupation.” Salon,
22 Oct. 2015,
www.salon.com/2015/10/22/israels_descent_into_unmasked_right_wing_extremism_a_new_generation_ri
ses_to_fight_occupation_settler_colonialism_apartheid/.
---. “For Palestinians, the 1967 War Remains an Enduring, Painful Wound.” The Nation, June 2017. The Nation,
www.thenation.com/article/this-palestinian-refugee-fled-from-ramallah-in-1967-he-still-bears-the-scar/.
---. “Putting Palestine Back on the Map: Boycott as Civil Resistance.” Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 35, no. 3,
2006, pp. 51–57. JSTOR.
---. “Why Israel Fears the Boycott.” The New York Times, 31 Jan. 2014,
www.nytimes.com/2014/02/01/opinion/sunday/why-the-boycott-movement-scares-israel.html.
Barghouti, Omar, and Glenn Greenwald. “Interview With BDS Co-Founder Omar Barghouti: Banned by Israel
From Traveling, Threatened With Worse.” The Intercept, 13 May 2016,
www.theintercept.com/2016/05/13/interview-with-bds-advocate-omar-barghouti-banned-by-israel-fromtraveling-threatened-with-worse/.
Barghouti, Omar, and Rami Younis. “Interview: The Man behind the BDS Movement.” +972 Magazine, 14 June
2015, www.972mag.com/interview-the-man-behind-the-bds-movement/107771/.

VERNACULAR BDS TEXTS:
For these student-created or chosen texts, I include citations for a variety of text formats that I
gathered during the 2017 Israeli Apartheid Week (IAW) events at four Washington D.C.-area
universities (i.e., panels, brochures, posters, events, Facebook posts, linked external articles,
etc.). I have grouped them by university and then alphabetically within each section.
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American University Students for Justice in Palestine (AU SJP):
Durham, Jaquial. “Revisiting Black Substantive Solidarity with the People of Palestine.” Club Relaford, 27 March
2017, www.clubrelaford.tumblr.com/RR%20. Accessed June 2017.
Lahood, Maria and Yousef Munayyer. “Palestine Advocacy Under Trump." AU SJP, 6 April 2017, American
University, Washington D.C. Panel Discussion.
AU SJP. Events: "3000 Nights Film Screening." Facebook, 5 April 2017, URL no longer available. Originally
Accessed June 2017.
---. Events: “The BDS Movement: Contexts, Developments, and Future Visions.” Facebook, 28 March 2017, URL
no longer available. Originally Accessed June 2017.
---. Events: “Palestine Advocacy Under Trump.” Facebook, 6 April 2017, URL no longer available. Originally
Accessed June 2017.
---. “Revisiting Black-Palestinian Solidarity (External link).” Facebook, 27 March 2017, URL no longer available.
Originally Accessed June 2017.
---. "Taylor Dumpson for Student Body President." Facebook, 28 March 2017, URL no longer available. Originally
Accessed June 2017.

George Mason University Students Against Israeli Apartheid (SAIA):
Abdulhadi, Rabab et al. “Confronting Apartheid Has Everything to Do With Feminism.” Mondoweiss, 21 March
2017, www.mondoweiss.net/2017/03/confronting-apartheideverything/?fbclid=IwAR3yJCerKvbFuJVT_zdAKZq1mzYlk5t8LXb9HwjC3Vmoz2tcpfXZnk1siSY.
"Gaza in Context." Co-Directed by Noura Erakat and Dia’ Azzeh. Quilting Point Productions, 2016.
www.gazaincontext.com/film.html.
GMU SAIA. “Confronting Apartheid Has Everything to Do With Feminism.” Facebook, 24 March 2017,
www.facebook.com/GMUSAIA/posts/1273466909407509. Accessed June 2017.
---. Events: “Five Broken Cameras Screening.” Facebook, 27 March 2017,
www.facebook.com/events/600953860099969/. Accessed June 2017.
---. Events: "Gaza In Context Discussion.” Facebook, 29 March 2017,
www.facebook.com/events/768528749961366/. Accessed June 2017.
---. Events: “IAW Series: Solidarity.” Facebook, 30 March 2017, www.facebook.com/events/396093874093092/.
Accessed June 2017.
---. “First Meeting of GMU Muslim-Jewish Alliance.” Facebook, 30 March 2017,
https://www.facebook.com/GMUSAIA/posts/1281426661944867. Accessed June 2017.
---. “Free Kifah Quzmar.” Facebook, 30 March 2017, www.facebook.com/GMUSAIA/posts/1281526528601547.
Accessed June 2017.
---. “Gaza in Context Discussion.” 29 March 2017, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA. Documentary and
Discussion.
---. “I Acknowledge Apartheid Exists.” Facebook, 4 April 2017,
www.facebook.com/GMUSAIA/posts/1287055684715298. Accessed June 2017.
---. IAW Visual Display of Paintings and Fliers. Israeli Apartheid Week. 29 March 2017, George Mason University,
Fairfax, VA.
---. “#JewishResistance Goes to AIPAC.” Facebook, 27 March 2017,
www.facebook.com/GMUSAIA/posts/1278016575619209. Accessed June 2017.
---. “Jewish Voice for Peace Video of Anti-AIPAC Protests.” Facebook, 29 March 2017,
www.facebook.com/GMUSAIA/posts/1280684282019105. Accessed June 2017.
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---. “Israeli Police Officer Beats Palestinian Man - AJ+ Video.” Facebook, 24 March 2017,
www.facebook.com/GMUSAIA/posts/1274436872643846. Accessed June 2017.
---. “Solidarity.” 30 March 2017. George Mason University, Fairfax, VA. Discussion.
---. “Sudanese Identity. . . African or Arab?” Facebook, 6 April 2017,
www.facebook.com/GMUSAIA/posts/1289667864454080:0. Accessed June 2017.

George Washington University Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP GWU):
Bellware, Kim. “Protesters Take On Settlements In ‘Biggest Ever Jewish-Led Protest’ Of AIPAC.” Huffington Post,
27 March 2017, www.huffpost.com/entry/protesters-take-on-israeli-settlements-in-biggest-ever-jewish-ledprotest-ofaipac_n_58d80212e4b03692bea6d5ea?fbclid=IwAR39ywvWbsYrieinnhBBkSCN0kZhTjlTjdLld3CutNKc
ao_J_sAVhPB_JOM
Davis, Angela. "Freedom is a Constant Struggle: Why Movements for Social Justice Should Support Palestine.”
Palestine Awareness Week at GWU, 27 March 2017, Marvin Center Grand Ballroom, George Washington
University, Washington D.C., Keynote Address.
Roaten, Meredith. “Students Call for Divestment from Companies that Support Palestinian Occupation.” The GW
Hatchet, 6 April 2017, www.gwhatchet.com/2017/04/06/students-call-for-divestment-from-companiesthat-support-palestinianoccupation/?utm_content=buffer203ab&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=b
uffer&fbclid=IwAR3Nqx8jW8kh9Gto0AEDEmcHt0rZkCfZyd3j5y1dv0To1l4gCzYEQ9Pd934. Accessed
June 2017.
SJP at GWU. Chemical Attack in Syria. Facebook, 5 April 2017,
www.facebook.com/SJPatGWU/posts/1318196781602737. Accessed June 2017.
---. “Die-In.” Protest Action. Palestine Awareness Week, March 2017, Kogan Plaza, George Washington University,
Washington D.C.
---. "Divest This Time.” Divestment Campaign Poster. Palestine Awareness Week, March 2017, George Washington
University, Washington D.C.
---. "#DivestThisTimeGW (Video)." Facebook, 29 March 2017,
www.facebook.com/divestthistimeatgw/videos/387179585001899/. Accessed June 2017
---. Events: “Divest This Time (Die-in in Kogan Plaza).” (Post later deleted). Facebook, 29 March 2017,
www.facebook.com/divestthistimeatgw/posts/387372174982640. Accessed June 2017.
---. Events: GWU SJP Palestine Awareness Week Keynote - Angela Davis. Facebook, 27 March 2017,
www.facebook.com/events/1279387188808913/. Accessed June 2017.
---. Events: “Why Divest?” Facebook, 28 March 2017, www.facebook.com/aljazeera/videos/10155360688678690/.
Accessed June 2017.
---. Events: "Women in Liberation Struggles.” Facebook, 6 April 2017,
www.facebook.com/events/677171155803237/. Accessed June 2017.
---. Events: “Support Palestine in DC! - GWU.” Facebook, 26 March 2017.
www.facebook.com/events/396409867381255/. Accessed June 2017.
---. “Gaza’s First Baseball Team - AJ+ Video.” Facebook, 22 March 22 2017,
www.facebook.com/ajplusenglish/videos/924970727644435/. Accessed June 2017.
---. “Jewish Americans Taking a Stand Against AIPAC - Al Jazeera English Video.” Facebook, 27 March 2017,
www.facebook.com/aljazeera/videos/10155360688678690/. Accessed June 2017.
---. “Land Day.” Facebook, 30 March 2017, www.facebook.com/SJPatGWU/posts/1311922895563459. Accessed
June 2017.
---. “Palestinian Child Forcefully Taken by Israeli Forces - AJ+ Video.” Facebook, 26 March 2017,
www.facebook.com/watch/?v=927860554022119. Accessed June 2017.
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---. “Protesters Take On Settlements In ‘Biggest Ever Jewish-Led Protest’ of AIPAC.” Facebook, 26 March 2017,
www.facebook.com/SJPatGWU/posts/1308505465905202. Accessed June 2017.
---. "Running for Palestine - AJ+ video.” Facebook, 5 April 2017,
www.facebook.com/ajplusenglish/videos/934600626681445/. Accessed June 2017.
---. “Students Call for Divestment.” Facebook, 6 April 2017,
www.facebook.com/SJPatGWU/posts/1319060521516363. Accessed June 2017.
---. "Why Divest?” Presentation and Q & A. Palestine Awareness Week, 28 March 2017, District B114, George
Washington University, Washington D.C.

Georgetown Students for Justice in Palestine (Georgetown SJP):
Abu-Irshaid, Osama. “The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine.” Georgetown Students for Justice in Palestine, 13 March
2017, Georgetown University, Washington D.C. Lecture and Discussion.
El-Husseini, Ahmad. “Viewpoint: A Boycott for Humanity.” The Hoya, 21 March 2017,
https://www.thehoya.com/viewpoint-a-boycott-forhumanity/?fbclid=IwAR0KHPXCXYoOIzOp1TY9p1L2DmJY5gaU0y6CbQ2ci6cULLQ3F6_mE87TDGg.
Elia, Nada. “No Room for Zionism in Any Movement for Justice.” Mondoweiss, 20 March 2017,
https://mondoweiss.net/2017/03/zionism-movementjustice/?fbclid=IwAR2n5bvAxCjZNd6Z8vEhhjPlEBwYqLbynz8kONGV2-7HKhTuqFK9V51w_XI.
Georgetown Students for Justice in Palestine. Announcement of IAW Events. Facebook, 11 March 2017,
www.facebook.com/GeorgetownSJP/posts/1261332720610231:0. Accessed May 2017.
---. Divest Now, Facebook, 17 March 2017, www.facebook.com/GeorgetownSJP/posts/1266269540116549.
Accessed May 2017.
---. Event: “The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine." Facebook, 13 March 2017,
www.facebook.com/events/1807340156256228/. Accessed May 2017.
---. Event: “Poetic Injustice with Remi Kanazi.” Facebook, 23 March 2017,
www.facebook.com/events/1873253312949937/. Accessed May 2017.
---. Event: "So You Wanna Go on Birthright?" Facebook, 14 March 2017,
www.facebook.com/events/359603797773093/. Accessed May 2017.
---. Image of Mock Apartheid Wall. Facebook, 14 March 2017,
www.facebook.com/GeorgetownSJP/posts/1263537103723126:0. Accessed May 2017.
---. Mondoweiss: “No Room for Zionism.” Facebook, 20 March 2017. https://mondoweiss.net/2017/03/zionismmovement-justice/?fbclid=IwAR2n5bvAxCjZNd6Z8vEhhjPlEBwYqLbynz8kONGV27HKhTuqFK9V51w_XI. Accessed May 2017.
---. Pinkwashing Image. Facebook, 14 March 2017,
www.facebook.com/GeorgetownSJP/posts/1264154490328054:0. Accessed May 2017.
---. Remembering Rachel Corrie (link to external page). Facebook, 16 March 2017,
www.palsolidarity.org/2017/03/honoring-rachel-corrie/?fbclid=IwAR00oeTtkJ2RPRHfZZNxnELu5aROtWU7kVJeYtnv2QW8VRGBKgFnyLgJX4. Accessed May 2017.
---. Viewpoint: “A Boycott for Humanity.” Facebook, 21 March 2017, https://www.thehoya.com/viewpoint-aboycott-forhumanity/?fbclid=IwAR0KHPXCXYoOIzOp1TY9p1L2DmJY5gaU0y6CbQ2ci6cULLQ3F6_mE87TDGg.
Accessed May 2017.
“Honoring Rachel Corrie.” International Solidarity Movement, 16 March 2017,
www.palsolidarity.org/2017/03/honoring-rachel-corrie/?fbclid=IwAR00oeTtkJ2RPRHfZZNxnELu5aROtWU7kVJeYtnv2QW8VRGBKgFnyLgJX4.
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“Mock Apartheid Wall.” Georgetown Students for Justice in Palestine, 13-17 March 2017, Georgetown University,
Washington D.C. Installation.
"So You Want to Go on a Birthright Trip?" Georgetown Students for Justice in Palestine, 15 March 2017,
Georgetown University, Washington D.C. Panel Discussion.
“Visualizing Palestine.” Visualizing Palestine, www.visualizingpalestine.org/#visuals. Accessed 21 Mar. 2020.
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